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This dissertation is an examination of human moral precariousness in Kant's ethics. Human beings are in
a state of moral precariousness insofar as they are ever-capable of transgressing the moral law and are
often uncertain of the moral worth of their actions. Put another way, in this dissertation I argue that the
basic relationship between human beings and the moral law, in Kant's moral philosophy, is, most
fundamentally, one of tenuousness and vacillation. This relation is the fundamental characteristic of the
human moral condition because such a relation is built into Kant's account of human moral agency. We
have a tenuous relation to the moral law because we always have at least the possibility of conflict
between our desire for happiness (i.e. the satisfaction of our inclinations) and the requirements of the
moral law. We also may have a vacillating relation to the moral law insofar as we usually find ourselves
acting in accordance with the moral law (that is, we often find ourselves committing lawful actions), while
also (for many, if not all, human beings) finding ourselves occasionally deviating from the requirements of
the moral law (this is a consequence of Kant's doctrine of radical evil). In my dissertation, I argue that this
moral precariousness manifests itself as a set of ongoing, perpetual moral crises. That is, there are
several crucial points in Kant's moral thinking that provide the occasion for a crisis. In each of these
crucial points, Kant's account of human beings as dual-natured (both natural and rational) generate a
struggle (or at least the representation of a struggle) that has a variety of moral consequences. This
dissertation approaches this moral precariousness through analyses of several key features of Kant's
moral philosophy: his concept of humanity, the dignity of human beings, the moral feeling of respect, and
experience of sublimity, and Kant's theory of radical evil. Through an examination of each of these topics,
I argue that Kant's account of the moral condition of human beings is one of perpetual open-endedness,
uncertainty about one's moral worth, and, above all, (at least) potential crisis.
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ABSTRACT
HUMAN BEINGS AND THE MORAL LAW: MORAL PRECARIOUSNESS IN
KANT’S ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
Bradley M. Taylor
Dr. Paul Guyer

This dissertation is an examination of human moral precariousness in Kant’s ethics.
Human beings are in a state of moral precariousness insofar as they are ever-capable of
transgressing the moral law and are often uncertain of the moral worth of their actions.
Put another way, in this dissertation I argue that the basic relationship between human
beings and the moral law, in Kant’s moral philosophy, is, most fundamentally, one of
tenuousness and vacillation. This relation is the fundamental characteristic of the human
moral condition because such a relation is built into Kant’s account of human moral
agency. We have a tenuous relation to the moral law because we always have at least the
possibility of conflict between our desire for happiness (i.e. the satisfaction of our
inclinations) and the requirements of the moral law. We also may have a vacillating
relation to the moral law insofar as we usually find ourselves acting in accordance with
the moral law (that is, we often find ourselves committing lawful actions), while also (for
many, if not all, human beings) finding ourselves occasionally deviating from the
requirements of the moral law (this is a consequence of Kant’s doctrine of radical evil).
In my dissertation, I argue that this moral precariousness manifests itself as a set of
ongoing, perpetual moral crises. That is, there are several crucial points in Kant’s moral
v

thinking that provide the occasion for a crisis. In each of these crucial points, Kant’s
account of human beings as dual-natured (both natural and rational) generate a struggle
(or at least the representation of a struggle) that has a variety of moral consequences. This
dissertation approaches this moral precariousness through analyses of several key
features of Kant’s moral philosophy: his concept of humanity, the dignity of human
beings, the moral feeling of respect, and experience of sublimity, and Kant’s theory of
radical evil. Through an examination of each of these topics, I argue that Kant’s account
of the moral condition of human beings is one of perpetual open-endedness, uncertainty
about one’s moral worth, and, above all, (at least) potential crisis.
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Preface
Human Beings and the Moral Law: Crises in Kant’s Moral Philosophy

One of the more striking aspects of Kant’s moral philosophy is the moral
precariousness of human beings.1 The moral law presents itself as an imperative, as an
imposition on us that may limit our striving for happiness. Oftentimes a person will
encounter moments where they must choose between the morally correct thing to do and
their self-interested happiness. While Kant does claim that we can cultivate certain moral
feelings that create greater and greater harmony between happiness and morality, there is
nevertheless always the possibility of a conflict between what our self-love would have
us do and what the moral law requires of us. Kant’s moral philosophy is committed to the
idea that a perfect harmony between our natural and rational beings is unlikely to ever
occur, and even if it does occur, is always subject to deterioration. For most human
beings, the clash between self-love and morality is a recurring issue; for the rare few who
have disciplined their inclinations to be broadly consistent with (and even conducive to)

1

Some recent scholarship on Kant’s moral thinking has focused on this precariousness,
emphasizing the extent to which human beings find themselves on the wrong side of morality.
While my approach to Kant’s moral thinking is hugely indebted to recent work on Kant’s theory
of evil, I take as my starting point the moral precariousness that human beings face, even when
acting in accordance with morality. That is, human beings neither as virtuous, nor as mired in
immoral behavior, but rather as uncertain (and vaguely pessimistic) about their moral worth. For
discussions of the pervasiveness of evil in Kant’s moral thinking, see “Kantian Moral Pessimism”
by Patrick Frierson and “Evil Everywhere: The Ordinariness of Kantian Radical Evil” by Robert
B. Louden both in Kant’s Anatomy of Evil, edited by Sharon Anderson-Gold and Pablo
Muchnik: Cambridge University Press, New York, NY (2010).
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morality must stay vigilant in their discipline, lest they experience anew the unhappy
clash between the two competing principles.
This dissertation takes this clash (whether it be actual and merely potential) as the
starting point for its investigation of several aspects of Kant’s moral philosophy. I argue
that the clash between self-love and morality is a crucial and recurring issue in Kant’s
thinking about morality and its relation to human beings. That is, human beings, for Kant,
have a fraught relation to the moral law, one that tends towards moral failure or (at least)
moral struggle. The inextricable precariousness of human beings’ moral situation is an
important part of the backdrop for Kant’s thinking about morality. Without a full
appreciation for the clash between self-love and morality, Kant’s moral philosophy may
seem overly formalistic and dry. Kant’s moral philosophy, though, does indeed take this
striking, potentially dramatic struggle between competing principles (self-love and
morality) as embedded into the very nature of moral choice itself, and into his account of
the moral psychology that flows from moral choice. The clash between self-love and
morality is a recurring and inescapable aspect of Kant’s moral thinking. This clash
manifests in Kant’s moral philosophy as various crises. By “crisis” I mean it in its two
ordinary senses: 1) a crisis is of a time of conflict and tension between competing
interests; crisis is resolved when one of the competing interests takes precedence and
affects the chain of events that follows the resolution; 2) a crisis is an experience of
heightened tension that accompanies a significant struggle whose outcome is not readily
known. A crisis in this sense is a psychological phenomenon as well as an objective one.

ix

In Kant’s moral philosophy, we see many instances of crises in both senses of the
word. The presence of these crises is an unsurprising consequence of certain key features
of Kant’s moral thinking. These crises appear largely on account of our (as human
beings) status as natural and rational beings. As we will see, these crises appear in Kant’s
thinking in crucial points of conflict between our dual natures. The appearance of these
crises, then, is not accidental, but rather is integral to Kant’s overall moral theory of how
human beings experience the moral law. In Kant’s moral philosophy, there are (on my
reading) three kinds of crisis that occur in the moral life (and moral theorizing) of human
beings. Each type of crisis is grounded in the ever-present potential (or actual) clash
between self-love and morality, but each figures into Kant’s moral thinking in a distinct
way, and each operates in different ways on how human beings are affected by their
knowledge of, and struggle with, the moral law. The crises in Kant’s moral philosophy I
describe as follows:
1. In the noumenal realm, there is a crisis that we must represent as taking place
between the principle of self-love and the moral law. That is, the formation of our
fundamental maxim involves a choice, according to which self-love is prioritized (by the
will) over morality or vice-versa.2 The kind of choice that the will makes determines the
2

In his book Kant on Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Lawrence Pasternack
refers to the formation of this fundamental maxim the Gesinnung choice. The choice of our
fundamental maxim, though, must occur in the phenomenal world, since maxims are embedded in
our volitional state (which is psychological). The Gesinnung choice must be determined by some
activity in the noumenal world, which is genuinely imputable to us. Therefore, if we think about
the noumenal choice, we can represent it as consisting of a struggle between self-love and
morality, but the actual struggle between those two principles occurs in the phenomenal world.
We can think of the noumenal choice as adopting either a positive or a negative stance toward
morality because the immediate consequence of the noumenal choice will be our Gesinnung
choice and because the more remote consequences of the noumenal choice are the more specific
x

morally relevant conduct of the moral agent in the phenomenal world. This crisis I call
the “crisis from transcendental idealism” because it follows from Kant’s rigid distinction
between the noumenal and the phenomenal realms. It is a crisis we cannot experience
directly, but which we must represent as a crisis between two competing volitional
principles.
2. From our perspective, in the phenomenal world, we have no access to the
workings of the noumenal choice. As a result, we can never experience directly the
exercise of our free choice in choosing our fundamental maxim. In our phenomenal
choices, we can recall, and even think about in real time, the processes by which we
render a decision. This is not the case for noumenal choices; we only can observe the
consequences of our choice. As a result of this epistemological inaccessibility and
uncertainty, we can never rest assured of our possession of a good will and therefore our
moral worth. Even when we are engaged in seemingly appropriate behavior, we might
simply be acting in accordance with morality, rather than out of pure respect for the
moral law. Furthermore, we know that it is always possible for us to commit an immoral
action, even if we have hitherto not done so. This means that we must represent the
noumenal choice as perpetually open-ended. Our inability to observe the noumenal
choice directly can result (especially perhaps in particularly morally earnest people) in an
uneasy sense of tension in which our relation to the moral law is unknowable and the
possibility for immoral actions is ever-present. I call this kind of crisis the “crisis from
transcendental epistemology.”
maxims we adopt in our day-to-day lives. Pasternack seems to treat the Gesinnung choice and the
noumenal choice as one and the same (pp. 115-117).
xi

3. Finally, there are the crises that emerge from empirical introspection. Kant, in
the Groundwork, states that our (psychological) motives are opaque to us. He writes early
on in Section II of the Groundwork: “[I]t is absolutely impossible by means of experience
to make out with complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action
otherwise in conformity with duty rested simply on moral grounds and on the
representation of one’s duty.”3 We cannot trust introspection to provide us with insight
into our motives in part because we tend to overestimate the moral worth of ourselves:
“…for we like to flatter ourselves by falsely attributing to ourselves a nobler motive,
whereas in fact we can never, even by the most strenuous self-examination, get entirely
behind our covert incentives, since, when moral worth is at issue, what counts is not
actions, which one sees, but those inner principles of actions that one does not see.”4 In
this passage, Kant seems to be making a slightly ambiguous statement when he discuses
the “inner principles of actions that one does not see.” Does he mean that we do not have
access to our the full depth of our psychological state when we act, or does he mean by
that phrase the noumenal choice, which, of course, we do not see? While this particular
phrase might be ambiguous, I would argue that if it is, then that is only because Kant
affirms both. The inaccessibility of the noumenal gives rise to the second sort of crisis I
discuss immediately above and the opacity of our psychological motives is this third
sense of crisis. This is true when thinking about morally neutral actions as well as
morally relevant ones. This opacity of motives means that there is no way of knowing
whether or not an action was motivated by respect for the moral law, or by some self3
4

G 4:407.
G 4:407.
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interested inclination. Moral earnestness, according to Kant, brings about uncertainty and
doubt about one’s moral worth, not self-satisfaction. Such doubt in human beings, who
all recognize the categorical and imperative nature of the moral law, may bring about a
psychological crisis.
This dissertation will examine five aspects of Kant’s moral philosophy that all, in
one way or another, manifest at least one of these three sorts of crises. I argue that much
of Kant’s moral philosophy has some sense of moral crisis underlying, framing, or
informing many of its core concepts and ideas. I hope to show this by devoting each
chapter to a central concept in Kant’s moral thinking and to show how each one, in its
own way, brings to light the potential for moral crisis in us human beings that dramatizes
or otherwise manifests the precarious relationship between human beings and the moral
law.
Chapter one, titled “Humanity in Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” discusses Kant’s
conception of humanity. Here, I argue that members of humanity, according to Kant,
always exercise their capacity to set and pursue ends freely (i.e. exercise their humanity)
according either to the principle of self-love or to the principle of morality. That is, the
supreme maxim that a person forms in setting his or her ends either has the moral law or
happiness as its foundation. If a human being, in exercising their capacity for free choice,
pursues ends on the basis of respect for the moral law, then the expression of the
humanity is also an expression of the moral personality. Alternatively, if a human being
makes an immoral choice and opts to satisfy an inclination in opposition to his or her
duty, then the expression of humanity is not also an expression of one’s moral
xiii

personality. Humanity, then, occupies a vacillating place on the continuum between what
Kant calls animality (our predisposition to pursue happiness) and personality.
Chapter two, titled “Human Dignity in Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” deals with the
notion of human dignity in Kant’s moral philosophy. I argue that the basis for human
dignity, according to Kant, rests upon our capacity for morality. Human dignity lies in
our capacity to elevate ourselves above the dictates of nature (as expressed through our
natural inclinations) and to organize our choices on the basis of morality. Human beings,
therefore, are in a crisis position in which we either live up to our dignity, or fail to do so.
Human dignity, then, is a dynamic concept that involves capacity to lift ourselves up out
of the merely natural. The vacillating dynamism of human dignity is an integral part of
the human moral condition because, while we can fail in achieving the fullness of our
dignity, we can never lose entirely our predisposition to the good. There is always the
possibility of moral conversion, so that no matter the kind of life a person has led up to a
certain point, it is always possible to change course. Each moment can be a crucial point
in the moral life of a human being. This possibility for moral conversion is the baseline,
necessary and sufficient condition for human dignity.
Chapter three, titled “Respect in Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” analyzes Kant’s
account of respect as a moral category. Here, I argue that Kant employs respect as a
moral term in at least three distinct ways: 1) as the feeling human beings have for the
moral law; 2) as the attitude we are required to harbor for other human beings; 3) the
feeling of approbation we have towards human beings who demonstrate virtue. I claim
that the second and third senses of respect are ultimately grounded in the first sense. That
xiv

is, the respect we owe all human beings and the praiseful respect we pay to moral
exemplars are dependent on, and derive from, the respect we feel for the moral law itself.
In this chapter, I also argue that each sense of respect, in different ways, arises out of (and
helps clarify) our own crisis-ridden relation to the moral law. That is, it is only in beings
like us (that is, beings who are prone to moral crisis) that the feeling of respect can take
on the character that it does.
Chapter four, titled “Sublimity and Morality,” is about the sublime and its relation
to Kant’s moral philosophy. Here I claim that Kant argues that the sublime can have an
indirect contribution to a moral life, and that Kant’s account of the sublime manifests and
dramatizes the potential crisis between our natural and rational natures. The sublime
experience (particularly the dynamical sublime) makes us feel (or at least imagine) the
rupture point between our animal and rational natures and enlivens in us an awareness of
our potential for moral action. The sublime does not resolve the crisis between self-love
and morality, but rather brings about a heightened awareness of it, which we experience
as pleasurable because of the sense it allows us to feel of being elevated above nature.
Sublimity, I argue, gives Kant a way of doing justice to those intense moments of moral
self-awareness without giving way to enthusiasm and fanaticism.
Chapter five turns to the question of radical evil in Kant’s moral philosophy.
Here, I argue that, given Kant’s doctrine of radical evil, human beings tend to find
themselves in a perpetual moral crisis because we are not morally good, but, given our
predisposition to personality, strive (or at least wish we were striving) for moral
goodness. Kant’s account of radical evil is not a despairing doctrine, but rather one that
xv

describes human beings as drawn in two directions by competing principles. There
remains, even for immoral human beings, the possibility of moral conversion and the
achievement of a good will. Correspondingly, no good human being is immune from the
possibility of regress back into immorality. Human beings, on Kant’s account, always
find themselves in a potential crisis-point. Moral life is a perpetually open-ended
endeavor with no assurances or guarantees of our moral goodness or of our moral
impropriety.
Kant’s moral philosophy, I argue, stakes out a middle ground between
ungrounded moral optimism and self-defeating moral despair. Ungrounded moral
optimism can instill a sense of laziness, complacency, and arrogance that inevitably wear
away at our moral fortitude. In extreme cases, such simplistic optimism can give rise to
moral fanaticism where one falsely assumes that one’s own desires and morality form a
one-to-one relationship. Desire and morality, in such a case, combine and, as a result, the
potential for a moral crisis is nullified.5 So, human beings, when using their reason
properly, relate to the moral law through its appearance to us as an imperative, as if from
without. We do not identify with the moral law except insofar as we see ourselves as
potentially acting out of respect for it.
The opposite extreme regarding the moral law and its relation to human beings
that one might take is one of moral despair. If the moral law can never be totally absorbed
5

In her paper, “Kant’s Account of Practical Fanaticism,” Rachel Zuckert makes a similar point
when she writes, “Practical reason provides us with legitimate concepts of the supersensible—of
God and of the morally good—and these ideas are also legitimate objects of feeling (moral
feeling). Nonetheless, Kant argues, such feeling does not identify the good or ground moral
claims…Rather, moral feeling is an effect of one’s recognition of the validity of the moral law”
(308).
xvi

by us so as to prevent the possibility of a clash between happiness and morality, and the
majority (if not the totality) of human beings are evil, then it seems that people may lapse
into a kind of despair in which one loses hope that one can become good. Kant’s moral
philosophy, though, does provide space for moral hope. In the Collins Lectures on Ethics,
Kant warns against fixating too strongly on our own (or humanity’s in general) moral
shortcomings: “However, let us not brood upon the weakness of human nature, and
wonder whether it be incapable of moral purity; for the endeavour to find all one’s
actions impure is apt to cause a man to lose self-confidence in his ability to perform good
and morally pure actions, and to believe his nature too weak and incapable of that; we
have to believe, rather, that rectitude moralis might be a strong motivating ground for
us.”6 Human beings are always capable of moral conversion to the good, and are always
subject to experiences (sublimity) or feelings (moral respect and benevolence) that can
embolden them in their hope of attaining a good will and realizing the fullness of their
moral dignity.

6

Collins Lectures 27:293.
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CHAPTER 1
Humanity in Kant’s Moral Philosophy
Introduction
This chapter examines the concept of humanity in Kant’s moral philosophy. I
argue that there are two distinct tendencies in Kant’s discussions of humanity. One is
Kant’s tendency to treat humanity as consisting in possession of a rational nature. The
other is Kant’s regular discussion of humanity being in some relation to the moral law as
well as being in possession of a moral predisposition. I also contend these two ways do
not seem to be straightforwardly consistent with each other. In this chapter I examine
both of these tendencies in Kant in some detail, independent of each other. Once I have
examined these dual notions of humanity, I will discuss two possible ways in which, their
prima facie distinctness notwithstanding, these two tendencies in Kant’s discussions of
humanity can be rendered consistent with each other. The first I label the ‘moral capacity
reading of Kantian humanity,’ the second the ‘good will reading.’ After introducing these
two ways of reconciling the two tendencies, I will discuss some problems facing each
interpretation of Kantian humanity. I argue that the good will reading cannot be
maintained, and that the moral capacity reading can be maintained, but only after taking
into account, and resolving, the problems I raised. I conclude by defending a version of
the moral capacity reading of Kantian humanity. I will argue that, properly understood,
the moral capacity reading reconciles the two tendencies in Kant’s moral philosophy and
also that these tendencies are actually deeply connected to each other when Kant
considers the humanity of human beings.

1

I. The Importance of Humanity: Humanity as an End-In-Itself
Determining the precise nature of humanity has wide-ranging consequences for
any interpretation of Kant’s moral philosophy. The second formulation of the categorical
imperative reads: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the
person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”7
Earlier in the Groundwork, Kant seems to suggest that human beings are ends in
themselves as a result of their being rational beings: “Now I say that the human being and
in general every rational being exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means to be used
by this or that will at its discretion; instead he must in all his actions, whether directed to
himself or also to other rational beings, always be regarded at the same time as an end.”8
Humanity, according to Kant, has a value above all price and cannot be traded away at
equal value for anything else. Kant writes, “What is related to general human inclinations
and needs has a market price…but that which constitutes the condition under which alone
something can be an end in itself has not merely a relative worth, that is, a price, but an
inner worth, that is, dignity.”9 Humanity is a dignity that is to be treated as sacrosanct,
never to be undermined or violated for another purpose, no matter how valuable that
purpose may be.10
As a result of its status as an end in itself, humanity is also granted more
particular moral protections within Kant’s moral philosophy. Members of humanity are
7

G 4:429.
G 4:428.
9
G 4:435.
10
In his notes on moral philosophy, Kant describes humanity as “holy and invulnerable” (Notes
and Fragments 19:165).
2
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not to be treated with contempt or disrespect, but rather with respect: “Every human
being has a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow human beings and is in turn bound
to respect every other. Humanity itself is a dignity; for every human being cannot be used
merely as a means by any human being (either by others or even by himself) but must
always be used at the same time as an end.”11 Kant specifically lays out “duties of
respect” that are to be extended to all of humanity; we must not, according to our duties
of respect, defame, ridicule, or act arrogantly toward members of humanity.12
Given the importance of humanity in Kant’s moral philosophy, it becomes
especially important to have a clear understanding of what exactly Kant means by
humanity. Kant, it seems, does not have a simple view of what humanity is, but there do
seem to be two tendencies in Kant’s various descriptions of humanity that form the basis
of Kantian humanity: 1) humanity as possessing a rational nature, capable of setting ends,
and 2) humanity as being receptive to morality and capable of moral action.
II. Rational Nature and Setting Ends
Kant at times discusses humanity as consisting in possession of a rational
nature.13 The basic distinction that Kant makes in discussing humanity as rational nature
is that between humanity and animality. Whereas humanity involves possession of
rational capacities, animality involves those features that belong to the human being
considered solely as an animal. The basic principle that underlies animality is what Kant
calls in the Religion “physical or merely mechanical self-love, i.e. a love for which
11

MM 6:462.
MM 6:465-469.
13
G 4:428-430.
12

3

reason is not required.”14 In the case of human beings, our animality is concerned chiefly
with our instinctual drives toward self-preservation, propagation of the human species,
and inclusion within a community. In the Religion Kant writes, “It [the predisposition to
animality in the human being is threefold: first, for self-preservation; second, for the
propagation of the species, through the sexual drive, and for the preservation of the
offspring thereby begotten through breeding; third, for community with other human
beings, i.e. the social drive.”15 Animality, and the various drives that it involves, are not
the result of rational deliberation and evaluation; that is, they are instinctual.16
Humanity, in contrast to animality, involves rationality. Kant holds that humanity
consists in possession of a rational nature; he contends that the crucial feature of
humanity, or possession of a rational nature, that which distinguishes humanity from the
rest of nature (especially animality), is the capacity to set ends for oneself. The
paradigmatic expression of one’s rational nature is when agents’ (members of humanity)
set ends for themselves. Kant asserts in the Groundwork that the capacity to set ends is
the crucial distinguishing characteristic between rational nature and animal nature. Kant
writes, “Rational nature is distinguished from the rest of nature by this, that it sets itself
an end.”17 The ends that the agent pursues are not passively received through the

14

Rel. 6:26.
Rel. 6:27.
16
Allen Wood describes the predisposition to animality in similar terms: “They [the drives of
animality] give us (as they do nonrational) an instinctive urge to do what is necessary for our own
survival and that of the species. But they operate at an entirely prerational level in that they
involve no conscious representation of these natural ends and no deliberation as to how they are
to be achieved” (Kant’s Ethical Thought 118).
17
G 4:437.
4
15

impulses and inclinations natures implants in the agent, but rather the agent in possession
of rational nature “sets itself an end.”18
In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant reiterates the connection between humanity
and the capacity to set ends when he writes, “The capacity to set oneself an end—any end
whatsoever—is what characterizes humanity (as distinguished from animality).”19 As he
did in the Groundwork, here Kant suggests that humanity’s essential characteristic is its
capacity to set ends.20 He emphasizes setting ends as humanity’s central characteristic
earlier in the Metaphysics of Morals in writing that humanity is that “by which he alone is
capable of setting ends.”21
The activity of humanity, unlike animality, is not determined solely by instinct.
Animals may appear to act in deliberate and careful manners; such mannerisms may even
resemble the ways in which human beings (humanity) behave. The crucial difference,
Kant argues, between animality and humanity is that those who possess humanity set
ends that need not be the result of a dictation from instinct.22 Animals uncritically pursue
ends that are set by instinct. Humanity, by contrast, is capable of deliberation and
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reflection before choosing whether or not to pursue some end that instinct recommends.
In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant holds that human beings, in addition to
acting as animals would, act “purposively and independently of nature.”23 Kant also
elaborates on humanity’s unique capacity to set ends when he describes the human being
(in general) as “the sole being on earth who has reason, and thus a capacity to set
voluntary ends for himself…”24 We set our ends voluntarily, and thus independently of
nature, insofar as human beings are not necessitated to pursue ends recommended by
instinct.
Instinct does not provide the basis according to which members of humanity set
and pursue ends. Rather the basis is provided through an evaluative and deliberative
process whereby one reflects on ends (deliberative) and renders an evaluation about
which ends are worth pursuing. Christine Koorsgard emphasizes the deliberative and
evaluative components of humanity’s capacity to set ends when she writes, “When Kant
says that the characteristic of humanity is the power to set an end…he is referring to a
more general capacity for choosing, desiring, or valuing ends; ends different from the
ones that instinct lays down for us, and to which our interest is directed by the operations
of reason.”25
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The act of freely, or voluntarily, setting and pursuing an end involves rendering
an evaluative stance toward the end, namely, the agent must deem the end as worth
pursuing. When instinct does not simply dictate what one does, members of humanity
must take it upon themselves to assign value to some ends. Kant imagines what might be
involved with humanity’s coming to reject instinct as the sole arbiter over what they will
do when he writes, “He discovered in himself an ability to choose his own way of life
without being tied to any single one like the other animals. But the momentary
gratification which this realization of his superiority may have afforded him was
inevitably followed at once by anxiety and fear as to how he should employ his newly
discovered ability…He stood, as it were, on the edge of an abyss. For whereas instinct
had hitherto directed him towards individual objects of his desire, an infinite range of
objects now opened up, and he did not yet know how to choose between them. Yet now
that he had tasted this state of freedom, it was impossible for him to return to a state of
servitude under the rule of instinct.”26 Here again we see Kant emphasize humanity’s
freedom from instinct as being the central feature of humanity as well as the realization
that freedom involves one’s own choice in deciding about which objects of desire (or
ends) one will pursue. Involved in such a choice-making process must be some way of
determining which objects of desire are worth pursuing.
It is important to note that the capacity to set ends does not necessarily include the
capacity to set moral ends. That is, one can have the capacity to set ends without having
the separate, but related, capacity to set ends for the sake of morality. Humanity, insofar
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as the concept is exhausted by the capacity to set ends, does not necessarily involve
morality as entering into the process whereby members of humanity set ends.27 Setting an
end involves the use of one’s rational capacities, but one can exercise a rational capacity
without reference to morality. In the Religion Kant seems to make this point when writes,
“The most rational being of this world might still need certain incentives, coming to him
from the objects of inclination, to determine his power of choice. He might apply the
most rational reflection to these objects—about what concerns their greatest sum as well
as the means for attaining the goal determined through them—without thereby even
suspecting the possibility of such a thing as the absolutely imperative moral law which
announces to be itself an incentive, and indeed, the highest incentive.”28
Kant, then, seems to be suggesting that humanity is amoral in the sense that an
individual may possess humanity without also possessing a receptivity to the moral law.
Kant argues that we can readily imagine a perfectly rational being that sets and pursues
ends who, at the same time, does not consult with the moral law at all in his or her
deliberation. The agent in this case exhibits humanity (and therefore agency), but not
moral agency.
It may seem natural, given Kant’s apparent amoral description of humanity, to
think of Kant as committed to a view a humanity that does not include moral agency.
Humanity on this reading need not involve any reference to morality in the determination
27
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of one’s ends. An individual can be a member of humanity without having any relation
whatsoever to the moral law. This interpretation of humanity can be labeled as the amoral
reading of Kantian humanity. In short, according to the amoral reading, Kantian
humanity consists solely in one’s rational capacity to deliberate about, to evaluate, and to
set voluntary ends. Moral considerations need not enter into one’s deliberative procedure
or factor into the content of one’s chosen ends. One can exhibit humanity while also
exhibiting complete indifference to the moral law.29
II. Moral Predisposition
While the amoral tendency of Kantian humanity has considerable textual support,
there is also another tendency in Kant’s discussions of humanity that suggests Kantian
humanity involves moral consideration as well. This morally thick view of humanity
poses a potential problem for an interpretation of humanity that focuses solely on rational
deliberation in setting voluntary ends. According to this moralistic interpretation of
humanity, the amoral picture, while not incorrect as far as it goes, is incomplete.
The general thrust of the morally thick view of Kantian humanity consists in
Kant’s suggestion that human beings have an “original predisposition to the good.”30 In
the Religion Kant holds that predispositions or properties are in human beings originally
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when “they belong to the possibility of human nature.”31 Part of what it is to be a human
being is to have the predisposition to the good. That is, all human beings considered
simply as human beings must have tendencies that make them receptive to the moral law,
its imperatives, and morally relevant affective states. In the Metaphysics of Morals, for
instance, Kant writes that a human being “can never lose entirely his predisposition to the
good.”32
Furthermore, Kant sometimes suggests that if a human being were to lack, or lose,
an original predisposition to the good, and its attendant morally relevant affective states,
then that person would also lack humanity. This morally thick view of humanity often
arises when Kant is discussing human beings’ receptivity to moral feeling. For instance in
the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes, “No human being is entirely without moral
feeling, for were he completely lacking in receptivity to it he would be morally dead; and
if (to speak in medical terms) the moral vital force could no longer excite this feeling,
then humanity would dissolve (by chemical laws, as it were) into mere animality and be
mixed irretrievably with the mass of other natural beings.”33 Without receptivity to moral
feeling, our humanity would “dissolve” into “mere animality.” If this were to occur then
the human being would simply be an inhabitant of the natural world, “mixed irretrievably
with the mass of other natural being.” Kant does not suggest that our moral personality
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would dissipate if we lacked moral feeling, rather he suggests that our humanity would
wither away and we would be back into a state of mere animality. If the amoral reading
maintains that an agent could be indifferent to morality while still retaining their
humanity, then this passage seems flatly to contradict the amoral interpretation.
According to this passage, a characteristic of human beings that is necessary for us to
retain our humanity is a decidedly moral one, not one that involves mere deliberative
rationality in setting ends. If Kant is committed to the claim that a predisposition to the
good is an essential component of humanity, then a straightforward amoral reading of
Kantian humanity cannot be sustained.
There is further textual support for a more morally thick reading of Kantian
humanity. In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant suggests that reason alone (that is
deliberative, amoral reason) does not raise human beings above animality. He argues, on
the one hand, it is undeniable that, insofar as human beings are members of the natural
world, it is inevitable (and not necessarily problematic) that they will use reason to aid in
the satisfaction of their animal desires: “The human being is a being with needs, insofar
as he belongs to the sensible world, and to this extent his reason certainly has a
commission from the side of his sensibility which it cannot refuse, to attend to its interest
and to form practical maxims with a view to happiness in this life and, where possible, in
a future life as well.”34 On the other hand, Kant argues that amoral use of reason, on its
own fails to raise the human being above mere animality: “But he is nevertheless not so
completely an animal as to be indifferent to all that reason says on its own and to use
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reason merely as a tool for the satisfaction of his needs as a sensible being. For, that he
has reason does not at all raise him in worth above mere animality if reason is to serve
him only for the sake of what instinct accomplishes for animals; reason would in that
case be only a particular mode nature had used to equip the human being for the same
end to which it has destined animals, without destining him to a higher end.”35 Reason
used only in the pursuit of the needs of one’s sensible being would simply be a
mechanism nature has equipped human beings with. Reason, then, would not be all that
different from the fast-twitch musculature of a rabbit, the long nose of an anteater, or the
visual system of an eagle. This would not give to human beings a worth above and
beyond that of the rest of nature. But Kant is also clear that possession of humanity gives
an agent a worth beyond accounting.36 If humanity is that by which one attains absolute
worth, apart from mere animality, and reason simply in the service of sensibility does not
separate an agent from mere animality, then humanity must be something beyond the
mere exercise of reason in the setting and choosing of ends.
III. Reconciling the Tendencies: Two Options
It seems clear, then, there exists two tendencies in Kant’s moral philosophy
regarding humanity. On the one hand Kant at times describes humanity as consisting
solely in a capacity to set voluntary ends, independent of instinct. On the other hand,
Kant occasionally suggests that humanity involves some relation to morality. If we accept
that both tendencies factor into Kantian humanity, then we need an account that captures
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both the capacity to set ends and the capacity for morality. The task, then, for a
satisfactory interpretation of Kantian humanity would incorporate the capacity to set ends
while also taking into account Kant’s repeated claims that humanity must also involve the
agent having some relation to morality.
In this section I will describe two ways in which some commentators have
brought together these tendencies in Kant’s treatment of humanity. The first approach is
what I will call the ‘moral capacity reading’ of Kantian humanity; the second approach is
the ‘good will reading’ of humanity put forward by Richard Dean. After briefly laying
out the basics of both readings, I will consider some difficulties I take to be facing each
approach.
The Moral Capacity Reading
There is a significant strand of Kant scholarship that interprets humanity along
more moralistic lines than the amoral reading. This interpretation treats humanity as a
rational nature, which, in addition to having the power to choose and set ends, includes
the capacity for morality. We see this tendency in Thomas Hill,37 Barbara Herman,38
Roger Sullivan,39 and also in John Rawls.40 Rawls expresses the basic description of
humanity on the moral capacity reading in his Lectures on the History of Moral

37

Thomas E. Hill, Respect, Pluralism, and Justice (page 87). Hill’s formulation here seems to be
less purely in the humanity as capacity for morality camp, but he does describe humanity as
possessing “certain normative capacities and dispositions” which include, among other things, the
willingness “to reciprocate with others in endorsing principles that respect each person as a
potential source of legitimate values” (87).
38
Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (page 238).
39
Roger Sullivan, Introduction to Kant’s Ethics (page 70).
40
John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (page 188).
13

Philosophy, “Kant means by humanity those of our powers and capacities that
characterize us as reasonable and rational persons who belong to the natural
world…These powers include, first, those of moral personality, which make it possible
for us to have a good will and a good moral character; and second, those capacities and
skills to be developed by culture: by the arts and sciences and so forth.”41 The existence
of some sort of relation between the agent and the moral law is not irrelevant, or beside
the point, to this interpretation of humanity. Rather humanity consists precisely in having
capacities suited for morality and in being capable of possessing a good will. These
capacities must include the ability to set ends voluntarily and apart from what instinct
recommends. Also included in the capacity for morality must be receptivity to the moral
law. A person must be aware of the moral law and that it applies to him or herself in
order for moral action to be possible.
The Good Will Reading
In his book The Value of Humanity in Kant’s Moral Theory Richard Dean
presents a provocative challenge to the capacity interpretation of humanity. Instead of
conceiving humanity as the rational capacity to set ends as well as the capacity for moral
personality, Dean argues that humanity consists in the actual possession of a good will.
The various proponents of the moral capacity reading, regardless of whatever
disagreements they may have, are united in the claim that possession of a good will is not
a necessary feature of humanity. That is, one could be a member of humanity while also
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lacking a good will. Richard Dean’s basic departure, then, from the capacity
interpretation is his rejection of that claim.
Dean argues that the term ‘humanity’ in Kant’s moral philosophy is reserved for a
rational being “who actually accepts moral principles as providing sufficient reasons for
action.”42 He then labels such a being as possessing a “properly ordered will,” which is a
will in which moral considerations are given priority over self-love. Dean then claims
that this sort of will is a good will.43 A good will is found in any rational being “who
actually accepts moral principles as providing sufficient reasons for action.”44 So, on
Dean’s reading, the humanity formulation can be interpreted as claiming that those who
possess the property of having a good will are to be treated as ends-in-themselves. This
implies that anyone or anything that lacks a good will is not required to be treated as
ends-in-themselves.
IV. Problems with the Moral capacity reading and the Good Will Reading
I would argue that both the capacity and good will interpretations face problems
in explaining Kant’s notion of humanity. In this section I explore some potential
problems with each approach. There are also problems facing the good will interpretation
of Kantian humanity. While the good will reading is worth consideration, given the
consequences it would have for Kant’s moral philosophy, it leads to conclusions that
cannot be withstood within Kant’s moral philosophy. In what follows I first run through
three problematic implications of the good will reading. After my discussion of the good
42
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will reading I attempt to bring out features of humanity that a capacity interpretation
would allow but that bear emphasis.
The Moral Capacity Reading
The chief difficulty facing the moral capacity reading is the fact that Kant seems
to locate the capacity for morality not in humanity, but in what he calls our
“predisposition to personality.” In the Religion, for instance, Kant writes, “The
predisposition to personality is the susceptibility to respect for the moral law as of itself a
sufficient incentive to the power of choice.”45 Without such susceptibility, it is not clear
how an agent could have the capacity for morality. In the Groundwork, Kant argues that
respect for the moral law is the only determining ground for a morally good will: “Now,
an action from duty is to set aside entirely the influence of inclination and with it every
object of the will; hence there is left nothing that could determine it except objectively
the law and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and so the maxim of
complying with such a law even if it infringes upon all my inclinations.”46 If the
susceptibility to respect for the moral law is part of our predisposition to personality, and
not to humanity, then it seems that the capacity for morality must not be included in an
interpretation of Kantian humanity.
Kant in fact explicitly states that the concept of personality must be separated by
the concept of humanity: “We cannot consider this predisposition as already included in
the concept of the preceding one [humanity], but must necessarily treat it as a special
45
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predisposition. For from the fact that a being has reason it does not at all follow that,
simply by virtue of representing its maxims as suited to universal legislation, this reason
contains a faculty of determining the power of choice unconditionally, and hence to be
“practical” on its own; at least, not so far as we can see.”47 One can readily imagine a
being with reason, but at the same time lacking receptivity to the moral law. Such an
agent would be able to decide on an end to pursue, calculate likely outcomes from his or
her actions, determine the best course of action, and then skillfully go about pursuing the
end. None of this deliberative process needs to consult with the moral law or ask whether
or not the maxim upon which the agent is acting is suited for universal legislation. An
additional property, beyond humanity, is required to bring moral considerations to the
forefront in an agent’s deliberative process. The moral capacity interpretation of
humanity thus seems to miss the mark in identifying the unique characteristic that
distinctively marks humanity.
Problems with the Good Will Reading
The first problematic implication of the good will reading is that humanity would
be incredibly scarce and therefore that the group whose members are to be treated as ends
in themselves would be almost vanishingly tiny. Kant in the Groundwork writes, “One
need not be an enemy of virtue but only a cool observer, who does not take the liveliest
wish for the good straight–away as its reality, to become doubtful at certain moments
(especially with increasing years, when experience has made one’s judgment partly more
shrewd and partly more acute in observation) whether any true virtue is to be found in the
47
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world.”48 If true virtue is taken to be possession of a good will, then this passage, coupled
with Dean’s reading, would seem to suggest that it’s entirely possible that no one in the
world is to be treated as an end in itself. We may hear all sorts of pious-sounding wishes
that virtue be found in the world and in oneself, but we still would not be able to find true
virtue anywhere.
Dean tries to preempt concerns about the first implication I discussed by arguing
that good will is more widely dispersed than is commonly believed. Dean writes, “[A]
good will, properly understood, is not such a rarity among humans…”49 Dean makes this
claim and then provides some textual support for it. Dean initially defined a good will as
being possessed by a person “who actually accepts moral principles as providing
sufficient reasons for action.”50 A bit later in the book we get a fuller discussion of the
good will. He defines the good will as follows, “A good will is the will of an agent who is
committed to moral principles, and this commitment can be present even when one is not
performing actions that display it.”51 So he has in mind here a person who is choosing
between different morally permissible ends. Such a person, Dean plausibly contends, can
still be in possession of a good will. Dean further specifies his definition of a good will
when he writes, “A good will is the will of a being who is committed to acting morally,
who gives priority to moral principles rather than acting simply to satisfy her own
desires, inclinations, impulses, or sentiments.”52
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Interpreting the good will as giving priority to moral principles over the principle
of self-love is indeed consistent with Kant’s description of the good will in the opening
section of the Groundwork. Giving priority to moral principles over selfish ones is
another way of saying that one is prepared to do one’s duty, even if doing so would
require keeping one’s selfish inclinations in check. Kant writes that the concept of
“duty…contains that of a good will though under certain subjective limitations and
hindrances.”53 The “subjective limitations and hindrances” can be interpreted as the
inclinations we have that cause us to experience the requirements of the moral law as
constricting and as setting limits to what we can do. In fact, Kant says exactly this in the
Mrongovius Lectures when discussing why people so often fail to do what they know a
reasonable person would do: “We are well aware of what a being with such reason would
do; but we do it not, for we have inclinations that are hindrances.”54 Dean’s interpretation
of a good will, so far, is also consistent with the argument laid out by Kant in the Religion
where the moral predicament of human beings is construed as a struggle to properly order
the requirements of the moral law on the one hand and the inclinations to self-love on the
other hand.55
In my view, though, Dean problematically argues that possession of a good will is
“compatible with significant degrees of self-deception, lack of attention to the moral
dimensions of one’s choices, and weakness of will.”56 Dean’s interpretation of a good
will is perhaps most easily understood in the context of the degrees or “grades” of evil in
53
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the human being that Kant discusses in the Religion.57 Kant writes, “We can think of
three different grades of this natural propensity to evil. First, it is the general weakness of
the human heart in complying with the adopted maxims, or the frailty of human nature;
second, the propensity to adulterate moral incentives with immoral ones… i.e. impurity;
third, the propensity to adopt evil maxims, i.e. the depravity of human nature, or of the
human heart.”58 Dean argues, I think, that a good will is consistent with frailty and
impurity, but not with depravity. Dean writes, “Frailty can keep one from choosing
particular right actions even though one truly wills to act on the moral law as one’s
supreme and overriding principle.”59
I would argue that possession of a good will is not compatible with any of these
grades of evil. Human beings possess good wills when they perform their duties out of
respect for the moral law. They also can possess good wills when, while choosing from
different morally permissible ends, the demands of the moral law are in fact given
priority over self-love. In cases of frailty, a person has failed to perform his or her duty
because they did not in fact properly order the relationship between self-love and
morality. The maxim on which they act placed, in that instance, the inclinations of selflove over the requirements of the moral law. Even though, on some level, the person does
indeed recognize that morality must be given priority over self-love, the maxim they
acted upon had to privilege self-love over morality. The person might be making a pious
wish that their will was properly ordered, but as Kant notes in the Groundwork, even the
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liveliest of wishes for the good does not amount to its reality. I think this is the best way
to interpret Kant when he writes, “An evil heart can coexist with a will which in the
abstract is good.”60 Dean takes this passage to support his view, but it is not clear how
precisely it does. In abstract the will may be good, but this, it seems, does not amount to
saying that the will is good in fact. The maxim on which the person acted cannot
possibly, in my view, have properly ordered morality and self-love, otherwise the person
would not have intentionally committed the misdeed.
Dean also suggests that there is textual support of his reading of the good will in
the Religion where Kant is discussing moral progress. Dean writes, “To embark firmly on
the path of continual moral improvement is to have the commitment to moral principles
that marks a good will.”61 Kant writes, “If by a single and unalterable decision a human
being reverses the supreme ground of his maxims by which he was an evil human
being…he is to this extent…a subject receptive to the good; but he is a good human being
only in incessant laboring and becoming…to find himself upon the good (though narrow)
path of constant progress from bad to better…this is the same as actually being a good
human being…”62 I don’t think this passage provides a sound basis for asserting, as Dean
does, that a good will is consistent with occasional intentional immoral actions. Dean
writes, “A good will is not present only when an agent acts on the motive of duty. It
endures when performing merely permissible actions and can even coexist with some
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intentional immoral actions.”63 It seems right to say that person can be on the whole good
even if there are occasional misdeeds along the way, so long as they are engaged in the
struggle for moral improvement from bad to better that Kant discusses in the Religion,
but a good will, does not seem to be consistent with intentional immoral deeds.
A background assumption in Dean’s discussion of the good will seems to be the
claim that good will is not identical to perfect will. Dean describes a perfect will as
follows: “We could imagine a will that is short of a holy will, because it is subject to the
temptations of inclination, yet still chooses always to act according to the principles of
reason. Kant thinks (and intuition seems to fall on his side here) that humans do not have
this sort of perfect, finite will either.”64 Since Dean thinks it is reasonable to suppose that
good wills are fairly common, it seems to follow that Dean would not think of good and
perfect wills as equivalent.
It is not clear, though, that there really is a distinction to be drawn between a
perfect will, as defined above, and a good will. A good will, as Kant lays out in the
Groundwork, is a will that is determined by respect for the moral law and that chooses to
act in ways that fulfill one’s duty (even if there are inclinations of self-love that would, if
acted upon, lead one to immoral action). It is not clear, then, what a perfect will would
consists in over and above a good will. Kant even seems to define moral perfection,
which we may suppose is at least in part achieved through possessing a perfect will, in
terms rather similar to his description of good will: “[P]erfection consists subjectively in
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the purity of one’s disposition to duty, namely, in the law being by itself alone the
incentive, even without the admixture of aims derived from sensibility, and in actions
being done not only in conformity with duty but also from duty.”65
Perhaps one can think of a perfect will as a will that remains good over an entire
lifetime or a will can be perfect from the moment of a moral conversion on out. But then
a perfect will would just be a good will that persists through time. The internal features of
a good and perfect will would be identical. If a good will is equivalent to a perfect will,
then it is clear that Kant thinks a good will would be rare. This reading of a good will also
has the benefit of cohering with Kant’s statement from the Groundwork suggesting that
it’s conceivable and perhaps even probable that true virtue is nowhere to be found among
human beings.
Furthermore, Dean’s contention that good wills are not all that scarce among
human beings seems to rub against much of what Kant says about the attitude we should
take toward our own will. Kant suggests that it is not conducive to morality to assume we
have a good will. He writes, “[O]ne is never more easily deceived than in what promotes
a good opinion of oneself. Moreover, it seems never advisable to be encouraged to such a
state of confidence but much more beneficial (for morality) to “work out one’s salvation
with fear and trembling” (a hard saying which, if misunderstood, can drive one to the
darkest enthusiasm).”66 Kant suggests that the assumption that one indeed has a good will
is actually often evidence of a lack of moral honesty:
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This is how so many human beings (conscientious in their
own estimation) derive their peace of mind when, in the
course of actions in which the law was not consulted or at
least did not count the most, they just luckily slipped by the
evil consequences; and [how they derive] even the fancy that
they deserve not to feel guilty of such transgressions as they
see others burdened with, without however inquiring whether
the credit goes perhaps to good luck, or whether, on the
attitude of mind they could well discover within themselves
if they just wanted, they would not have practiced similar
vices themselves, had they not been kept away from them by
impotence, temperament, upbringing, and tempting
circumstances of time and place (things which, one and all,
cannot be imputed to us).67

It seems that Kant does not think we should assume that we have a good will; nor do we
seem justified in supposing that good will is commonplace among human beings. So, I
would argue that the first implication still holds from Dean’s reading. That is, if Dean’s
reading is correct, then humanity would be rare and so too would be human beings who
are required to be treated as ends in themselves.
A second implication of Dean’s thesis is the following: If humanity is the good
will, then we cannot ever know who we are required to treat as an end in itself. In Section
II of the Groundwork Kant asserts that it is indeed impossible to know if an action was
committed out of respect for the moral law, “In fact, it is absolutely impossible by means
of experience to make out with complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an
action otherwise in conformity with duty rested simply on moral grounds and on the
representation of one’s duty.”68 Even after we have undergone “the keenest selfexamination” and have still found in our maxim “nothing besides the moral ground of
67
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duty that could have been powerful enough to move us to this or that good action” we
still cannot infer “with certainty that no covert impulse of self love, under the mere
pretense of that idea, was not actually the real determining cause of the will.”69 Kant
expresses a similar sort of skepticism about moral self-knowledge in The Metaphysics of
the Metaphysics of Morals when he writes, “The depths of the human heart are
unfathomable. Who knows himself well enough to say, when he feels the incentive to
fulfill his duty, whether it proceeds entirely from the representation of the law or whether
there are not many other sensible impulses contributing to it that look to no one’s
advantage…and that, in other circumstances, could just as well serve vice?”70 This is
true for our own wills, to which we have a degree of privileged access. It is more
pressingly true in the case of others.
Furthermore, Kant argues that we have reason to not give to ourselves the benefit
of the doubt with regard to having a good will: “[F]or we like to flatter ourselves by
falsely attributing to ourselves a nobler motive, whereas in fact we can never, even by the
most strenuous self-examination, get entirely behind our covert incentives, since when
moral worth is at issue, what counts is not actions, which one sees, but those inner
principles of actions that one does not see.”71
So, if humanity is to be treated as an end in itself and never merely as a means,
and humanity is possession of a good will: a) we cannot know who we are required to
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treat as an end in itself, and b) we have reason to believe that in our own person we are
likely to falsely attribute a good will to ourselves out of our desire to “flatter” ourselves.
Given this epistemological concern, it becomes possible that the humanity
formulation would fail to provide us with any concrete requirements on how to conduct
ourselves with regard to real individuals. We would know to treat humanity as an end in
itself, but we would have no reliable way of determining who in particular we are to treat
that way.
In the case of the second implication (That we cannot know who to treat as an end
in it self), Dean claims 1) We are justified in believing that good will is common, so we
know that most people, or at least many people should be treated as ends in themselves,
and 2) We have good reason to treat others as ends in themselves even if we suspect that
they do not have a good will. So, the epistemological impossibility of knowing whether
or not someone has a good will does not lead us to abandon the idea that we are to treat
most human beings as ends in themselves. As we have seen, I do not think Dean’s first
claim is justified (that good will is common), so I do not think it can be used here to
mitigate concerns about the second implication. This leaves the second claim he makes
(That there are good reasons for treating people who lack good will with respect). I will
wait in responding to this claim until I turn my attention to the third implication because
the two discussions are related to each other. For now, we should simply take Dean as
asserting that the epistemological problem is not a genuine worry because we do not need
to know or even suspect that someone has a good will in order to be morally required to
treat them as an end in itself.
26

A third potentially problematic implication for Dean is that his account of
humanity and the good will seems to be incompatible with Kant’s duties of respect. This
third implication has its basis in the first implication that few people, if any, have
humanity. That is, the first implication holds that the set of ends in themselves is
extremely small, if perhaps empty (at least with regard to human beings). If that
implication holds, then the number human beings who are owed respect as described in
Kant’s duties of respect is equally small. This would be a problem for Dean’s reading, in
my view, because of Kant’s regular and consistent claims that all human beings are owed
respect.
Dean’s reading of humanity entails that some rational human beings are not owed
the respect that Kant describes in his discussion of the “duties of respect.” This, however,
seems to flatly contradict Kant’s more universal-sounding claim that opens his discussion
of the duties of respect: “Every human being has a legitimate claim to respect from his
fellow human beings and is in turn bound to respect every other.”72 In this same passage
Kant asserts that “the dignity of humanity” is “in every other human being.”73 Even
according to Dean’s more expansive reading of the good will, at least some vicious
wrongdoers would not be members of humanity. If the duties of respect are grounded in
one’s humanity, then we would not, on Dean’s reading, have duties of respect to
scoundrels. Kant, though, explicitly states that vicious people too are owed respect. Kant
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writes, when dealing with such a person, “Nonetheless I cannot deny all respect to even a
vicious man as a human being…”74
Dean recognizes that Kant seems to suggest that respect is owed to all human
beings and his reading might seem to conflict with this tendency in Kant. Dean, then,
tries to make his reading more consistent with Kant’s more universal formulation of the
duties of respect by arguing that we still have good reasons for treating human beings
who lack good will with respect. So, the duties of respect would be extended to a wider
group of people, including even those who lack humanity. The duties of respect would
not, according to Dean, be based on humanity (or good will), but rather on something
else. He writes, “[T]here are reasons to treat most humans with respect and concern, even
if they do not fully earn this treatment by possessing a good will.”75
There are two reasons that Dean outlines for why we should respect humans who
lack a good will (and therefore lack humanity). The first is the following: Dean says,
“First, to treat any human with disrespect lessens our respect for all humans.”76 In
defense of this claim, Dean refers to Kant’s discussion of defamation. While Dean is
certainly right that Kant does argue that in cases of defamation (one of the vices of
disrespect) we “cast a shadow of worthlessness over our race itself” and that defamation
“diminishes respect for humanity as such,”77 those concerns do not exhaust the wrongs
and injuries that have been committed. In cases of disrespect, a person’s humanity has
74

MM 6:463.
Dean 7. Dean also writes, “Kant himself provides some good reasons to treat all humans with
respect, even if some have no earned that respect by possessing a good will” (94).
76
Dean 94.
77
MM 6:466.
28
75

been undermined. Even if the person is indeed guilty of wrongdoing, that person was also
wronged when subjected to contempt, which consists precisely in denying them their
humanity. Kant writes, “Failure to fulfill mere duties of love is lack of virtue (peccatum).
But failure to fulfill the duty arising from the respect owed to every human being as such
is a vice (vitium). For no one is wronged if duties of love are neglected; but a failure in
the duty of respect infringes upon one’s lawful claim.”78 Dean’s reading precludes the
possibility of a person lacking a good will being wronged as a result of being
disrespected; the basis has for showing respect to scoundrels, according to Dean, is just
the need to avoid the effects that disrespect may have on our conception for the species in
general. The wrongdoer is not, himself, wronged in this case; Kant, however, is clear that
in cases of disrespect an individual person’s lawful claim is infringed upon.
Kant, again, is fairly explicit that we are to avoid contempt because it would
deprive a person of the respect they are owed on the basis of their being human beings:
“To be contemptuous of others, that is, to deny them the respect owed to human beings in
general, is in every case contrary to duty; for they are human beings.”79 Kant also notes
that we are rightly scandalized by ruthless treatment of criminals because we are appalled
that someone belonging to our species can be treated in such a way.80 So it seems that
Dean cannot try to base the duties of respect on anything other than the respect owed to
all human beings and since the duties of respect clearly extend to all human beings who
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lack a good will, it follows that humanity cannot be equivalent to as rare a property as
good will.
The second reason Dean argues that we have good reason to treat with respect
even vicious persons is that in failing to do so we would, “undermine his chances of
reforming his character.”81 Dean argues that showing contempt for those who lack good
will discourages the wrongdoer from moral improvement. I think Dean is correct in
saying that the possibility of moral improvement in all human beings is one reason why
we should not treat others with contempt. Kant, for instance, writes, “The same thing [the
duty to avoid contempt] applies to the censure of vice, which must never break out into
complete contempt and denial of any moral worth to a vicious human being; for on this
supposition he could never be improved…”82 I think, though, that Dean is overlooking
the fact that Kant seems to suggest that the very possibility for improvement is a
consequence of an individual being a human being. In this same passage, Kant claims
that the notion that a person cannot be improved in inconsistent with the very idea of a
human being.83
Dean goes on to claim that “This duty to show respect for others is not based on a
supposition that all humans necessarily deserve respect. In fact it presupposes the
opposite.”84 This seems correct so far as it goes, but it is important to remember that Kant
is hardly univocal in his usage of the term “respect” (Achtung). There certainly is a sense
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of respect in Kant’s moral philosophy that is owed only to those who have exhibited a
steadfast commitment to the moral law, but there is another sense of respect that seems to
be more inclusive and does not depend on meritorious action or virtue. This second sense
of respect is not based on possessing a good will, but rather simply being a human being.
Kant writes, “It is only through the noble predisposition to the good in us, which makes
the human being worthy of respect, that one can find one who acts contrary to it
contemptible (the human being himself, but not the humanity in him).”85 Here, Kant
refers to humanity as being “in” even a vicious person who has committed contemptible
misdeeds. In this sense of respect, it is not a matter of “deserving” respect in the ordinary
sense that someone might deserve something. A vicious person is owed respect because
of an inextricable property of rational human beings in general (namely, their “noble
predisposition to the good,” which Kant suggests, here at least, to be their “humanity.”)
So here too the good will reading overlooks the fundamental role humanity places in
anchoring the universalistic extension of the duties of respect.
IV. A More Refined Moral Capacity Reading?
Given these problems that arise for both the moral capacity reading and the good
will reading, coupled with a recognition of the tendencies in Kant’s moral philosophy to
treat humanity both as an amoral capacity to set ends as well as a receptivity to morality,
we may well ask: what sort of interpretation of humanity remains viable?
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Even though the moral capacity reading faces problems, there is much in the
moral capacity reading that remains promising in providing a satisfactory interpretation
of Kantian humanity. Unless we are to dismiss the morally thick tendency Kant displays
in describing humanity, then we must account for humanity’s necessary relation to, and
ultimately capacity for, morality. Furthermore, the moral capacity reading does so in a
way that does not posit that humanity must always display morally virtue. That is, a
complete understanding of humanity and its role within Kant’s moral philosophy must
involve in some way humanity’s receptivity to the moral law, without involving
possession of a good will.
The problem that the capacity interpretation runs into is, I would argue, the result
of not taking into account a crucial distinction in its reading of Kantian humanity. The
distinction is between what I will call “humanity as such” and “humanity as it is.”86
Humanity as such requires a narrower, amoral interpretation, while humanity as it is does
indeed involve the capacity for morality and receptivity to morally relevant feelings. On
this reading, humanity as such is the capacity to set voluntary ends; in the case of human
beings humanity also necessarily involves the capacity for morality and the
accompanying receptivity to respect for the moral law, and other morally relevant
feelings.
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Humanity As Such
Humanity as such, considered on its own, is simply possession of the rational
capacity to set voluntary ends.87 This amoral tendency is, according to Kant, the core
faculty of humanity, that by which members of humanity do indeed separate themselves
from the rest of nature. Humanity as such also possesses the foundational characteristic of
moral action; moral action must be based on the capacity to choose ends free from the
dictates of instinct. Humanity as such is captured by Kant’s imaginative reconstruction of
the beginnings of human history when human beings come to realize that instinct need to
dictate to them their course of action: “He discovered in himself an ability to choose his
own way of life without being tied to any single one like the other animals.”88 Humanity
as such involves the rational deliberative process whereby individuals make choices
about what sorts of ends are worth pursuing, but this sort of activity can, in principle,
occur without reference to morality.
Humanity in the Moral World (Humanity as it is)
While humanity as such is conceptually distinct from the exercise of freedom
considered from a moral perspective, in the case of human beings, the activity of
humanity as such always and necessarily must be situated within a moral context.
Furthermore, the choices that mark the capacity for setting ends must always, at the same
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time, be made in some conscious awareness of the requirements of the moral law.
Actually existing humanity (humanity as it is), involve humanity’s core activity of setting
ends, but it also involves, in the case of human beings, morally relevant actions.89
Whenever we encounter an exercise of one’s humanity in a particular instance, it must
exist in some morally relevant state.
Any and all exercises of humanity as such (i.e. rational end-setting), are also
instances of humanity as it is, here in this moral world (that is, an end-setting action that
is subject to moral consideration).90 While this fact brings together humanity as such and
humanity as it is (exercised within a moral framework), the connection is empirically
based, and therefore not conceptually necessary. It is possible, I would argue, to draw a
necessary and conceptual link between humanity as such and humanity as it is. That is,
humanity as such would not be possible without the capacity for morality. If we define
humanity as the capacity to set ends voluntarily, then we must think of humanity as freely
choosing its desired ends. For Kant choices are free only when they come as the result of
the exercise of one’s free will. That is, if nature is dictating to you the ends you adopt,
then one is not freely choosing them; they are being adopted involuntarily. If one goes
about setting one end over another, one must have some way of adjudicating between two
possible ends. Without morality providing an alternative set of ends, then one’s
inclinations will sort themselves out according to the relative power they are able to
89
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exercise over a person’s decision-making. Choosing one end over the other, therefore,
would not really be the result of authentic volition, but rather the result of a natural
process whereby inclinations compete with each other in a power struggle. The notion of
voluntarily setting ends, on this picture, is weakened down to the idea that no other
person is forcing you to set one end over another. It is still true, though, that nature (that
is, the predispositions nature has assigned to you) is dictating the ends you adopt. A
person may, un-coerced by another person, choose to forego that piece of cherry pie in
favor of a healthy apple, and that decision may seem voluntary, but really it is simply the
case that the person’s inclination to vanity (let us say) is determining his actions (summer
is coming and he wants to cut a certain figure on the beach in order to impress people). In
this example, inclinations are determining the person’s decision-making process.
While for a compatiblist like David Hume, this is a sufficient account of free or
voluntary action, for someone like Kant, who has a robust theory of free agency, this is a
limited, incomplete, and, ultimately, illusory case of voluntary action. Truly voluntary
actions require the possibility of grounding one’s power of choice on the moral law
because only the moral law provides an authentic alternative to the principle of self-love.
On Kant’s picture, the possibility of morality requires the postulating of a noumenal, free
self exercising choice in a way that determines the choices we make in the phenomenal
world. Choosing to forego the piece of cherry pie on prudential grounds would be an
exercise of one’s free will only if there is some noumenal choice that ultimately grounds
and explains the choice. Without the possibility of noumenal choice, every phenomenal
choice would be determined according to natural laws (be they laws of physics,
35

psychology, or something else). Whether or not one actually chooses the moral law,
without the moral alternative to nature, humanity would collapse back to mere animality
(albeit of a more complicated sort).
This morally thick conception of humanity is consistent with Kant’s regular
comments that humanity is something that can be improved, cultivated, and developed.91
Kant at times describes humanity as a goal or aim to which we must aspire. Moral
progress is understood as increasingly coming to realize one’s own humanity. In the
Vigilantius Lectures, Kant says, “Humanity itself, if we wished to personify it, actually
lacks any inclination to evil, but the more a man compares himself therewith, the more he
finds out how far away he is from this.”92 Here humanity seems to be an ideal that we
compare ourselves with in order to determine the extent of our own moral shortcomings.
It is not, at least here, simply a property “in” us, but something that is outside of us,
something to aim towards in our moral development. The capacity to set ends (humanity
as such) does seem to simply reside “in” is in a constant and unchanging way, but this
seems to be only the bare precondition for a full flowering of our humanity that
undergoes, potentially, radical change and improvement.
In Kant’s published works we also get instances in which he treats humanity as a
goal. In the Metaphysics of Morals while discussing moral education he writes, “[I]t is
not comparison with any other human being whatsoever (as he is), but with the idea (of
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humanity), as he ought to be, and so comparison with the law, that must serve as the
constant standard of a teacher’s instruction.”93 Moral education and culture generally
function as the means by which humanity is cultivated and perfected in human beings.
While humanity as such must underlie any and all actual exercises of humanity
(humanity as is), the particular sorts of ends that human beings choose may change and
improve radically over the course of both an individual life as well as of the history of the
species. Humanity is not simply a static, unchanging property in human beings. It
undergoes change, development, and improvement.
The exercise of free choice undergoes change; that is, our very usage of our
capacity to set ends develops and improves. Individual human beings undergo a process
of development whereby they learn to exercise their humanity in increasingly cultivated
ways. In his Lectures on pedagogy, Kant writes, “The human being is the only creature
that must be educated. By education we mean specifically care (maintenance, support),
discipline (training) and instruction, together with formation. Accordingly, the human
being is first infant, then pupil, and then apprentice.”94 The very concept of humanity
(humanity as such) leads to humanity as it that is in some level or degree of completion.
Only through education does one realize their humanity: “Discipline and training changes
animal nature into human nature.”95 Training and instruction allows the human being to
formulate their own course of action and to shape the sort of life he or she will lead. Kant
again contrasts the human situation and the animal situation by claiming that the potential
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of non-human animals is determined by instinct: “An animal is already all that it can be
because of its instinct; a foreign intelligence has already taken care of everything for it.
But the human being needs his own intelligence. He has no instinct and must work out
the plan of his conduct for himself.”96
This is true in both the lives of individual human beings as well as for the
species as a whole. Once human beings have discovered within themselves the capacity
to choose their own ends, questions immediately arise as to which ends should be
pursued and which should not. In his imaginative reconstruction of the beginning of
human history, Kant expresses the immediate need for human beings to decide how their
newfound freedom from instinct is to be best expressed: “But the momentary gratification
which this realization of his superiority may have afforded him was inevitably followed
at once by anxiety and fear as to how he should employ his newly discovered ability…”97
Early attempts in exercising freedom may well be crude, uncivilized, and even immoral,
but through the gradual improvement of one’s humanity, one’s humanity can become
more in line with morality and with the promotion of humanity as an end in itself. Kant
expresses the idea that humanity (i.e. the free setting and pursuing of ends) can only
begin to be perfected through preliminary cruder attempts: “I admit that I am not
comfortable with this way of speaking, which even clever men are wont to use: “A
certain people…is not ripe for freedom” … For on this assumption freedom will never
come, since we cannot ripen to it if we are not already established in it (we must be free
in order to be able to make use of our powers purposively in freedom). To be sure, the
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first attempts will be crude…yet we do not ripen to freedom otherwise than through our
own attempts (and we must be free to be allowed to make them).”98
An analogy may clarify the point here. When people are first learning how to
read, their capacity to read exists, but only at a basic or crude level. As they develop into
better readers, their reading capacity undergoes improvement. While we can call rightly
claim that the elementary reader and the highly developed reader are doing the same
thing (i.e. reading), we can also rightly claim that there are significant differences in the
exercise of the highly developed reader’s capacity to read and the basic reader’s capacity
to read. The same can be said about the exercise of one’s humanity. As individuals
exercise their freedom, with the constant improving tendency our relation to the moral
law has on our humanity and with the stimulation and impetus for growth that culture
generally allows for, human beings can move from crude and immoral uses of their
humanity, to cultivated and moral ones.
One may raise two related concerns against my layered, multi-faceted account of
humanity. Given that Kant seems to be of two minds about humanity (at times as amoral
end-setting, at other times as a more morally thick notion regarding our capacity for and
failures in morality), does Kant have a unified account of humanity at all? The related
concern is that perhaps my reading of humanity fails on the same grounds as the basic
moral capacity reading does; namely, what I describe as humanity as is or the morally
thick conception of humanity is really personality. Humanity would remain the amoral
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capacity to set ends, while personality, and not humanity, would include the capacity for
morality.
I maintain that both concerns can be answered adequately within my account.
First, I would argue that Kant does indeed have a unified account of humanity. The core
activity of humanity, on my reading, is the capacity to set voluntary ends. Free immoral
action, on my account, is still an exercise in one’s humanity, just as free moral action is.
In the case of the free actions of human beings, though (what I call ‘humanity as is’), free
actions are inseparable from moral considerations. In the case of human beings, there are
morally acceptable and laudable exercises of freedom as well as morally unacceptable or
blameworthy ones. So the very activity of setting ends must necessarily have a moral
dimension.
One may retain the merest sort of humanity by neglecting one’s duty, but built
into humanity is an inherent tendency toward its completion, promotion, and perfection:
“Now there are in humanity predispositions to greater perfection, which belong to the end
of nature with respect to humanity in our subject; to neglect these might admittedly be
consistent with the preservation of humanity as an end in itself but not with the
furtherance of this end.”99 Moral actions are only possible if they were freely chosen (i.e.
they were an exercise in one’s humanity). In any exercise of a free act (i.e. setting an end
and pursuing it) by a human being, one must consider whether the action is consistent
with morality. Furthermore, in every case of humanity as is, the moral law will present
itself as something that should be incorporated into one’s maxim. This is the case for all
99
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human beings, even those who engage in contemptible behavior: “There is no one—not
even the most hardened scoundrel, if only he is otherwise accustomed to use reason—
who, when one sets before him examples of honesty of purpose, of steadfastness in
following good maxims, of sympathy and general benevolence (even combined with
great sacrifices of advantage and comfort), does not wish that he might also be so
disposed.”100
The second concern (that humanity as is and personality are the same thing) can
also be allayed. First, humanity as is and personality are not strictly identical because
humanity exists on a wide-ranging continuum whereas personality occupies only the
extreme end of the continuum. That is, there can be instances of humanity as is that fall
somewhere on the continuum between animality and personality that do not fall onto the
personality end of the spectrum. Kant emphasizes that there can be free actions that
depart radically from the requirements of morality, and yet the agent involved has
nevertheless retained his or her humanity. In the Religion, Kant maintains that humanity
involves “a self-love which is physical.”101 He then asserts that the exercise of humanity
is consistent with vices such as “envy, ingratitude, joy in others’ misfortunes…”102 Such
vices, though, are not possible expressions of one’s personality. Personality can only be
expressed through one’s will being determined objectively by the moral law itself and
subjectively by pure respect for the moral law. In cases of envy, for example, one’s level
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of humanity is in an undeveloped, immoral state. One’s humanity as is remains in a state
well short of the achievement of personality.
Second, it is not a problem with my reading to say that humanity and personality
can in some cases be identical to each other. Humanity can exist in various degrees or
levels. At the very bottom, perhaps not even realized in the natural world, is the amoral
level humanity. This consists merely in an agent’s capacity to choose ends voluntarily
and not on the sole basis of instinct. An individual’s humanity, in its fully developed
form, would be the attainment of a good will or perfect moral personality. Korsgaard
makes a similar point when she writes, “Humanity, completed and perfected, becomes
personality, so that in treating the first as an end in itself we will inevitably be led to
realize the second.”103 Personality, on this reading, is a peculiar form of humanity that
sets its ends in a way that the maxim upon which the person acts in pursuing those ends is
capable of universal legislation.
Personality, understood as our capacity to respond to moral incentives, must
retain, when expressed in human beings, the capacity to set and choose ends. Personality,
in human beings, is achieved through a specific sort of exercise of one’s freedom (i.e. of
one’s humanity); furthermore, personality consists precisely in our capacity to set ends
being directed toward, not arbitrary and conditionally valuable ends, but rather necessary
and unconditionally valuable ones. Personality is only exercised when respect for the
moral law operates as the subjective determining factor of one’s will. Personality is
realized when one the moral law and pure respect for it are the determining grounds for
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one’s maxim: “The idea of the moral law alone, together with the respect that is
inseparable from it, cannot be properly called a predisposition to personality; it is
personality itself.”104
So while humanity is not in all cases identical with personality, it can be said that
humanity, fully developed and perfected, is identical with personality.105 In the Religion,
for instance, Kant describes personality as “the idea of humanity considered wholly
intellectually.”106
Humanity as is always sets ends from the perspective of an agent with a
predisposition to the good or to personality. In the Religion Kant describes the
predisposition to personality: “The predisposition to personality is the susceptibility to
respect for the moral law as of itself a sufficient incentive to the power of choice.”107 The
disposition to personality is present in all human beings that are capable of setting ends,
even wicked ones. In the Religion, for example, Kant writes, “The human being (even the
worst) does not repudiate the moral law, whatever his maxims, in rebellious attitude (by
revoking obedience to it). The law rather imposes itself irresistibly, because of his moral
predisposition; and if no other incentive were at work against it, he would also
incorporate it into his supreme maxim as sufficient determination of his power of choice,
i.e. he would be morally good.”108 The law imposes itself irresistibly on all of human
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beings and, as a result, even if a person has totally subverted his or her will and has
privileged self-love over morality, morality still presents itself to that person as
something that should be acted upon. Our very capacity to set ends is inextricably related
to our moral predisposition precisely because the moral law introduces constraints and
demands about what sorts of ends we can legitimately willfully pursue.
As a consequence of our predisposition to personality human beings are receptive
to morally relevant affective states. Humanity is always exercised with the morally
relevant feelings impinging on our affective states, either strongly as in cases where one
is tempted to commit an immoral act or weakly in cases where one seems to be choosing
between morally neutral alternatives. In instances where the determination of our will
was formed with reference to respect for the moral law (and only in cases like these),
personality and humanity become identical. An expression of one’s humanity becomes
also an expression of one’s personality, and vice versa.
Humanity, on this multi-faceted account, has as its core feature the capacity to set
and choose ends. Humanity is also inseparable, in the case of human beings, from the
improvement and cultivation of that very same capacity to set and choose ends. Humanity
exists in a cultivated state when a person exhibits fine taste and culture, as well as sound
moral virtue. Humanity, when perfected, also promotes the humanity of others so that
individuals are able to pursue ends that in turn promote one’s own humanity, as well as
the humanity of others.109 Humanity, then, is both a static, constant feature of (rational)
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human life and a dynamic process that is an ongoing project in human life. Humanity is a
constant in human life because rational human beings always have the capacity to set and
pursue ends of their own choosing; it is dynamic because it is always expressed in some
determinate way, which can be cultivated and improved throughout one’s life.
Humanity, then, is one way in which human beings exist in a state of moral
precariousness. Humanity can be exercised in a way that is consistent with morality, and
an expression of our commitment to the moral law, but it can just as easily be exercised
in a manner that works only to promote our happiness (at the expense of morality).
Humanity is a necessary feature of a morally good life (for human beings), but humanity
also figures crucially in a morally problematic life. Without the freedom to choose our
own ends, we cannot have an authentic moral status (either for good or for ill). Humanity,
in its capacity for freely setting ends, must be protected and promoted because freedom is
the only source of value in the world.110 But, by that same token, humanity is a necessary
component of an immoral human life in which a person sets and pursues ends that
conflict with the requirements of morality. Humanity, as we will see in the next chapter,
occupies a tenuous place on a continuum with animality and personality as its polar ends.

of the categorical imperative and his system of duties (developed in The Metaphysics of Morals).
On Guyer’s reading, Kant’s account of humanity, combined with the second formulation of the
categorical imperative, leads to the following moral obligation: “[O]ne must always use one’s
own capacity to set ends in a way compatible with the greatest possibility of other exercises of
this capacity by oneself and others, that is to say, in a way compatible with the greatest possible
use of freedom.”
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as saying, “Freedom…is the capacity which confers unlimited usefulness on all others. It is the
highest degree of life. It is the property that is a necessary condition underlying all perfections.”
He goes on, “[T]he inner worth of the world, the summum bonum, is freedom…Freedom is thus
the inner worth of the world.”
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CHAPTER 2
Dignity in Kant’s Moral Philosophy
Introduction
The notion that human beings have dignity, and that morality requires us to treat
others and ourselves with respect seems to be a broadly held and deeply felt moral
intuition. The Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights says, “the inherent
dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” According to the Universal
Declaration, then, all human beings possess dignity; dignity is not limited to certain
persons, but rather extends to “all members of the human family.” The importance of
human dignity is also affirmed in the Third Geneva Conventions, which prohibits,
“outrages on personal dignity” against prisoners of war. Social and political movements
from all over the world often appeal to the conscience of other people in terms of human
dignity and mutual respect. One of the striking features of these appeals to human dignity
is their democratic, egalitarian nature. Dignity is not something earned through
meritorious action, nor is it claimed on the basis of noble birth or high social standing.
When considering such deployments of the concept of dignity, it is reasonable to
look back to the history of moral thought to find antecedents and forerunners. Such
historically-oriented individuals would seem to find in Kant’s moral philosophy an earlier
formulation of the same concept of dignity. With Kant’s frequent and regular invocation
of the concept of human dignity, it might seem clear that Kant, in part, laid the
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foundation for modern conceptions of human dignity. The truth, though, is a bit more
complicated than it might initially appear. Kant’s account of human dignity bears some
clear resemblances to our shared, modern conception of dignity, but there are interesting
differences that we find as well. This chapter is an analysis Kant’s concept of dignity
(especially human dignity).
There are features of Kant’s moral philosophy that seem to resonate with moral
sentiments of this sort. That is, Kant’s moral philosophy seems to make similar claims
about the importance of human dignity. As we will see, Kant repeatedly makes reference
to the dignity of humanity, of human nature, and of human beings. This chapter examines
Kant’s views on human dignity. It argues that Kant affirms human dignity largely in
perfectionist terms regarding our capacity for freedom. It also argues that Kant’s
perfectionist understanding of human dignity nevertheless is ultimately broadly inclusive
and universal. That is, even though Kant claims that dignity rests upon the capacity for,
and proper use of, freedom, dignity is widely possessed, universally so, among rational
human beings.
In Section I, I will begin my examination of Kantian dignity by noting some of
the objects to which the term applies. I review passages where Kant claims that an object
or a thing has dignity. I emphasize the relationship between dignity and morally relevant
concepts, showing that Kant repeatedly claims that morality, the moral law, human
nature, human beings, and humanity all possess dignity.
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In Section II, I lay out a general definition for Kantian dignity, emphasizing its
relational component. That is, something has dignity when it is morally elevated over and
distinguished from something else. I also discuss the connection Kant draws between
sublimity and dignity. I claim that sublimity is a kind of dignity and that our moral being
is both dignified and sublime on the basis of its superiority over nature.
In Section III, I examine in further detail what it is about morality and humanity
that has dignity. That is, I examine the intrinsic properties of morality and humanity by
virtue of which they are elevated. I conclude by arguing that they both possess a
superiority over mere nature. I then consider the ways in which humanity can be
understood as being superior to nature and its relation to the moral law.
Section IV defends the claim that human dignity, for Kant, is based on our
capacity for freedom. And finally, Section V considers the relationship between respect
and Kantian dignity. Here, I try to reconcile the perfectionist tendencies in Kant’s
discussions of human dignity with his inclusive understanding of our duty to respect all
people. I conclude that Kant’s account of dignity shares with our modern notion of
human dignity the characteristics of universality and inalienability, but, unlike the
modern concept of human dignity, Kant grounds his notion of dignity in the ability of
human beings to attain virtue.111
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In his book Kant on Human Dignity, Oliver Sensen makes a similar claim in which he argues
that Kant’s views on dignity has both modern and pre-modern features. Pre-modern accounts of
dignity claim that dignity is less widely distributed and is limited to special human beings who
are elevated above ordinary human beings. Modern notions of dignity tend to be more egalitarian
and not merit-based (see Oliver Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity . De Gruyter: Boston, MA,
2011). My discussion of dignity departs with Sensen’s approach slightly in emphasis. In this
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I. What Has Dignity?
Kant repeatedly makes a connection between dignity and morality. That is,
dignity, for Kant, is a moral concept. He makes this connection between dignity and
morality in several ways: He claims that morality, the moral law, and duty have dignity.
In the Groundwork, Kant claims that morality has dignity112 and that it is only through
the lens of morality that anything whatsoever can possess dignity. In the second Critique
he describes the task of reason, in part, as the need to “work itself up as to gather strength
to resist inclinations by a lively representation of the dignity of the law…”113 Also in The
Metaphysics of Morals he warns against raising mere custom to “the dignity of the
law.”114 In addition to the moral law’s dignity, Kant also claims that humanity or human
nature has dignity. In the Groundwork, Kant writes the following: “[M]orality, and
humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity.”115
The idea that human nature itself has dignity seems to have been present in Kant’s
moral thinking from a rather early stage. In Observations on the feeling of the beautiful
and sublime, Kant claims that “true virtue” must be based on principles, which “are not
speculative rules, but the consciousness of a feeling that lives in every human breast and
that extends much further than to the special grounds of sympathy and complaisance. I
believe that I can bring all this together if I say that it is the feeling of the beauty and the
chapter I claim that Kant’s notion of dignity does indeed have a merit component, but I argue
that, on the whole, Kant’s account of human dignity is more modern than pre-modern. All human
beings, as long as they are rational (with their predisposition to the good in place), never lose
their dignity.
112
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dignity of human nature.”116 In the Groundwork, Kant also writes of the “dignity of
human nature and of every rational nature.”117 In the Religion, Kant again refers to the
“dignity of human nature” and praises the Stoics for correctly, in his view, basing their
moral philosophy on it, claiming, “they [the Stoics] could not have laid down a better or
nobler principle for foundation.”118
In the second Critique, Kant references the dignity of the human being. He claims
that what he calls the “pure moral motive…teaches the human being to feel his own
dignity.”119 Kant also repeatedly refers to the dignity of humanity. In the Metaphysics of
Morals, for instance, Kant refers to “the dignity of humanity within us” when discussing
our duty to avoid servility.120 These examples121 make plain, in my view, that Kant was
committed to the view that the moral law, morality, humanity, human nature, and human
beings have dignity. We now can begin to think about what Kant means by the dignity of
the moral law or the dignity of humanity.
II. Dignity, Sublimity, and Elevation
Dignity and sublimity are closely related concepts in Kant’s moral philosophy.
Human dignity is expressed, we will see, most pointedly when we act out of respect for
the moral law, and thereby check the influence of merely natural inclinations in the
determination of the ends we set. An action that is expressive of human dignity, for Kant,
116
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can rightly be called sublime. Kant writes, for instance, “Among moral qualities, true
virtue alone is sublime.”122 A brief examination of some of Kant’s remarks about the
sublime provides a way to understand Kantian dignity.
The sublime, for Kant, is, “that which is absolutely great,” and also “that which
is great beyond all comparison.”123 The truly sublime, according to Kant, is incapable
of being measured: “If…we call something not only great, but simply, absolutely great,
great in every respect (beyond all comparison), i.e., sublime, then one immediately sees
that we do not allow a suitable standard for it to be sought outside of it, but merely within
it.”124 It is impossible to bring to bear any “outside” standard regarding the sublime. The
sublime cannot be broken down into terms of something else. The magnitude of the
sublime is somehow radically untranslatable into sensory, empirical categories of
quantity or magnitude.
In his moral writings, Kant describes the moral law and humanity (particularly its
capacity for morality) in terms of sublimity. In Observations on the feeling of the
beautiful and sublime, Kant writes, “Among moral qualities, true virtue alone is
sublime.”125 A bit later, Kant claims that virtue becomes more sublime as it becomes
nobler.126 In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant describes the moral predisposition in
humanity as sublime.127 In the second Critique Kant claims that the moral law possesses
122
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“sublimity” and that it is a rather serious error to explain moral or practical concepts
solely in terms of “experiential consequences (so-called happiness).”128 A bit later in the
second Critique, Kant refers to self-sacrificing actions done “for the sake of duty alone”
as “noble and sublime.”129Also, in the Religion Kant writes that the respect we feel for
the law “rouses a feeling of the sublimity of our own vocation…”130 So Kant seems to
apply both sublimity and dignity to similar sorts of things.
The reason for this convergence of terms might be explained by Kant’s tendency
to think of both the sublime and the dignified in terms of elevation. Elevation is a
metaphor that Kant consistently applies both to sublimity and to dignity.131 The sublime
is a “disposition of the mind” that is always “striving to advance to the infinite.”132 Kant
describes the sublime as follows: “That is sublime which even to be able to think of
demonstrates a faculty of the mind that surpasses every measure of the senses.”133
The sublime, then, provides us with proof, or a demonstration, that there must be a
faculty of the mind that “surpasses” our senses’ capacity to measure.
This is particularly acutely dramatized in the case of the dynamical sublime,
which makes us experience the receding power of our natural selves in the face of the
irresistible power of nature and, at the same time, the retaining of our capacity for
morality: “[I]t [the dynamical sublime] reveals a capacity for judging ourselves as
128
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independent of it [nature] and a superiority over nature on which is grounded a selfpreservation of quite another kind than that which can be threatened and endangered by
nature outside us, whereby the humanity in our person remains undemeaned even though
the human being must submit to that domination.”134
As the sublime awakens in us recognition of a faculty of the mind that surpasses
every measure of the senses, human dignity rests upon the existence of the sublime self.
In the Groundwork, Kant claims that if one is presented with a truly moral act, then one’s
soul “elevates” and strives to act in a similar fashion.135 Human beings, when engaged in
a good moral act, achieve sublimity. Kant also claims that a will with pure respect for the
moral law is a “cast of mind” that is to be “cognized as dignity” and is “infinitely above
all price, with which it cannot be brought into comparison or competition at all without,
as it were, assaulting its holiness.”136 Similarly in the second Critique, Kant writes that
moral action, results in an “elevating” feeling. In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes
that humanity, through “our capacity for internal lawgiving” and our reverence for the
“(moral) human being within” our own person, we feel an “exaltation of the highest selfesteem…”137 A bit later in the same work, Kant writes that awareness of our moral and
“sublime vocation” brings about an “elation of spirit.”138 In the Religion, Kant writes,
“Now it is our universal human duty to elevate ourselves to this ideal of moral
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perfection” he also claims that the ideal of holiness is something to which we must strive
to “raise” ourselves.139
In a way similar to how the sublime is beyond all comparison, dignified things,
like the moral law and humanity, stand above any equivalence, or even comparison, with
the satisfaction of inclinations. The value of morality cannot be translated in terms of
inclination-satisfaction; the dignity of humanity, also, is not measurable in terms of
inclination-satisfaction. In fact, no amount of happiness (i.e. inclination satisfaction) can
be exchanged, at equal value, for one’s humanity. In the Groundwork, Kant writes, “In
the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price can be
replaced by something else as its equivalent; what on the other hand is raised above all
price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity.”140 If something has a dignity,
then, that thing cannot be replaced by something else (by a different sort of thing) of
equal value. Its value is radically incommensurable with other sorts of things. Kant
makes a similar point in his notes on moral philosophy when he writes, “A value: for
which something else can be given as an equivalence. Virtue has no price. Dignity is the
inner value, which therefore has no price.”141 In the Groundwork, Kant applies this basic
point to the distinction between the demands of morality and the desire for satisfaction of
inclinations; he claims that those things that can satisfy human inclinations have a price,
but not a dignity: “What is related to general human inclinations and needs has a market
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price.”142 By contrast, if something has a dignity, then it admits of no equivalent in terms
of pleasure: “[T]hat which constitutes the condition under which alone something can be
an end in itself has not merely a relative worth, that is, a price, but an inner worth, that is,
dignity.”143 Here, dignity is extended to “the condition under which alone something can
be an end in itself.” In other words, that in virtue of which it is possible for something to
be an end in itself has dignity.144 Kant then extends the concept of dignity to humanity
explicitly: “Now, morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an
end in itself, since only through this is it possible to be a lawgiving member in the
kingdom of ends. Hence morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is
that which alone has dignity.”145 So, both the moral law and humanity have dignity and
are both above and beyond price.
Dignity, then, is a peculiar sort of property. It is not a straightforward intrinsic
property things have, but rather is a property something has only considered in relation
with something else. Oliver Sensen also makes this point when he writes, “Ontologically
‘dignity’ refers to a relational property of being elevated, not to a non-relational value
property. ‘X has dignity’ is another expression for ‘X is elevated over Y.” 146 Something
has dignity only in comparison with things that merely have a price. A dignified thing,
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then, would be something that is elevated over anything that merely has a price, but not
an inner worth.
III. Dignity, Morality, and Humanity
A natural question to ask here would be the following: What is it about the moral
law and humanity that gives them dignity? The answer, hinted at just now, is that both
morality and humanity possess properties that transcend or rise above things that are
amenable to price. Put another way: They possess dignity on account of their elevation
over and their being superior to any satisfaction of one’s inclinations.
Morality requires us to set aside completely the force of our natural inclinations
and instead to act out of a sense of duty. In the Groundwork, Kant describes the
paradigmatic moral action as follows: “[A]n action of integrity done with steadfast soul,
apart from every view to advantage of any kind in this world or another and even under
the greatest temptations of need or allurement…”147 No amount of advantage or of
satisfaction of inclinations can, in any way, ground or motivate one’s will in a truly
virtuous action. That is, a moral act is done from duty, not from inclination. Earlier in the
Groundwork, Kant provides his famous definition of duty: “[D]uty is the necessity of an
action from respect for law.”148 An action from duty, furthermore, “is to put aside
entirely the influence of inclination and with it every object of the will…”149 A moral
agent, when committing a moral action, possesses a will that is determined by something
over and above our natural concern for happiness (i.e. the satisfaction of our inclinations),
147
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namely, the moral law itself and rational respect for it: “[H]ence there is left for the will
nothing that could determine it except objectively the law and subjectively pure respect
for this practical law, and so the maxim of complying with such a law even if it infringes
upon all my inclinations.”150 This rather stark formulation is an expression of Kant’s view
that morality has dignity because the moral law requires a total repudiation of the
inclinations in forming and motivating our actions, in favor of a higher moral motivation.
In fact, Kant claims that the sublimity of moral action is augmented, or at least
made clearer, in cases where there are powerful inclinations weighing against doing one’s
duty: “[T]he sublimity and inner dignity of the command is all the more manifest the
fewer are the subjective causes in favor of it and the more there are against it, without
thereby weakening in the least the necessitation by the law or taking anything away from
its validity.”151 The command of the moral law is sublime and possesses inner dignity
because we recognize its validity in all cases, even when there are powerful inclinations
standing in opposition to it. While harmonious inclinations can accompany a moral action
(for instance, one can, indeed should, feel benevolence for others while engaged in
charitable giving, so long as one is motivated only by respect for the law), inclinations
can nevertheless play no role in forming the maxim upon which one acts. Furthermore, if
acting on a moral imperative would run afoul of every single inclination to happiness we
may have, we must still act on the moral imperative, and thereby frustrate all our
inclinations. Morality, then, possesses dignity in part through its opposition to and
superiority over the dictates of the inclinations.
150
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We have seen that the ground for morality’s dignity consists in its superiority over
the merely natural (i.e. inclinations). Its necessity and validity obtain even in cases where
all inclinations are opposed to it. We now turn to the ground of humanity’s dignity. In
order for the claim “humanity has dignity” to be comprehensible, one has to understand
what Kant means by “humanity.” A helpful way to introduce Kant’s concept of humanity
is by reflecting on its relationship with what Kant calls “animality.” In the Religion, Kant
distinguishes between three “original predispositions.”152 An original predisposition is a
trait that something has simply by being the sort of thing it is. In the Religion, Kant
writes, “They [original predispositions] are original, for they belong to the possibility of
human nature.” He goes on to write, “By the predispositions of a being we understand the
constituent parts required for it as well as the forms of their combination that make for
such a being.”153 The three original predispositions Kant lays out in the Religion are the
following: animality, humanity, and personality. For our purposes here we need only
focus our attention on the distinction between animality and humanity (we will consider
in some detail the distinction between the predisposition to humanity and to personality a
bit later). The predisposition to animality consists in those drives and tendencies we have
in virtue of our belonging to the natural world and of having what Kant calls a “sensuous
nature”154 (Sinnlichkeit): “The predisposition to animality in the human being may be
brought under the general title of physical or merely mechanical self-love, i.e. a love for
which reason is not required.”155 Animality is non-rational. That is, one can have a
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predisposition to animality without possessing reason. Kant introduces the capacity for
reason with the predisposition to humanity. The predisposition to humanity concerns
human beings’ “rational being” in additional to its animal being.156 Rationality, then, is
the characteristic that distinguishes humanity from animality. Kant at times uses the
terms ‘humanity’ and ‘rational nature’ interchangeably.157 This is especially evident in
the Groundwork, where, for instance, Kant refers to “the mere dignity of humanity as
rational nature…”158 Rational nature is expressed in choosing and setting ends. In The
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes, “The capacity to set oneself an end—any end
whatsoever—is what characterizes humanity (as distinguished from animality).”159 Kant
makes a similar point in the Groundwork, when he writes, “Rational nature is
distinguished from the rest of nature by this, that it sets itself an end.”160
The capacity to set and choose ends means, for Kant, independence from our
natural instincts and inclinations. Kant, as we saw earlier, understands dignity as
involving an elevation of one thing over something else. The dignity of humanity consists
in its capacity to set aside completely the influence of inclinations in one’s decision
making. We can now refine this idea by saying that members of humanity are free to set
aside any particular inclination in setting and choosing ends. That is, members of
humanity can deliberate on their inclinations and then set ends according to their
deliberation. The capacity to set ends freely, then, must involve the capacity to curb one’s
156
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inclinations. Non-rational animals (i.e. creatures with a predisposition to animality, but
not to humanity) are capable of intentional activity; they may even have the capacity to
make choices and express preferences. In the Collins Lectures, Kant says, “All animals
have the capacity to use their powers according to choice. Yet this choice is not free, but
necessitated by incentives and stimuli.”161 If the choice one makes is determined solely
by “incentives and stimuli,” then one is not exercising humanity, but rather mere
animality. Kant also discusses incentives in the Groundwork; there he describes
incentives as a subjective state that motivates one to act. He writes, “The subjective
ground of desire is an incentive.”162 Kant reiterates this definition of an incentive in the
second Critique. An incentive is “the subjective determining ground of the will.”163 A
moral action cannot be motivated by incentives, understood as the subjective ground of
desire or of the will.
An incentive is a kind of enticement to act on the basis of an interest in satisfying
an inclination. A good will acts solely from duty and not on the basis of incentives. In the
Groundwork, Kant distinguishes between an incentive, which is grounded in one’s
particular inclinations and a motive, which is not based on narrow self-interested
inclinations, but which hold for all rational beings: “[T]he objective ground of volition is
a motive; hence the distinction between subjective ends, which rest on incentives, and
objective ends, which depend on motives, which hold for every rational being.”164 What
separates humanity from animality, then, is its capacity to set ends on the basis of
161
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something other than merely subjectively determined incentives (i.e. the capacity to set
ends independently of what instinct and inclination may recommend).
Humanity, then, consists in the capacity to set and choose ends for oneself,
independent of the dictates of inclination.165 It seems natural, then, to suppose that
humanity has dignity insofar as it is elevated above mere nature (i.e. inclinations) in its
capacity to choose ends freely.166 In the Groundwork, though, Kant is a bit more specific
in the particular reason why humanity has dignity. There, Kant claims that humanity has
dignity, “insofar as it is capable of morality.”167 The phrase “capable of morality” merits
some consideration, especially since Kant oftentimes describes the dignity of humanity
specifically with regard to humanity’s relation to the moral law. Is humanity, or rational
nature, necessary and sufficient for being capable of morality, or is there another faculty
or property that moral action requires? It seems that Kant is committed to the view that
the capacity for morality, in created rational beings, certainly involves humanity, but that
it also requires what he variously calls a “predisposition to personality” or a
“predisposition to the good.”168
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Kant sometimes describes humanity solely in terms of instrumental rationality,
without reference to the moral law.169 That is, possession of a rational nature is consistent
with indifference to the moral law. Humanity therefore would be capable of existing
without receptivity to morality. Revisiting Kant’s definition of humanity in The
Metaphysics of Morals, he writes, “The capacity to set oneself an end—any end
whatsoever—is what characterizes humanity (as distinguished from animality).”170
Humanity is characterized by the capacity to set “any end whatsoever,” presumably both
morally permissible and morally impermissible ends. In the Religion, Kant carefully
distinguishes between the predisposition to humanity and to personality. The
predisposition to humanity, as we saw before, consists in possession of a rational nature.
The predisposition to personality, by contrast, concerns a human being as both “a rational
and at the same time as responsible being.”171 He also writes, “The predisposition to
personality is the susceptibility to respect for the moral law as of itself a sufficient
incentive to the power of choice.”172 He goes on to describe the predisposition to
personality as “susceptibility to simple respect for the moral law within us…”173
Personality, not humanity, is responsive to the moral law.
In a footnote in the Religion, Kant explains that personality cannot simply be
included in the concept of humanity:
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We cannot consider this predisposition as already included
in the concept of the preceding one, but must necessarily
treat it as a special predisposition…The most rational
being of this world might still need certain incentives,
coming to him from the objects of inclination, to
determine his power of choice…Were this law not given
to us from within, no amount of subtle reasoning on our
part would produce it or win our power of choice from
determination by all other incentives (of our freedom) and
thereby also of the accountability of all our actions.174

Without susceptibility to the moral law, it is not clear how a person could engage in
morally worthy action. Humanity, without personality, is capable of being exercised in
the service of incentives other than the moral law: “The second [predisposition to
humanity] is rooted in a reason which is indeed practical, but only as subservient to
other incentives…”175 Morality, though, presents itself to us as something that is
necessary and universally valid for all rational beings. Through our predisposition to
personality, we experience the moral law as the necessary determining ground of our
will. That is, we take on an interest in the moral law because of our disposition to
personality. Kant writes, that the moral law “announces itself to be itself an incentive,
and, indeed, the highest incentive.”176
Without our taking a rational interest in the moral law, we (as human beings,
who must act on the basis of interest) would not be capable of moral action. Toward the
end of the Groundwork, Kant claims that the “idea of a pure world of understanding as a
whole of all intelligences, to which we ourselves belong as rational beings” is “useful
174
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and permitted for producing in us a lively interest in the moral law…”177 In the second
Critique, Kant claims that pure respect for the moral law “produces an interest in
compliance with the law which we call moral interest…”178 Our capacity for moral
interest resides, it seems, in our predisposition to personality, not in our predisposition to
humanity. Since human dignity, according to Kant, seems to be grounded in our capacity
for morality, humanity alone, it would seem, is an insufficient ground for the basis of
human dignity. Humanity, as Kant claims in the Religion, is “subservient to other
incentives.”179 Human dignity must then be based on possession of humanity and of
personality. Without personality, our end-setting capacity can only be put in the service
of satisfying inclinations and not in the service of morality.
Why, then, does Kant repeatedly claim that humanity has dignity? If dignity
consists in capacity for morality and personality is required for that capacity, why does
Kant identify humanity as possessing dignity, absolute worth, and as existing as an end in
itself?180 The answer, it seems, has to be that there is a degree of flexibility in the way
Kant deploys terms like ‘humanity’ and ‘personality.’ While there is, to be sure, an
authentic distinction between the two in the Religion, perhaps, the distinction is not as
stark in other places. In other words, the distinction between humanity and personality
may not be as clear as it appears.
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There are at least two ways in which humanity and personality can coincide. First,
in the case of human beings, humanity and personality are both ever-present in our nature
and in that sense can never be separated. In the Religion, Kant claims that the
predispositions to humanity and to personality are “original,” which, as we saw, means
that they are included in the very concept of human nature itself: “They [predispositions]
are original if they belong with necessity to the possibility of this being, but contingent if
the being in question is possible in itself also without them.”181 In the Religion, Kant
writes, “The human being (even the worst) does not repudiate the moral law, whatever
his maxims, in rebellious attitude (by revoking obedience to it). The law rather imposes
itself irresistibly, because of his moral predisposition; and if no other incentive were at
work against it, he would also incorporate it into his supreme maxim as sufficient
determination of his power of choice, i.e. he would be morally good.”182 The moral law
always inspires in human beings an attitude of respect (insofar as human beings are
incapable of repudiating or renouncing it). Whenever a human being is going about
deliberating about which ends to pursue, the moral law will always figure into one’s
deliberations as something that should be accounted for and incorporated into one’s
maxim.
There is another, perhaps stronger, sense in which one could attempt to draw a
connection between humanity and personality. One could attempt to show that humanity
and personality are related in such a way that the one leads to the other. That is,
personality would be derivable from the humanity of human beings. Though I will
181
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ultimately argue that such an attempt would fail, there are nevertheless two interesting
ways in which humanity and personality relate to each other, without actually forging a
bona fide connection. In other words, while the distinction between humanity and
personality is unbridgeable, a careful look at them brings them closer together; the
distinction is perhaps not as stark as Kant seems to make in the Religion.
Humanity, as we saw earlier, consists in the capacity to choose among alternatives
in setting ends. Kant writes, “The predispositions to humanity can be brought under the
general title of a self-love which is physical yet involves comparison (for which reason is
required)…”183 The capacity to make comparisons, between the happiness of oneself and
that of others, as well as between the efficacy of means in achieving one’s happiness,
involves use of one’s reason without reference to morality and its separate requirements.
The exercise of one’s humanity always involves making value judgments about
the particular ends that one sets. Christine Korsgaard makes this observation when she
writes, “the distinctive feature of humanity, as such, is simply the capacity to take a
rational interest in something: to decide, under the influence of reason, that something is
desirable, that it is worthy of pursuit or realization, that it is to be deemed important or
valuable, not because it contributes to survival or instinctual satisfaction, but as an end—
for its own sake.”184 Instinct is the sole basis on which animals act. So, while animals
may have preferences, their actions are determined entirely by instinct. Human beings,
insofar as they have reason, are not determined by instinct in the setting and choosing of
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ends. In Conjectural beginning of human history, Kant illustrates this point when he
writes, “Instinct, that voice of God which all animals obey must have guided the novice.”
He goes on to write, “As long as the inexperienced human being obeyed this call of
nature, he did well for himself. Yet reason soon began to stir and sought through
comparison of that which gratified with that which was represented to him by another
sense than the one to which instinct was bound…”185 Reason leads to reflection and
comparison between different possible ends. At this early stage in human history, Kant
does not suppose that the moral law presents itself clearly as an alternative to instincts,
but, crucially, reason does make it possible to begin to make value judgments and
comparisons between possible ends.
Humanity possesses reason, but it is used solely in the service of self-love.
Reason may suggest particular means and ways of achieving the satisfaction of one’s
inclinations; it may even produce a hierarchy of inclinations and deem some more worthy
of satisfaction than others. Humanity, without personality, lacks a moral incentive. The
moral law does not present itself as required. The most emphatic inclination we have is
our desire for freedom (understood as not being under the control of another). Kant’s
discussion of this particular inclination, and his description of some psychological states
that accompany it, begin to shift the exercise of our humanity as solely concerned with
out own freedom towards a recognition that the freedom of others may need to be taken
into account.
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A Natural Connection Between Humanity and Personality?
In Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view (hereafter Anthropology) Kant
claims that human beings have a passion for freedom. The discussion on our passion for
freedom takes place in a section entitled “On the inclination to freedom as a passion.”186
Kant had earlier defined passion as follows: “Inclination that can be conquered only with
difficulty or not at all by the subject’s reason is passion.”187 Additionally, Kant defines
inclination as “[h]abitual sensible desire.”188 Kant, then, seems committed to the claim
that human beings have a natural and habitual sensible desire for freedom that is difficult,
or perhaps even impossible, to eradicate. Kant writes, “For the natural human being this
[passion for freedom] is the most violent inclination of all…”189 Our inclination for
freedom is not simply one inclination among many. We desire freedom with great a vigor
that is unequalled by our desires for all other things.190
Kant, in this section, defines happiness largely in negative terms. In other words,
freedom is defined in terms of not existing in a particular state, under a particular set of
circumstances. Freedom, here, seems to consist in not being in a position where your
happiness depends on the choices that someone else makes. Such a situation, even if one
186
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is under the thumb of a benevolent person, cannot possibly be a happy state: “Whoever is
able to be happy only according to another person’s choice (no matter how benevolent
this other person may be) rightly feels that he is unhappy.”191 Kant argues that the un-free
person rightly judges him or herself as unhappy because living under the control of
another is not a sound guarantee for securing one’s happiness: “For what guarantee has
he hat this powerful fellow human being’s judgment about his well-being will agree with
his own?”192 Even a relatively benevolent person is not an especially reliable provider of
one’s happiness and is likely to produce cases in which a person’s views about his or her
happiness differs from the more powerful person. Furthermore, a person who stands to
lose his or her freedom to another has good anthropological reasons for suspecting the
supposed benevolence of the would-be master, namely the fact that people have a natural
inclination to dominate others in the service of their happiness (and often with
indifference to the happiness of others).193
Interestingly, Kant does not stop at the claim that we have a violent inclination for
freedom; he additionally claims that, in the interest of acquiring or protecting our
freedom, we make a demand on others not to impede on our freedom. Kant writes that
our passion for freedom places the human being “in a condition where he cannot avoid
making reciprocal claims on others.”194 One could imagine humans as being possessive
and jealous of their freedom without making a claim that others are bound to respect their
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freedom. The inclination to freedom, in such a case, would express itself solely in the
readiness to defend one’s freedom against anyone who might impede it. Kant describes
this readiness as a “state of continuous warfare, by which he intends to keep others as far
away from him as possible…”195 In such a scenario, those who defend their freedom
make no demand to others that they are bound to respect their freedom. Rather, they
simply make it evident that they will not surrender their freedom without a robust and
violent defense of it. Kant, though, does not claim that the human defense of freedom
does not solely consist in violent defense of it, rather people do indeed claim that others
have an obligation to honor their freedom. Kant, as we saw, calls demands of this sort
“reciprocal claims on others.”196
We experience coercion or lack of outer freedom as an injustice. While we may
not have a clear understanding of why it is unjust, or the authentic rational ground for our
complaint, we nevertheless have an inchoate notion of moral outrage. Kant writes, “Even
the child who has just wrenched itself from the mother’s womb seems to enter the world
with loud cries, unlike all other animals, simply because it regards the inability to make
use of its limbs as constraint, and thus it immediately announces its claim to freedom (a
representation that no other animal has.”197 In a note to this passage, Kant develops this
idea further, “[T]he fact that his feeling of uncomfortableness is not due to bodily pain
but to an obscure idea (or a representation analogous to it) of freedom and its hindrance,
injustice, is disclosed a few months later after the birth by the tears which accompany his
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screaming; they indicate a kind of exasperation when he strives to approach certain
objects or in general merely strives to change his position and feels himself hindered in
it.”198 Human beings are distinct from other animals, in part, because the frustration of a
wholly natural desire (freedom of movement) is tinged with an inchoate sense of beings
wrongly constrained. In our relation to other people, also, we come to expect them to
honor our outer freedom through our making “reciprocal claims” on them.
Kant makes a similar point in a note he wrote in his copy of Observations. There,
he claims that we have a natural abhorrence of servitude, which he describes in terms that
are similar to the deprivation of outer freedom. He writes:
The human being has his own inclinations, and by means of
his capacity of choice has a clue from nature to conduct his
actions in accordance with these. Nothing can be more
appalling than that the action of one human stand under the
will of another. Hence no abhorrence can be more natural
than that which a person has against servitude. On this
account a child cries and becomes bitter if it has to do what
another wants without one having made an effort to make
that pleasing to him. And it wishes only to become a man
quickly and to operate in accordance with its own will.199

Here, might seem reasonable to suppose that Kant envisioned the particular human
inclination to freedom as providing a foundation for the moral law. Nature, through
inclinations, has provided human beings with a “clue” about how to conduct their actions
by means of our “capacity of choice.” If, in the Religion, Kant describes humanity as
operating solely with ends that are set by one’s inclinations (and by one’s capacity to
198
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choose one end among many), then perhaps the strongest and most basic inclination
(desire for freedom) can serve as a bridge between humanity and personality. Since we
cannot help but make demands on others to respect our freedom. We protect our freedom,
on this reading, by making a reciprocal demand that if the others will not impede my
freedom, I will not impede theirs. The relationship would not be an analytic one, but
would only establish itself with the discovery of a particular inclination (through
anthropological and psychological inquiry) that is so highly valued by human beings, that
they naturally take on the requirements of morality (namely, protecting and promoting
the freedom of all, not just of oneself) in order to preserve and protect its satisfaction.
However, natural it may seem to make this connection, our strong natural
inclination for freedom cannot serve as the basis of a connection between humanity and
personality, for basic Kantian reasons: a merely natural inclination cannot serve as the
foundation for morality. Even though the result of this movement from humanity to
personality (via a consideration of the human desire for freedom) does end up in basing
one’s choices on the freedom of all, the fundamental starting point on which the whole
edifice of morality rests is a psychological fact about human beings. In the beginning of
the Groundwork, Kant describes his project as an attempt to “work out for once a pure
moral philosophy, completely cleansed of everything that may be only empirical and that
belongs to anthropology…”200 While empirical and anthropological claims may have a
role at some level in moral reasoning, they cannot serve any function whatsoever in
establishing why we possess personality in addition to humanity. So, while our natural

200

G 4:389.
72

inclination to freedom does seem to resonate with our ultimate moral vocation, and
perhaps even the existence of such a strong desire for freedom provides a clue that we
have a moral being that is not possessed by other animals and that thereby raises us above
nature, it cannot provide a substantial link between our desire for our own freedom and
our duty to preserve and promote the freedom of others.
A Metaphysical Connection?
If a connection between humanity and personality cannot be based upon an
empirical and psychological insight, then perhaps a connection is located in rational
nature itself. A connection based on rational nature would constitute a link not based on
natural inclination, but rather on the basis of rationality itself and its necessary
relationship to morality.
Humanity’s value resides in its capacity for freedom. Protecting and promoting
humanity involves protecting and promoting the exercise of human freedom (and the
freedom of all rational beings in general). The second formulation of the categorical
imperative claims: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the
person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”201 One
way in which a person can reduce others to mere means to an end is to tell them a false
promise in order to cause a person to behave in a way that will satisfy an inclination one
has. In such a case one person (the liar) would be putting another’s humanity (their
capacity to choose how to act) in the service only of the liar’s ends, without regard for the
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ends of the other person. Such a scenario is rather similar to the case that Kant laid out in
the Anthropology concerning the happiness of someone depending on the choice of
another. Kant claims that being in such a state of dependency is (rightly) abhorrent to us.
Kant’s justification for describing a false promise in terms of treating others as mere
means goes as follows: “For, he whom I want to use for my purposes by such a promise
cannot possibly agree to my way of behaving toward him, and so himself contain the end
of this action.”202 This may be read prima facie as providing a strong empirical
hypothesis, according to which no human being actually would agree to be lied to and to
be put in the service of another’s ends on the basis of disinformation. If Kant were
making an empirical claim here, his mode of argument would be similar to the discussion
in the Anthropology about our natural inclination to freedom and our disinclination to
servitude. It seems, though, that Kant is not making a naturalistic claim here at all, but is
rather making a claim about to what it is possible for a rational being to consent. Another
rational being, for Kant, “cannot possibly agree” to be used as a mere means, not because
of an inclination that they may have, but rather because of rational nature itself.
A bit earlier in the Groundwork, Kant makes a claim that also potentially can be
read as a naturalistic claim: “The human being necessarily represents his own existence
in this way; so far it is thus a subjective principle of human actions.”203 As Kant notes,
this sort of description of human beings is based merely on inclinations (which are
subjective, as opposed to objective) and is therefore not adding anything new to the
discussion he had in the Anthropology about the human desire for freedom. He continues,
202
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though: “But every rational being also represents his existence in this way consequent on
just the same rational ground that also holds for me; thus it is at the same time an
objective principle from which, as a supreme practical ground, it must be possible to
derive all laws of the will.”204 The basis for viewing oneself as an end in itself is no
longer merely natural (i.e. a desire or inclination) but rather “rational” and “objective.”
The wrongness of exploiting others for one’s own private ends now is justified through
its basis in a rational ground, common to all rational beings.
My self-image as an end in itself and my rational demand to be treated as such is
based on the same ground as other rational beings similar self-images and rational
demands. The rational ground seems to be the freedom that all rational beings possess,
and the dignity that each has on the basis of that freedom. The human being as an end in
itself provides an objective end for guiding one’s moral choices, one for which all
rational beings must, insofar as they are rational, strive. In describing human beings as
ends in themselves, Kant writes, “These, therefore, not merely subjective ends, the
existence of which as an effect of our action has a worth for us, but rather objective ends,
that is, beings the existence of which is in itself an end, and indeed one such that no other
end, to which they would serve merely as means, can be put in place…”205 An objective
end has a status (a worth) that is exalted above any other merely subjective end. Kant
goes on to write, “…since without it [an objective end] nothing of absolute worth would
be found anywhere; but if all worth were conditional and therefore contingent, then no
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supreme practical principle for reason could be found anywhere.”206 Only rational beings,
viewed as ends in themselves, possess absolute worth: “But suppose there were
something the existence of which in itself has an absolute worth, something which as an
end in itself could be a ground of determinate laws; then in it, and in it alone, would lie
the ground of a possible categorical imperative, that is, of a practical law.”207 Kant
follows this discussion immediately with his claim that “the human being and in general
every rational being exists as an end in itself…”208 The rational basis for viewing oneself
as an end in itself, then, is not simply a strong inclination to outer freedom, but rather a
rational recognition of the absolute worth one has on the basis of one’s humanity. If one
is to remain rational in his or her demand that humanity (in his or her own person) be
respected, then one must also recognize, preserve, and promote the humanity in others.
Personality, then, is possession of a rational nature, coupled with this recognition.
Kant’s discussion, though, seems simply to assume that human beings view
themselves as ends in themselves on the basis of a rational ground and that such a rational
ground has the power to motivate us in our capacity of choice. That is, he seems to
suppose, without argument, that we are receptive to the demands of morality and aware
of the absolute worth of our freedom. Kant does indeed seem to hold, ultimately, that we
are aware of our moral obligations and are affected by the moral law (i.e. possess a
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predisposition to personality) on the basis of an indemonstrable and immediate “fact of
pure reason.”209 Kant, in the Critique of Practical Reason, writes:
Consciousness of this fundamental law may be called a fact of
reason because one cannot reason it out from antecedent data
of reason, for example, from consciousness of freedom (since
this is not antecedently given to us) and because it instead
forces itself upon us of itself as a synthetic a priori proposition
that is not based on any intuition, either pure or empirical,
although it would be analytic if freedom of the will were
presupposed; but for this, as a positive concept, an intellectual
intuition would be required, which certainly cannot be
assumed here.210

The categorical imperative applies to us, but we only know this through a fact of reason,
not through a demonstration of its validity. We again are a breaking point between
humanity and personality. We recognize our own legitimate claim to freedom on the
basis of our humanity (i.e. on our capacity for freedom), but we lack an account, without
assumption, of the rational interest we take in the moral law (and in freedom for all
rational beings).
If one takes our freedom as a given (as a fact of reason), then ultimately, there are
two basic principles that one can apply in setting and choosing ends: satisfying one’s
desires or abiding by the moral law.211 In the Groundwork, Kant simply assumes that if
inclinations are not going to provide the motivational grounds for the will, then the only
thing left to do so would be the moral law. In introducing the universal law formulation
of the categorical imperative at the end of Section I of the Groundwork, Kant writes,
209
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“Since I have deprived the will of every impulse that could arise for it from obeying some
law, nothing is left but the conformity of actions as such with universal law…”212 In the
Religion, Kant describes the moral situation of human beings as the struggle to bring two
volitional principles into a proper ordering: that of self-love and that of morality.213 He
claims that the moral law and the “law of self-love…cannot stand on equal footing, but
one must be subordinated to the other…”214 For any end that one sets, the reason one sets
it, ultimately, is either based on considerations of self-interest (i.e. out of self-love) or it is
based on considerations of the moral law and one’s duty. In the latter case, choosing the
end and pursuing it is either consistent with the moral law or it is actually required by the
moral law. In either case, the moral law must be the basic ground in determining the
content of one’s will. In Kant’s terms, it must be “incorporated” into one’s maxim.215 If
one sets an end or makes a choice to neglect the demands of the moral law and to violate
it, then one has willingly debased one’s humanity by putting it to use in a way that is no
different than the way non-rational animals make choices on the basis of inclinations. In
the Collins Lectures, Kant says, “All animals have the capacity to use their powers
according to choice. Yet this choice is not free, but necessitated by incentives and stimuli.
Their actions contain bruta necessitas [animal necessity]. If all creatures had such a
choice, tied to sensory drives, the world would have no value.” If one sets ends solely in
accordance with one’s instincts, then one is forfeiting one’s humanity, and also one’s
dignity. Instead of being determined by the moral law within oneself and by autonomy,
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one is allowing nature, in the form of instincts and inclinations, to push oneself around.
If one were truly to exercise one’s humanity, then one would choose, set, and pursue ends
that are consistent with, and determined by, the moral law and its requirements.
Furthermore, any and all failures to conform one’s will to the moral law are expressions
of one’s mere animality and not one’s personality. Humanity, when perfected, would be
identical with expressing one’s personality.
In the case of human beings, humanity could not really exist without personality.
Without a rational interest for the moral law, then, humanity would lapse into mere
animality. In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant describes what he calls “certain moral
endowments” that are subjective consequences of our receptivity to the moral law: moral
feeling, conscience, love of human beings, and self-esteem. In his discussion of these
four moral endowments, Kant seems to be operating under the assumption that all human
beings have a predisposition to personality (and therefore that the exercise of one’s
humanity will always be accompanied by a concern for the moral law in one’s
deliberations). He writes, “To have these predispositions cannot be considered a duty;
rather every human being has them, and it is by virtue of them that he can be put under an
obligation.–Consciousness of them is not of empirical origin; it can, instead, only follow
from consciousness of a moral law, as the effect this has on the mind.”216 The existence
of these endowments in all people cannot serve as proof that the moral law applies to us,
but they are in concert with the assumption that the moral law does indeed apply to us.
They are the effects that would befall human beings who existed as moral beings.
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In discussing moral feeling, Kant writes, “No human being is entirely without
moral feeling, for were he completely lacking in receptivity to it he would be morally
dead; and if (to speak in medical terms) the moral vital force could no longer excite this
feeling, then humanity would dissolve (by chemical laws, as it were) into mere animality
and be mixed irretrievably with the mass of other natural beings.”217 Of course since the
predisposition to personality is “original,” it is not really possible for one to lose it
(without also perhaps losing one’s capacity to set and choose ends freely). In other words,
no person is completely lacking moral feeling. Kant writes, “[E]very human being (as a
moral being) has it [moral feeling] in him originally.”218 We can, and do, and an
obligation to cultivate and perfect our moral feeling, which is accomplished by
meditating on its source: “Obligation with regard to moral feeling can be only to cultivate
it and to strengthen it through wonder at its inscrutable source.”219 This “inscrutable
source” seems to be the part of us that is receptive to moral incentives, and not mere
natural ones: “This [cultivation and strengthening or one’s moral feeling] comes about by
its being shown how it is set apart from any pathological stimulus and is induced most
intensely in its purity by merely rational representation.”220

IV. Dignity and Freedom
Human dignity, then, is grounded in the capacity to set ends apart from instinct;
put another way: dignity is grounded in the capacity to set ends freely. The dignity of
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humanity therefore consists in freedom. Kant expresses this point in a note when he
writes, “The dignity of humanity in one’s own person is personality itself, that is,
freedom; for one is only an end in oneself insofar as one is a being that can set ends
oneself.”221 One can elevate oneself above nature only by setting aside completely the
influence of inclinations and instead acting on the basis of pure respect for the moral law.
In a note, Kant writes, “Freedom has a dignity on account of its independence; it also has
a high price, for through it we are able to become authors of the good in accordance with
our own concepts, which we can extend and multiply far beyond the natural instincts of
animals.”222
Human dignity, though, is grounded in the possibility of fulfilling one’s capacity
for freedom.223 That is, a person’s dignity, in some sense, depends on actually rising
above mere animality and one’s natural instincts. In another note on moral philosophy,
Kant writes, “The dignity of human nature lies solely in freedom; through it we alone can
become worthy of any good. But the dignity of a human being (worthiness) rests on the
use of freedom, whereby he makes himself worthy of everything good.”224 Humans
become worthy of happiness only through the proper use of one’s reason.
Not only does freedom make people worthy of happiness, freedom is that which
makes value possible in the world. There can be no value in the world without freedom:
“Freedom…is the capacity which confers unlimited usefulness on all the others. It is the
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highest degree of life.” If no creatures in the world were free, then “the world would have
no value.” With the possibility of freedom, though, it also becomes possible for there to
be value in the world: “But the inner worth of the world, the summum bonum, is freedom
according to choice that is not necessitated to act. Freedom is thus the inner worth of the
world.”225
Freedom, then, is a kind of precondition for anything else to carry value (as
opposed to carrying a mere price). That is, one can never rightly forfeit one’s freedom,
even if one would thereby gain immense satisfaction of one’s inclinations (such as
gaining massive amounts of wealth and power, for instance, in order to achieve
happiness). In the case of human beings, only a free human being can have dignity. As
Kant writes in the note quoted above, “[T]he dignity of a human being (worthiness) rests
on the use of freedom…”226 Kant, in a perhaps rather extreme formulation contained in
the Collins Lectures, claims that life itself has no value aside from freedom (that is, using
one’s freedom in a morally proper fashion): “It is better to sacrifice life than to forfeit
morality. It is not necessary to live, but it is necessary that, so long as we live, we do so
honourably…”227 Kant, then, seems committed to a generally perfectionist conception of
dignity.228 Free rational beings have dignity insofar as they use their freedom properly,
which means they do not allow inclinations (no matter how numerous and powerful) to
dictate one’s ends. On this reading, dignity is not a widely possessed property among
human beings. Kant, at various times, expresses considerable skepticism about their
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being any authentic instances of virtue at all. So he is skeptical that human beings have
ever truly overcome the inclinations of self-love and have acted with a good will. In the
next section I will try to show that Kant nevertheless holds that dignity is in fact widely
possessed by human beings through their status as ends-in-themselves.
V. Dignity, Respect, and Contempt
Kant claims that beings with dignity are also ends-in-themselves and are owed
respect by all other rational beings. In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes, “[A]
human being considered as a person, that is, as the subject of a morally practical reason,
is exalted above any price; for as a person he is not to be valued merely as a means to the
ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end in itself, that is, he possesses a
dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all other
rational beings in the world.”229 People are entitled to respect from others on account of
their dignity. Kant writes, “The respect that I have for others or that another can require
from me is therefore a recognition of a dignity in other human beings, that is, of a worth
that has no price, no equivalent for which the object could be exchanged.”230 Human
dignity, then, presents all rational beings with a requirement to treat all fellow rational
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beings with respect. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes, “Every human being has
a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow human beings and is in turn bound to respect
every other. Humanity itself is a dignity; for a human being cannot be used merely as a
means by any human being (either by others or even by himself) but must always be used
at the same time as an end. It is just in this that his dignity (personality) consists, by
which he raises himself above all other beings in the world that are not human
beings…”231 When one possesses dignity, one is also to be valued not merely as a means
to some end, but rather also as an end in itself. Human beings are to be treated with
respect on account of their status as dignified beings.
If we have a perfectionist understanding of dignity, though, it seems that we are to
respect only those who possess true freedom (i.e. moral worth or virtue). This would be a
troubling conclusion. It seems to come into tension with Kant’s more universal-sounding
declarations of the duty to respect all persons, even vicious persons who clearly are not
free within the perfectionist framework. In the Collins Lectures, for instance, Kant says,
“Humanity, however, is worthy of respect, and even though somebody may be a bad
man, the humanity in his person is entitled to respect.”232 In fact, Kant clearly states that
we have a duty to respect others: “To be contemptuous of others, that is, to deny them the
respect owed to human beings in general, is in every case contrary to duty; for they are
human beings.”233
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The basic way to reconcile a perfectionist interpretation of Kantian dignity with
his inclusive remarks about the duty to respect all human beings, including vicious ones,
is in Kant’s claim that a person can command respect as a moral being (that is, as a
rational creature that can set ends freely and takes on an interest in the moral law) while
at the same time, through his actions, make himself unworthy of respect. Kant makes this
claim when he writes, “I cannot deny all respect to even a vicious man as a human being;
I cannot withdraw at least the respect that belongs to him in his quality as a human being,
even though by his deeds he makes himself unworthy of it.”234
Human dignity obtains when a person is capable of setting ends freely and when
they take an interest in the moral law. These two dispositions, while only fully realized in
a good will, can manifest themselves imperfectly in other ways. The predisposition to
personality and an interest in the moral law is present in those who have engaged in
immoral behavior. In the Groundwork, Kant writes, “There is no one—not even the most
hardened scoundrel, if only he is otherwise accustomed to use reason—who, when one
sets before him examples of honesty of purpose, of steadfastness in following good
maxims, of sympathy and general benevolence (even combined with great sacrifices of
advantage and comfort), does not wish that he might also be so disposed.”235 The
“hardened scoundrel” retains his dignity because he still has his humanity and
personality, even though he, through his inability to prioritize properly the relationship
between self-love and the moral law, is wasting or squandering his capacity for morality.
Wrongdoers nevertheless retain something (predisposition to personality and humanity)
234
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that elevates them over the rest of nature and over mere animality. In the Religion, Kant
writes, “[T]he command that we ought to become better human beings still resounds
unabated in our souls; consequently, we must also be capable of it, even if what we can
do is itself insufficient and by virtue of it, we only make ourselves receptive to a higher
assistance inscrutable to us.—Surely we must presuppose in all this that there is still a
germ of goodness left in its entire purity, a germ that cannot be extirpated or
corrupted.”236 This is an interesting passage for a number of reasons, but for our purposes
we need only focus on Kant’s insistence that there is a “germ of goodness” that makes us
receptive to the command to become better human beings. We are responsive to the
demands of the moral law, even if we fail to abide by them, and even if we need “higher
assistance” to actually become good.
This elevation, however imperfect, manifests itself in ways other than pious
wishes for virtue. Another way in which the moral predisposition in human beings
expresses itself is through the care and sophistication that all people are able to bring to
bear regarding questions of morality. In the second Critique, Kant makes the following
observation:
Now of all arguments there are none that more excite the
participation of persons who are otherwise soon bored with
subtle reasoning and that bring a certain liveliness into the
company than arguments about the moral worth of this or
that action by which the character of some person is to be
made out. Those for whom anything subtle and refined in
theoretical questions is dry and irksome soon join in when it
is a question of how to make out the moral import of a good
or evil action that has been related, and to an extent one does
236
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not otherwise expect of them on any object of speculation
they are precise, refined, and subtle in thinking out
everything that could lessen or even just make the suspect of
purpose and consequently the degree of virtue in it.237

The moral law presents itself to all human beings (excepting those who may have severe
mental ailments or are otherwise badly incapacitated) as necessary and universally valid.
As a result, human beings know what it would mean to act in a morally laudable way,
and thus are capable of bringing a high degree of subtlety to moral discussions.
Furthermore, since all human beings take an interest in the moral law, those who may
otherwise become bored by abstract, theoretical discussions tend to maintain a high
degree of interest in discussions that center on moral worth. These sorts of propensities
can be taken as expressive of human dignity and our separation from (or elevation over)
non-rational or amoral animals.
Kant also affirms human dignity in the constant possibility for moral
improvement. So long as one remains capable of moral improvement, one retains one’s
humanity and predisposition to personality (i.e. one’s dignity) and so long as one remains
a human being, one remains capable of moral improvement. We saw earlier how Kant
claims that even “hardened scoundrels” maintain an interest in the moral law and a wish
for moral virtue. Kant also claims that we are to treat others with dignity and respect
because failure to do so would deny them even the possibility of moral improvement. In
The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes that the censure of vice “must never break out
into complete contempt and denial of any moral worth to a vicious human being; for on
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this supposition he could never be improved, and this is not consistent with the idea of a
human being, who as such (as a moral being) can never lose entirely his predisposition to
the good.”238 So long as one has a predisposition to the good, one is thereby elevated over
mere animality (which lacks responsiveness to the moral law), and therefore one has
dignity.
If human dignity consists in freedom (and I have claimed that ultimately it does),
then Kant even demonstrates considerable patience and tolerance for a certain degree of
misuse of one’s freedom, at least in the early stages of learning to exercise freedom. For
instance, as one begins to set ends free of coercion, both from internal coercion on the
basis of inclinations and from external coercion on the basis of social and political forces
(which in turn largely operate on the basis of manipulating a person’s inclinations). He
writes,
I will admit that I am not comfortable with this way of
speaking, which even clever men are wont to use: “A certain
people (intent on establishing civil freedom) is not ripe for
freedom”; “The bondsmen of a landed proprietor are not yet
ripe for freedom”; and so too, “People are in general not ripe
for freedom of belief.” For on this assumption freedom will
never come, since we cannot ripen to it if we are not already
established in it (we must be free in order to be able to make
use of our powers purposively in freedom). To be sure, the
first attempts will be crude, and in general also bound to
greater hardships and dangers than when still under the
command but also the care of others; yet we do not ripen to
freedom otherwise than through our own attempts (and we
must be free to be allowed to make them)…[T]o make it a
principle that those who are once subjected to them [those in
power] are essentially not suited for freedom, and that one is
justified in keeping them from it for all time, this is an
238
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intrusion into the prerogatives of Divinity itself, which
created human beings for freedom.”239

Freedom, as we saw earlier, is for Kant the precondition for anything having true value at
all in the world. If one could gain immense happiness by forfeiting one’s freedom, one
should nevertheless renounce happiness and retain freedom. Similarly, if one can live a
life of ease under the control of another or one can assert one’s freedom and lead a life of
tumult and strife, one should select the latter, even though it may lead, at first, to great
danger and merely “crude” attempts in exercising one’s freedom. For Kant, only a free
life can be a fully dignified life.
Kant’s view on human dignity brings together a kind of moral perfectionism with
an inclusive universalism. His conception of dignity does not lend itself to complacent
indifference to the moral law, as though since one has dignity one can, in a sense, simply
rest on that and not struggle for moral improvement. His views on dignity also, though,
are inclusive and egalitarian. Everyone has dignity and everyone is owed mutual respect
on account of it. Dignity is, perhaps, similar to a state of natural talent in something. A
person can use their talent in a proper way, or one can misuse it and waste that initial
talent one has.240 In the case of wasting talent, it would make no difference, in terms of
the end result (remaining in an uncultivated state), whether or not one ever had the talent
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in the first place. Similarly, while a human being has the capacity for freedom, if one fails
to prioritize properly the law of self-love and the moral law, then one is squandering that
freedom. Dignity consists in all human beings possessing the means to elevate
themselves above nature, but it can also be wasted if one descends back into mere
animality.
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CHAPTER 3
Respect in Kant’s Moral Philosophy
Introduction
This chapter examines the role and meaning of respect in Kant’s moral
philosophy. I contend that Kant uses the term “respect” in a variety of contexts that, on
the surface, seem inconsistent with each other. I argue that there are several senses of
respect that Kant employs in his moral philosophy and that properly distinguishing
between the various senses of respect helps dispel the apparent inconsistency.
Specifically, I distinguish between three senses of respect that Kant uses: First, respect as
the affective response human beings have toward the moral law. This is what Kant refers
to as “respect for the moral law.” Second, respect as the attitude we are required to hold
towards fellow human beings. This sense of respect is what Kant describes in his
discussion of the duties of respect. Third, respect as an expression of praise for another
person’s commitment to the moral law (this sense of respect I label “merit-based”
respect).
In Section I, I discuss Kant’s notion of respect for the moral law. In Section II, I
examine the duties of respect that Kant lays out in the “Doctrine of Virtue” in The
Metaphysics of Morals. In Section III, I discuss the respect that Kant thinks we reserve
for agents whose virtue we admire. I conclude by maintaining that all the senses are
ultimately grounded in the first sense (respect for the moral law). I also argue that each
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sense of respect gives rise to moral humility in us by providing us with firsthand
experience of our own tenuous and complex relation to the moral law.
I. Respect for the Moral Law
Respect for the Moral Law in the Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals
In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant claims that only acts
committed from duty (and not merely in conformity with duty) are worthy of moral
approbation. Actions from duty require a person to nullify the influence of particular
sensible desires and inclinations in her decision-making. Inclinations, even benevolent
ones, are to have no role in determining the will behind a morally relevant action. “Now,
an action from duty is to set aside entirely the influence of inclination and with it every
object of the will; hence there is left nothing that could determine it except objectively
the law and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and so the maxim of
complying with such a law even if it infringes upon all my inclinations.”241 Benevolent
inclinations, animated by an authentic delight in helping others, are “amiable” and
“honorable” and for that reason “deserves praise and encouragement but not esteem.”242
Esteem is reserved for actions that are done from duty alone.
Since Kant is discussing the actions of human beings, though, he does not deny
that some sort of feeling must always be present in a human being, even when she is
acting from duty. There will also be a “subjective” side to our choices. Kant holds that
subjectively the will must be determined solely by “pure respect” for the (moral) law.
241
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While Kant admits that pure respect for the moral law is a feeling, it is of a singularly
peculiar sort. He writes, “But though respect is a feeling, it is not received by means of
influence; it is, instead, a feeling self-wrought by means of a rational concept…”243 The
“rational concept” that is the ground of the “self-wrought” feeling is the moral law itself,
the objective determination of the good will. The feeling, then, is occasioned not by
anything empirical, but rather by a rational concept. In particular, a rational concept we
impose upon ourselves.244 The moral law nevertheless has an effect on human
subjectivity, namely respect. Kant continues:
What I cognize immediately as a law for me I cognize with
respect, which signifies merely consciousness of the
subordination of my will to a law without the mediation of
other influences on my sense. Immediate determination of the
will by means of the law and consciousness of this is called
respect, so that this is regarded as the effect of the law on the
subject, and not as the cause of the law.245

The moral law’s necessity246 with regard to the will brings about in subjects a distinctive
feeling or affect, which Kant labels as “respect for law”247 or “pure respect for this
practical law.”248 The character of the feeling is of a negative sort in this section of the
Groundwork. Kant argues that the moral law serves as a check or limitation on our
inclinations. He writes that the moral law “does not serve my inclination but outweighs it
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or at least excludes it altogether from calculations in making a choice…”249 A genuine
moral action, an action from duty, requires the subject “to put aside entirely the influence
of inclination.”250 We recognize the necessity of subordinating our inclinations to the
requirements of morality.
Besides the claim that the subjective determination of the good will is respect for
the moral law and the observation that doing so makes us aware of the need to ground
our choices on something other than our inclinations, Kant does not further elaborate on
the feeling of respect in the Groundwork. For a fuller account of respect for the moral
law, we need to examine Kant’s discussion of it in his Critique of Practical Reason.
Respect for the Moral Law in the Critique of Practical Reason
In the chapter entitled “On the incentives of pure practical reason” from the
Critique of Practical Reason, Kant discusses at some length the effect that the moral law
has on rational, non-divine (or created) beings. As we saw from our discussion of the
Groundwork, Kant calls the effect of the moral law on a rational created creature
“respect.” Kant defines “incentive” as “the subjective determining ground of the will of a
being whose reason does not by its nature necessarily conform with the objective law.”251
He then claims that the moral law itself is the only possible candidate for the incentive of
the good will.252 In other words, the moral law must always be that for the sake of which
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an action is performed, if the action is moral. So in the case of the moral law, the
subjective and objective determining ground of the will are one and the same. Kant
writes, “[T]he incentive of the human will (and of the will of any created rational being)
can never be anything other than the moral law; and thus that the objectively determining
ground must always and quite alone be also the subjectively sufficient determining
ground of action if this is not merely to fulfill the letter of the law without containing its
spirit.”253 If an action that conforms to our duty is subjectively determined by anything
other than the moral law, then the action possesses “legality” but not “morality.”254
The objective character255 of the law is such that simply by being aware of it we
are, at least in part, motivated to act for the sake of it. We become motivated to act for the
sake of it insofar as reason recognizes the necessity of the moral law in the determination
of our will (i.e. its universal validity).256 Part of this claim is the idea that there is
something about human beings that makes us receptive to the moral law. In Religion
Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant writes, “The human being (even the worst)
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does not repudiate the moral law, whatever his maxims, in rebellious attitude (by
revoking obedience to it). The law rather imposes itself irresistibly, because of his moral
predisposition; and if no other incentive were at work against it, he would also
incorporate it into his supreme maxim as sufficient determination of his power of choice,
i.e. he would be morally good.”257 So, a (human) will that has successfully restricted the
influence of inclination from its decision-making, by virtue of the human being’s “moral
predisposition,” will be morally good.
Instead of further examining the claim that the moral law must be the incentive of
a good will, Kant refocuses the discussion on the effect that the moral law has on subjects
insofar as it is an incentive: “What we shall have to show a priori is, therefore, not the
ground from which the moral law in itself supplies an incentive but rather what it effects
(or, to put it better, must effect) in the mind insofar as it is an incentive.”258 Kant, in this
section seems to believe he has already demonstrated that the moral law must in fact
supply itself as incentive. Now, the concern is to show what we can know about the effect
taking up the moral law as incentive involves for human beings.
A will is determined by the moral law only when inclination has been subordinated
to the requirements of the moral law. That is, if I find in myself an inclination that, if
pursued, would lead me to violate the moral law, then (insofar as my will is determined by
the moral law) I will not act upon the inclination. Inclinations can figure into our decisionmaking, but whatever inclinations we act upon must be consistent with the dictates of the
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moral law.259 Kant locates evil in the human being not in the mere presence of inclinations
(even vicious ones) or in the efficaciousness of inclinations in our decision-making, but
rather in cases where a person has subordinated the moral law to them, not the other way
around:
[T]he human being (even the best) is evil only because he
reverses the moral order of his incentives in incorporating
them into his maxims. He indeed incorporates the moral law
into those maxims, together with the law of self-love; since,
however, he realizes that the two cannot stand on equal
footing, but one must be subordinated to the other as its
supreme condition, he makes the incentives of self-love and
their inclinations the condition of compliance with the moral
law—whereas it is this latter that, as the supreme condition of
the satisfaction of the former, should have been incorporated
into the universal maxim of the power of choice as the sole
incentive.260

Since the moral law appears even to the least moral person as something that is required to
adhere to in one’s choices, the law will never completely disappear from our deliberation
of choice. That is, all human beings feel compelled or required to take up the moral law
and incorporate it into their choices. Every human being has the same kind of relation to
the moral law and finds him or herself in the same kind of predicament with regard to the
power of choice. Namely, we have the moral law on the one hand and our inclinations on
259
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the other; and at times they will come into conflict with each other. The effect of the moral
law on people, then, will be uniform in kind (though the particular dynamics between
inclinations and duty will vary from person to person).
The notion that respect for the moral law operates in the same way in all human
beings is another way of saying that no human being is perfectly innocent. Innocence can
be understood as a state in which one’s inclinations naturally lead one to do good and to
act in accordance with the duties that arise from the moral law.261 A human being’s
relation to the moral law is always complicated by the presence of inclinations that, if
acted upon, would cause one to violate the moral law. No human being, therefore, is
perfectly innocent. There are always tendencies that may gnaw at our moral resolve.
Respect is the result of the clashing of those tendencies and our duty. Kant writes:
The moral level on which a human being (and, as far as we
can see, every rational creature as well) stands is respect for
the moral law. The disposition incumbent upon him to have
in observing it is to do so from duty, not from voluntary
liking nor even from an endeavor he undertakes unbidden,
gladly and of his own accord; and his proper moral
condition, in which he can always be, is virtue, that is moral
disposition in conflict, and not holiness in the supposed
possession of a complete purity of dispositions of the will.262

Moral purity is not a possible moral disposition for human beings, but rather moral
discipline. Moral purity, like innocence, would involve no countervailing tendencies in
our inclinations to our predisposition to the moral law. Moral purity would mean that all
261
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our inclinations would lead us to do our duty gladly. Moral purity is not possible for
creatures like us.263 Kant even suggests that holding oneself up as an instance of moral
purity and innocence is contrary to morality because it suggests a degree of arrogance in
one’s own righteousness without an honest recognition of having any inclinations that, if
acted upon, would lead one to immoral action.264 Kant suggests that our reflection of
one’s duty does not lead us to “rove among fancied moral perfections” but rather to “set
limits of humility (i.e. self-knowledge) to self conceit as well as to self-love, both of
which are ready to mistake their boundaries.”265
The feeling of respect that Kant describes in the Critique of Practical Reason must
be widely (universally, in fact) shared feeling among human beings. The moral law
appears to human beings as containing requirements that, at times, will clash with our
inclinations. In other words, the moral law seems to human beings to set a limit on which
inclinations one can satisfy. A good will, then, is one in which the relation between
inclinations and duty is properly ordered; that is, a good will is determined by the moral
law. Kant writes, “What is essential in every determination of the will by the moral law is
that, as a free will—and so not only without the cooperation of sensible impulses but even
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with rejection of all them and with infringement upon all inclinations insofar as they could
be opposed to that law—it is determined solely by the law.”266
As in the Groundwork, Kant begins his discussion effect of the moral law on a
subjects in distinctly negative terms: “So far, then, the effect of the moral law as incentive
is only negative…”267 In particular, the moral law gives rise to a feeling that, in part,
consists in a negative or painful feeling: “For, all inclination and every sensible impulse is
based on feeling, and the negative effect on feeling (by the infringement upon the
inclinations that takes place) is itself feeling.”268 An inclination often presents itself as a
desire that we naturally seek to satisfy. The satisfaction of our desires is pleasurable, while
the dissatisfaction or frustration of our desires results in a painful or unpleasant feeling.
Therefore, whenever we have to infringe upon an inclination that would be immoral to act
upon, we will experience some measure of unpleasantness or pain.269
Hence we can see a priori that the moral law, as the determining
ground of the will, must by thwarting all our inclinations produce a
feeling that can be called pain; and here we have the first and
perhaps only case in which we can determine a priori from
concepts the relation of a cognition (here the cognition of a pure
practical reason) to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure.270
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The negative or painful effect of the moral law on subjects with inclinations that do not
always conform to the moral law has two components or aspects. Kant writes, “All the
inclinations together (which can be brought into a tolerable system and the satisfaction of
which is then called one’s own happiness) constitute regard for oneself (solipsismus).”271
This system of self-regard divides into two sorts: 1) What Kant calls a “love for oneself, a
predominant benevolence toward oneself (Philautia); and 2) a “satisfaction with oneself
(Arrogantia).”272 Kant also refers to benevolence toward oneself as “self-love” and
satisfaction with oneself as “self-conceit.”273
Self-love is the ordinary tendency in human beings to satisfy their desires; selfconceit, by contrast, consists of inclinations to have a positive evaluation of one’s own
worth or value. The moral law’s effect on each set of inclinations differs. Self-love is only
limited by the moral law. Kant writes, “Pure practical reason merely infringes upon selflove, inasmuch as it only restricts it…”274 Self-love is consistent with having a good will
(required even); when one’s inclinations are brought under the moral law, and satisfied
only when they are consistent with it, self-love becomes rational.275
Self-conceit is a different case. Whereas self-love can be preserved in a will
determined by the moral law, self-conceit must, necessarily, be completely done away
with. Kant writes, “But it [pure practical reason] strikes down self-conceit altogether, since
all claims to esteem for oneself that precede accord with the moral law are null and quite
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unwarranted because certainty of a disposition in accord with this law is the first condition
of any worth of a person…and any presumption prior to this is false and opposed to the
law.”276 Self-conceit is a “claim to esteem for oneself” for reasons other than one’s will
being determined by the moral law.277 Kant suggests that self-conceit can be understood in
similar terms as any other sort of inclination; he holds that “the propensity to self-esteem,
so long as it rests only on sensibility, belongs with the inclinations which the moral law
infringes upon. So the moral law strikes down self-conceit.”278 It seems plausible to think
of inclinations toward self-conceit as resting on sensibility if you extend to sensibility
psychological pleasure. Simply put, it feels good to regard oneself as worthy of esteem.
Inclinations toward self-conceit, though, will be completely struck down by the moral law
when their basis is merely on the desire to feel good about oneself, regardless of the content
of one’s will.
The moral law does not only generate a negative or painful affect in rational beings.
Thus far, Kant’s discussion is little more than a reiteration and refinement of his treatment
of the moral law’s effect on human beings from the Groundwork. Here, though, Kant adds
a crucial aspect to the notion of respect for the moral law. Kant also holds that there is a
positive affect that the moral law brings about in rational created beings. In fact, the
positive aspect of the effect of the moral law on human beings is what makes the feeling
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respect and not mere frustration or dissatisfaction.279 An action that contains morality (and
not mere legality) is a free one—the action of a will that is objectively determined by the
moral law. Kant writes:
But since this law is still something in itself positive—namely
the form of an intellectual causality, that is, of freedom—it is
at the same time an object of respect inasmuch as, in
opposition to its subjective antagonist, namely the inclinations
in us, it weakens self-conceit; and inasmuch as it even strikes
down self-conceit, that is, humiliates it, it is an object of the
greatest respect and so too the ground of a positive feeling
that is not of empirical origin and is cognized a priori.280

The very fact that a human being is capable of casting aside the influence of inclination
brings about the positive feeling of freedom, or our capacity to act on the basis of a
universal law.281 The result is a complex affective state consisting of both positive and
negative aspects.282 The pleasure we derive from the moral law, coupled with the
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It is interesting to note that in this passage Kant does not use the word “respect” (Achtung)
until he begins to discuss the positive aspect of the effect of the moral law. “Respect,” though,
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present. The two aspects are mutually reinforcing; one grounds the other. The very source of the
positive feeling of freedom consists precisely in our capacity to infringe upon inclination, while
the source of the negative feeling derives from our rational nature and its adherence to the moral
law.
280
CPrR 5:73.
281
Furthermore, successfully limiting the influence of inclination and conducting ourselves morally
is the only authentic basis for our inclinations of self-conceit to be satisfied rationally. We rightly
esteem ourselves when we act morally. This is not to say that we act morally for the sake of
satisfying our need for self-esteem, but rather as a consequence of moral action, we gain an
authentic basis for self-esteem (see CPrR 5:73).
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The complexity I describe here is different from the complexity described by several other
commentators (see Richard McCarthy “Motivation and Moral Choice in Kant’s Theory of
Rational Agency,” Kant-Studien, 1994, vol. 85 and Philip Stratton-Lake Kant, Duty and Moral
Worth pp. 35-39), who analyze respect as consisting of affective and cognitive aspects. My
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dissatisfaction we derive from its requirement that we curb the influence of inclination in
our decision making constitutes the complex affective state of respect for the moral law.
Respect for the moral law, then, is, at root, a feeling of freedom (understood, though, as
also conferring limitations on our inclinations) and an encounter with the authentic basis
for self-esteem (namely, our capacity to adhere to the moral law).

As submission to a law, that is, as a command (indicating
constraint for the sensibly affected subject), it therefore
contains in it no pleasure but instead, so far, displeasure in
the action. On the other hand, however, since this constraint
is exercised only by the lawgiving of his own reason, it also
contains something elevating, and the subjective effect on
feeling, inasmuch as pure practical reason is the sole cause
of it, can thus be called self-approbation with reference to
pure practical, inasmuch as he cognized himself as
determined solely by the law and without any interest, and
now becomes conscious of an altogether different interest
subjectively produced by the law, which is purely practical
and free; and his taking this interest in dutiful action is not
advised by any inclination; instead reason through the
practical law absolutely commands it and also actually
produces it, because of which it has quite a special name,
that of respect.283

The negative aspect of the affective state never completely drops out. So long as we are
human beings with empirical inclinations we will always be tugged in directions other
than towards the moral law.284 Nevertheless respect for the moral law does have a

interpretation is consistent with the claim that respect has both affective and cognitive aspects. I
simply am focusing on the affective aspect of it.
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Failure to recognize this point would conflate virtue and holiness. Virtue consists in moral
discipline, while holiness does not require moral discipline since there are no countervailing
inclinations that would break our commitment to the moral law. In the Metaphysics of Morals
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powerful positive aspect that, if not overwhelming the negative aspect, as least serves as
a powerful counterweight to it.285 Through adherence to the moral law (and the feeling
of respect that subjectively determines the will) we feel elevated and are rationally
justified in engaging in self-approbation This self-approbation is not based on morally
irrelevant features about who we are, but rather on our will being in accordance with the
command that the moral law lays out for it.
II. Respect Owed to All Human Beings: Duties of Respect
The Basic Duty of Respect: Respect as Avoiding Contempt
In the Groundwork as well as in “On the incentives of pure practical reason” from
the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant focuses on the effect of the moral law on a single
subject. That is, his discussion centers around the effect that the moral law has on the
affective state of individual human beings. The subjective feeling of respect is exclusively
directed to the moral law. A human being’s will, insofar as the agent adheres to the moral
law, is subjectively determined by “pure respect” or simply “respect” for the moral law.286
The notion of respect, though, is not exhausted by Kant’s discussion of respect as the
affective state one has when the moral law is the determining ground of one’s will. In The
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claims that human beings are morally required to respect

Kant writes, “Virtue signifies a moral strength of the will. But this does not exhaust the concept;
for such strength could also belong to a holy (superhuman) being in whom no hindering impulses
would impede the law of its will and who would thus gladly do everything in conformity with the
law” (6:405). A holy will is a “superhuman” will, not a human one.
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Paul Guyer (1993) also emphasizes the positive aspect of respect: “The feeling of respect is
thus a complex but ultimately pleasurable state of feeling produced by our decision to adhere to
the moral law, grounded, like other feelings of pleasure, in recognition of the possibility of the
realization of or own objectives but reflecting in its very complexity the fact that not all of our
objectives are conjointly satisfiable” (Kant and the Experience of Freedom 360).
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fellow human beings. He writes, “Every human being has a legitimate claim to respect
from his fellow human beings and is in turn bound to respect every other.”287 The claim to
respect is “legitimate” because of the dignity of humanity: “Humanity itself is a dignity;
for a human being cannot be used merely as a means by human being (either by others or
even by himself) but must always be used at the same time as an end.”288 The respect we
owe to human beings is a second sense of respect that plays a crucial role in Kant’s moral
philosophy.
Respect for other human beings involves recognition of their dignity. On account
of that dignity, one cannot harbor contempt for human beings;289 nor can one behave in
ways that express contempt for them.290 Something has dignity when it has something that
is “of a worth that has no price, no equivalent for which the object evaluated (aestimii)
287

MM 6:462. Kant makes a similar factual claim in the Collins Lectures when he writes, “By
nature we have two drives, whereby we demand to be respected by others, and to be loved”
(Collins Lectures 27:407).
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Ibid. Also, this echoes the second formulation of the categorical imperative formulated in the
Groundwork: “The practical imperative will therefore be the following: So act that you use
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an
end, never merely as a means” (G 4:429).
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Kant discusses contempt in his Lectures on Ethics as well, though the discussion there is along
a more naturalistic line. He begins with a factual claim (quoted above) about how human beings
by nature have two drives: 1) the demand for respect, and 2) the desire to be loved. He then
claims that respect is “directed to our inner worth…One is respected because one has inner
worth” (Collins Lectures 27:407). Kant then claims that our natural demand for respect is only
legitimate when one has respect for other people: “If we wish to be respected, we must also have
respect for other people, and for mankind in general” (Collins Lectures 27:407). Although the
form of this imperative seems to be hypothetical, Kant will separately argue that not only is our
demand for respect a natural drive, but it is also required by morality. He calls it the “love of
honor,” and claims it is the “highest duty of humanity to oneself” (Vigilantius Lectures §110
27:664).
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My discussion of humanity in this chapter is skeletal. I discuss Kant’s account of humanity in
greater detail in chapter one of this dissertation. For my purposes here it is sufficient simply to
assert that part of recognizing the humanity of fellow human beings consists in treating others
with respect, rather than contempt. Another way to put this idea is as follows: human beings have
dignity and are therefore owed respect by their fellow human beings.
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could be exchanged.”291 Given human beings have something which is of absolute value
(i.e. something that cannot (legitimately) be traded away for any price), judging any
human being as having no value is to treat someone with contempt.292 Contempt is never
consistent with the moral law, even contempt for people who have committed gross
misdeeds. Kant writes, “To be contemptuous of others (contemnere), that is, to deny the
respect owed to human beings in general, is in every case contrary to duty; for they are
human beings.”293
This general sense of respect (that owed to all human beings) is owed to all: those
who have a pattern of good moral action as well as those who have exhibited a pattern of
immoral action. Kant apparently sensed a kind of resistance such a claim might be met
with. Why, one may ask, do I owe respect to, say, scoundrels—to those who have
apparently forsaken altogether any commitment to the moral law? It may seem almost
grotesque to suggest that they are owed respect. Kant gives indirect voice to that concern
when he writes, “At times one cannot, it is true, help inwardly looking down on some in
comparison with others (despicatui habere); but the outward manifestation of this is,
nevertheless, an offense.”294 This passage problematizes Kant’s account a bit. One could
interpret it as asserting that, while in some cases it is justified to withdraw respect, one
must never show outward manifestations of contempt. One may harbor contempt, but
never act in a way that expresses it. Though here Kant seems to be suggesting such an
interpretation, it cannot be what Kant’s position actually is. Respect, in the sense that
291
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animates the duties of respect, must be held toward all people. Kant goes on to write,
“Nonetheless I cannot deny all respect to even a vicious man as a human being; I cannot
withdraw at least the respect that belongs to him in his quality as a human being, even
though by his deeds he makes himself unworthy of it.”295 The sometimes inevitable
“looking down on comparison with others” is not the same thing as withdrawing respect
for others insofar as they are human beings.296
This is not to deny that we can never condemn immoral acts. One can condemn the
immoral action while also respecting the person who committed it. What is disqualified by
our duty to respect others are actions that would undermine the guilty person’s dignity.
Kant argues that, as a result of a person’s dignity, there are limits for what can be done in
the punishment of criminals; namely, anything that would degrade their humanity: “So
there can be no disgraceful punishments that dishonor humanity itself (such as quartering
a man, having him torn up by dogs, cutting off his nose and ears). Not only are such
punishments more painful than loss of possessions and life to one who loves honor (who
claims respect of others, as everyone must); they also make a spectator blush with shame
at belonging to a species that can be treated that way.”297 The criterion Kant is laying out
here is that no punishment is permitted that would degrade humanity (even in the person
of vicious scoundrels).
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The same sort of reasoning applies to censure. We are right to censure vices in
others, but the censure cannot turn into vicious contempt, which degrades the offender’s
humanity. Kant writes, “The same thing applies to the censure of vice, which must never
break out into complete contempt and denial of any moral worth to a vicious human being;
for on this supposition he could never be improved, and this is not consistent with the idea
of a human being, who as such (as a moral being) can never lose entirely his
predisposition to the good.”298 Viewing another human being with contempt ultimately
amounts to a denial of his or her potential for moral action. We harbor contempt for
another when we deny the fact that they are capable of feeling respect for the moral law at
all. If one has no predisposition to the good, then one is really not a member of humanity.
A person, when viewed with contempt, is reduced to a mere thing.299 Respect, in this
sense, in part consists in refusal to look down with contempt on others, as well as
unyielding recognition of the other’s humanity and the other’s predisposition to the good.
In addition to the more general requirement of avoiding contempt, Kant discusses
particular vices that violate duties of respect owed to other human beings. They are: 1)
arrogance, 2) defamation, and 3) ridicule. The discussion of these vices brings out another
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MM 4:463-4. Note here the reason why we should not have contempt for wrongdoers is
because human beings never completely lose their predisposition to the good. This is not exactly
the same ground for respect Kant laid out earlier when he grounded it in humanity.
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Viewing an immoral person with contempt, then, would amount to seeing them in roughly the
same terms as a natural disaster or a vicious, dangerous animal. In which case, one might say,
harboring contempt for someone becomes irrational. We don’t have contempt for natural disasters
or to animals because we do not expect them to know any better. The ground for moral
disapprobation must be some sense of respect (i.e. a recognition of their predisposition to the
good). Kant seems to be making this point when he writes, “It is only through the noble
predisposition to the good in us, which makes the human being worthy of respect, that one can
find one who acts contrary to it contemptible (the human being himself, but not the humanity in
him)” (MM 6:441).
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element of the duties of respect that was implicit in the preceding discussion of respect
and contempt in general. Namely, the duties of respect forbid us from thinking of
ourselves as superior to others. Each vice with regard to duties of respect arise from
inclinations we have for being deemed superior in comparison with others. Respect, by
contrast, involves an egalitarian element that forbids such vicious competitiveness. The
common feature, then, that each of the three vices share is their source in inclinations that
drive us to make ourselves superior to others by undermining the bases for respect of
others.
Arrogance
The first vice that violates duties of respect for other human beings (hereafter
referred to as “vices of disrespect”) is arrogance. Kant offers a definition of arrogance
when he writes: “Arrogance (superbia and, as this word expresses it, the inclination to be
always on top) is a kind of ambition (ambitio) in which we demand that others think little
of themselves in comparison with us.”300 An arrogant person declares it his or her right to
view others with contempt: “Arrogance is, as it were, a solicitation on the part of one
seeking honor for followers, whom he thinks he is entitled to treat with contempt.”301
Arrogance, therefore, declares a right to hold others in contempt, which, obviously, is
expressly forbidden by the very idea of a duty of respect. Kant provides a similar
definition of arrogance in the Collins Lectures: “Arrogance…is founded on the demand a
person makes, that others should hold themselves in low esteem, in comparison with
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himself; this, therefore, is associated with a demeaning of the other’s personhood…”302
Arrogance violates the egalitarianism that underlies the duties of respect in its demand for
others to be reduced to mere “followers” who are not rightfully (in the mind of the
arrogant person) to seek their own aims and purposes in life, but only to defer
obsequiously to their superior.
Kant is clearly committed to the view that humans have a legitimate claim to
respect from other humans, so arrogance cannot simply be vicious in virtue of its demand
for respect. Rather, it consists in the inclination to demand esteem from others only at the
expense of their own self-esteem. Arrogance, therefore, “differs from pride proper
(animus elatus), which is love of honor, that is, a concern to yield nothing of one’s dignity
in comparison with others…for arrogance demands from others a respect it denies
them.”303 Pride proper is nothing more than the demand for equal recognition of our
shared humanity. Arrogance, unlike pride proper, involves a violation of the basic
egalitarianism that is at the heart of Kant’s duties of respect. Everyone is worthy of the
same kind of respect, in this sense, and in the same degree.

Defamation
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The second vice that Kant describes as a violation of our duty of respect towards
other human beings is defamation. Kant defines defamation as “the immediate inclination,
with no particular aim in view, to bring into the open something prejudicial to respect for
others.”304 This might strike one has an odd formulation because the ground for respect for
humanity is absolute and cannot be forfeited by any action whatsoever. So long as one is a
human being, nothing can undermine the legitimacy of one’s demand for respect from
others. So, nothing that a defamer could possibly bring out about another person could
possibly serve as grounds for others to withdraw respect.
Yet, Kant does seem to suggest here that defamation can in fact weaken the basis
for respect for others, “[F]or every scandal given weakens that respect, on which the
impulse to the morally good rests, and so far as possible makes people skeptical about
it.”305 Given Kant’s account of humanity as possessing absolute value as an end in itself
and his thesis that, on the basis of that absolute value, all human beings are owed respect,
it seems peculiar that he would justify his prohibition on defamation by writing, “The
intentional spreading (propalatio) of something that detracts from another’s honor—even
if it is not a matter of public justice, and even if what is said is true—diminishes respect
for humanity as such, so as finally to cast a shadow of worthlessness over our race itself,
making misanthropy (shying away from human beings) or contempt the prevalent cast of
mind, or to dull one’s moral feeling by repeatedly exposing one to the sight of such things
and accustoming one to it.”306 The line of reasoning here seems to be based on an
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empirical claim (premise 2 below): 1) Defamation is the intentional spreading of news,
gossip, or rumor about the various misdeeds of others; 2) constantly being bombarded
with news, gossip, rumor (even if true) about the various misdeeds and immorality or
others instills in us (human beings) an attitude of cynicism about and contempt toward the
human race as a whole; 3) contempt for humanity is prohibited because humanity has
absolute value; 4) a defamer knowingly instills contempt in human beings toward
humanity as a whole; so therefore, 5) defamation diminishes respect for human beings as a
whole and is therefore a violation of our duty to respect human beings.
On the surface, it might seem Kant is defining defamation in too broad a manner.
On this understanding of defamation, for example, many instances of corporate or
government whistle blowing, and the criminal investigations that may follow, would be
prohibited. Certainly it is sometimes acceptable, if not required, for a person to “go
public” with information about another person’s misdeed, even if it may result in a loss of
honor for that person in the eyes of other people. Here it is necessary to refine our
definition of defamation. Recall Kant’s definition: “By defamation (obtrectatio) or
backbiting…I mean only the immediate inclination, with no particular aim in view, to
bring into the open something prejudicial to respect for others.”307 There is a crucial
caveat in this definition: Defamation is an “immediate inclination” that has “no particular
aim in view.” There is a distinctly psychological component to defamation in which one
person seeks to place others into disrepute and take pleasure in it. Kant goes on to describe
the immorality involved in defamation is psychological terms: “It is, therefore, a duty of
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virtue not to take malicious pleasure in exposing the faults of others so that one will be
thought as good as, or at least not worse than, others…”308 The immorality of defamation
ultimately is based on a similar kind of inclination as arrogance—namely, the desire to
undermine the basis of respect for others in order to feel better about oneself (or to have
others feel better about oneself).
Defamation could be construed as an illicit way of easing one’s own conscience
(i.e. the awareness that one has inclinations that run against the demands of the moral law
or, more strongly, the awareness that one has indeed acted on such inclinations at one time
or another). Kant has a similar discussion in the Critique of Practical Reason in his
discussion of respect: “So little is respect a feeling of pleasure that we give way to it only
reluctantly with regard to a human being. We try to discover something that could lighten
the burden of it for us, some fault in him to compensate us for the humiliation that comes
upon us through such an example.”309 This discussion of our reticence to give respect is
particularly noteworthy for our purposes because it is couched in a larger discussion about
our attitude toward people in whom we detect a more steadfast commitment to the moral
law than we detect in ourselves. Kant claims that, instead of acknowledging our own
moral shortcomings, we often seek to alleviate our conscience by undermining positive
examples of moral excellence, thereby lessening the starkness of the comparison between
their moral discipline and our own.
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There is abundant empirical evidence for such attitudes and behavior. This sort of
bad faith rationalization is something that we regularly witness and participate in. Often
in times of conflict, each side self-righteously decries the misdeeds of the other side (real
as they may be) as a way of drawing attention away from one’s own misconduct. We often
attend most peculiarly to the faults of others in order to bolster our own sense of moral
self-esteem. In the Vigilantius Lectures we get a clear rendering of this vicious propensity
in us: “[W]e actually hate his [the other person’s] very virtues, and feel an inner joy at
viewing him with less respect; we notice the other’s failings more shrewdly than his
merits, in order to put him down.”310 These sorts of vicious inclinations lie at the heart of
defaming actions.
The second part of the caveat—that defamation is an inclination that has “no
particular aim in view”—provides a possible basis for legitimate instances of bringing to
light the crimes or misdeeds of others. There might be some “particular aims” where
morality would allow, and perhaps even require, the dissemination of information
regarding the misdeeds of others. Whistle blowing, therefore, does have a proper place in
Kant’s account here, even with his strictures on defamation. If it is done, for example,
with the aim of protecting consumers from predatory commercial practices or the aim of
bringing to light the suffering of people at the hands of some guilty party in order to end
the suffering and to ensure reparations are paid. Allen Wood presents a similar
interpretation of defamation when he writes, “It is wrong – a violation of a strict duty, and
a proper object of blame – to gossip about others, to expose their faults to public censure,
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when this is done not for the purpose of guarding others against their misdeeds but simply
in order to bring them (or even human nature in general) into disrepute” (emphasis
added).311 Even though there are instances where public disclosure of another person’s
misdeeds would be legitimate, the upshot of Kant’s discussion of defamation is that
revealing the misdeeds of others is not assumed to be morally admissible. There needs to
be a legitimate, “particular aim” that justifies such a disclosure. The target of Kant’s
discussion is clearly not whistle blowers or criminal investigators, but rather those who
revel in scandal in order to satisfy inclinations that would degrade the humanity of others.
Ridicule
The final particular vice of disrespect Kant discusses is ridicule. Kant defines
ridicule as follows: “Wanton faultfinding and mockery, the propensity to expose others to
laughter, to make their faults the immediate object of one’s amusement…”312 Ridicule is
first defined as a pattern of behavior—faultfinding and mockery—that aims to make a
person’s faults an object of amusement. Kant calls behavior like this a “kind of malice”
that differs from “banter” which takes as its object the morally neutral “peculiarities” (as
opposed to the faults) of others as the object of amusement.313
Like arrogance and defamation, there is a vicious psychological satisfaction that
some get from ridicule. So, like the other vices of disrespect, ridicule is the means to
satisfy an inclination. Kant writes, “But holding up to ridicule a person’s real faults, or
311
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supposed faults as if they were real, in order to deprive him of the respect he deserves, and
the propensity to do this, a mania for caustic mockery (spiritus causticus), has something
of fiendish joy in it; and this makes it an even more serious violation of one’s duty of
respect for other human beings.”314 The fact that ridiculers derive satisfaction from their
vice compounds the immorality of ridicule. The satisfaction, like arrogance and
defamation, consists in the demeaning of another’s humanity in order to put oneself in a
position of superiority.
The Gravity of Disrespect Towards Others
We should note that committing a vice of disrespect is a serious offense in Kant’s
ethics. Duties of respect are strict or narrow duties, meaning they are absolutely required.
Kant writes, “Failure to fulfill mere duties of love is lack of virtue (peccatum). But failure
to fulfill the duty arising from the respect owed to every human being as such is a vice
(vitium). For no one is wronged if duties of love are neglected; but a failure in the duty of
respect infringes upon one’s lawful claim.”315
I have argued that the vices of disrespect have as their sources particular sorts of
inclinations. Kant, in each of the three vices, discusses the “fiendishness,” “malice” or
“mania” that animate them. The desire for superiority over others is also present in
314
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arrogance, while a version of a similar inclination is there in defamation (by attending to
the misdeeds of others to prop up one’s own sense of moral excellence) and ridicule (by
caustically joking about the shortcomings of others). The description of these vices,
particularly the sorts of incentives that are behind them are quite similar to the sorts of
extremely malignant vices Kant labels as “diabolical” in the Religion:
[O]nly in comparison with others does one judge oneself
happy or unhappy…from this arises gradually an unjust
desire to acquire superiority for oneself over others…in the
face of all the anxious endeavor of others to attain a hateful
superiority over us, to procure it for ourselves over them
for the sake of security, as preventative measure…Hence
the vices that are grafted upon this inclination [to be
superior to others] can also be named vices of culture, and
in their extreme degree of malignancy...e.g. in envy,
ingratitude, joy in others’ misfortunes…they are called
diabolical vices.316

Arrogance, defamation, and ridicule involve the satisfaction of inclinations that seek to
place oneself in a position of superiority to others. Joy in others’ misfortune is a diabolical
vice; defaming another and taking joy in the other’s guilt is a vice of disrespect.
The duties of respect, on this reading, have two components, an inclination toward
disrespect and the behavior that satisfies the inclination. The inclinations behind the vices
of disrespect are distinctive in their inherent immorality. That is, there can never be a
legitimate satisfaction of the inclination to be arrogant, to defame, or to ridicule. Given
this fact, the question arises whether 1) the mere presence of these inclinations constitutes
a moral vice, or 2) an agent is only vicious when they seek to satisfy the inclinations
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behind the vices of disrespect. Prima facie it seems that (1) should be rejected because
Kant seems to think that vicious inclinations (i.e. inclinations that, if acted upon, will lead
us to deviate form our duty) are simply an inextricable part of human nature. It seems
reasonable to lump together inclinations toward disrespect with all the other inclinations
are conclude that, though obviously not a good thing to have, they do not in themselves
constitute a moral vice.
There might be another line one might take, though, regarding inclinations to
disrespect others. In the introductory remarks to the duties of respect in the Metaphysics of
Morals, Kant asserts that we are forbidden from harboring contempt for others. This
requirement seems to be a requirement on our attitude toward others; it sounds
distinctively psychological and only accidentally related to particular modes of behavior.
One could clearly harbor contempt for another person without overtly demonstrating the
contempt. An inclination, then, to diminish the respect given to others already seems to
come dangerously close to an actual instance of contempt for others.
How can one accommodate the plausibility of treating inclinations of disrespect
like any other inclination with the prohibition of having an attitude of contempt (i.e.
disrespect) for others? One way this might be accomplished is to provide a two-tiered
explanation for the mental activity of a person who has an inclination for contempt.
Perhaps a person’s mental state can actually betray a lack of commitment to the moral
law. For example, let’s say a person has committed an immoral act. One may be tempted
to view such a person with contempt (this would be the “inward looking down on someone
in comparison with others” that Kant describes in §39). At this stage, one can actually
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view them with contempt (i.e. by saying to oneself “This person is beneath me. This
person is of no moral value whatsoever,” etc.), or one can overcome the inclination that
would result in a violation of my duty to respect all my fellow human beings (i.e. by
saying “Even though this person has committed immoral acts, he is still a human being
and on account of that is still owed respect,” or “Even the most vicious of scoundrels, like
him, have some connection to the moral law via their moral predisposition,” etc.). On this
model we still have the inherently vicious inclinations, but we can see how the mere
presence of them has not translated to any sort of attitude of contempt for the other.
We get a similar model in Kant’s discussion of radical evil in Religion Within the
Boundaries of Mere Reason. In a footnote to his discussion of human nature’s propensity
to evil, Kant distinguishes between propensities, inclinations, and passions. Propensity is
something like the potential and tendency to have specific inclinations. An inclination is
the actual desire that seeks satisfaction. Kant writes, “Propensity is actually only the
predisposition to desire an enjoyment which, when the subject has experienced it, arouses
inclination.”317 So, using the example of the scoundrel, we have a propensity to disrespect
scoundrels before we are ever confronted with one. We develop an inclination toward
disrespect when we meet an actual scoundrel. Kant then introduces a third level to this
model: “Above inclination there is, finally, still another level of the faculty of desire,
passion (not emotional agitation, for this belongs to the feeling of pleasure and aversion),
or an inclination that excludes mastery over oneself.”318 When we have actually
succumbed to our inclination toward disrespect, the inclination becomes a passion (which
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is still an inclination, strictly speaking, but one that exceeds our resources for self-control).
Passion takes over when one says to oneself, for example, “This scoundrel is beneath me
and I have nothing but contempt for him.” Passion need not lead to concrete action.
Perhaps circumstances are such that the agent deems it unwise to behave in certain ways,
but the action is not averted through moral discipline.
In succumbing to passion in this case, one is already morally culpable. That is, one
has already “done” an immoral “deed.” This might seem like an odd claim, since there is
no overt behavior yet attached to the passion. Further on in the same section of the
Religion, Kant claims that there is ambiguity in the term “deed,” and that there are at least
two senses a person can commit a deed: “Now the term “deed” can in general apply just as
well to the use of freedom through which the supreme maxim (either in favor of, or
against the law) is adopted in the power of choice, as to the use by which the actions
themselves (materially considered, i.e. as regards the objects of the power of choice) are
performed in accordance with that maxim…The former is an intelligible deed, cognizable
through reason alone apart from any temporal condition; the latter is sensible, empirical,
given in time.”319 This is the sense in which a person who, for example, ridicules another
in order to satisfy an inclination toward disrespect is doubly guilty. The ridiculer commits
two distinct but connected deeds. This model does not place the exercise of choice in the
phenomenal level. That is, the difference between having an inclination and succumbing
to passion does not result from a choice made in the face of an inclination. Rather, the
choice, understood as the choice of incorporating the moral law into one’s supreme
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maxim, is made by the noumenal self. As a result of that choice one will experience, in
this case, one of two phenomenal mental states. That is, if one has incorporated the moral
law into one’s supreme maxim, then the inclination will not spill over into passion;
whereas if one has not chosen to give priority to the moral law, then it is possible one will
succumb to passion.
There is a bit of a complication we should clear up in this section of the Religion
that might appear to rub against the interpretation of the duties of respect I have presented.
According to my reading of the duties of respect there is both a psychological component
(anchored in inclinations toward disrespect) and a behavioral component, which are the
means of satisfying inclinations toward disrespect. That is, we have a duty to avoid certain
modes of behavior and a duty to avoid viewing other human beings with contempt or
disrespect. Furthermore, I hold that inclinations toward disrespect are immoral (i.e. a
violation of our basic duty to respect all human beings) even if circumstances prevent the
person from acting on them. In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant discusses three vices that
violate duties of respect for other human beings. I interpreted these vices in terms both of
the inclinations behind them and in the behavior that is prohibited. In this section of the
Religion, though, Kant writes, “The propensity to evil is a deed in the first meaning
[involving the power of choice in formulating one’s maxim], and at the same time the
formal ground of every deed contrary to law according to the second meaning [i.e. of a
deed] that resists the law materially and is then called vice.”320 Here Kant seems to be
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reserving the term “vice” exclusively for the behavioral side of immoral deeds. This seems
like it might be in conflict with my mixed interpretation of our duties of respect.
In order to sustain my interpretation it is necessary to examine the precise role of
the vices of disrespect with regard to the more general requirement of respect for all
human beings. First, though, we should reconstruct our model with the addition of vice at
the behavioral end of the spectrum. We have a propensity to disrespect some, if not all, of
our fellow human beings.321 This propensity turns into individual inclinations toward
disrespect in actual instances, with regard to actual other people. In the face of an
inclination to disrespect we either demonstrate commitment to the moral law or we fail to.
In the case of failure, we succumb to passion. If we succumb to passion, then, in some
circumstances, we will commit particular vices against other human beings (i.e. we may
defame others, or ridicule them). One possible interpretation of this model would be to say
that moral blame arises only in the last stage, when inclinations get acted out in the
exercise of vice. I reject this claim and instead contend that moral blame originates when
inclinations turn into passions. That is the moment in which it becomes evident that our
fundamental choice does not properly prioritize the requirements of the moral law with the
demands of inclinations. We have inverted the moral order in the determination of our
maxims and inclinations take precedence over the moral law in the exercise of our will.
Whether or not one actually acts on one’s passion is determined by factors other than
one’s choice, or commitment to the moral law. In the Religion, Kant seems to take a fairly
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radical stance in assigning moral culpability, or more precisely, guilt. Oftentimes, he
asserts, people demonstrate a certain moral smugness when their actions are always in
conformity with the law, and even when there are no obvious inclinations pulling them to
vice.
This is how so many human beings (conscientious in their
own estimation) derive their peace of mind when, in the
course of actions in which the law was not consulted or at
least did not count the most, they just luckily slipped by the
evil consequences; and [how they derive] even the fancy that
they deserve not to feel guilty of such transgressions as they
see others burdened with, without however inquiring whether
the credit goes perhaps to good luck, or whether, on the
attitude of mind they could well discover within themselves
if they just wanted, they would not have practiced similar
vices themselves, had they not been kept away from them by
impotence, temperament, upbringing, and tempting
circumstances of time and place (things which, one and all,
cannot be imputed to us).322

While in this passage Kant is involved in a more general discussion about radical
evil and guilt, the point Kant is making here holds in the case of distinguishing between
inclinations and passions. It would be incorrect to argue that a person commits a violation
of their duty to respect to other human beings only when they commit an actual vice.
Moral culpability begins with harboring an attitude of contempt, even if circumstances
prevent an actual vice from being carried out.
If one overcomes the inclination toward disrespect, then one will absolutely
abstain from any sort of behavior that would degrade the humanity of the other. One will
acknowledge the rights afforded to him insofar as he is a human being (i.e. his human
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rights). If one fails to overcome the inclination toward disrespect, then it is impossible that
one will have the moral fortitude or will to condemn, or even in some cases to avoid
engaging in, behavior that degrades the scoundrel’s humanity, to go back to our example.
In that case, the person harboring contempt might be doubly guilty: 1) One has already
degraded the humanity of the other by contempt, and 2) One will, circumstances
permitting, engage in behavior that manifests the contempt one harbors internally (i.e. by
defaming the person, or ridiculing the person, or by demanding that the other person
abdicate their self-respect in comparison with others). On this reading we could say that it
would be worse if a person actually acts out on his or her contempt, but the immorality of
their choice does not depend on the circumstances in which a person finds him or herself.
III. Merit-Based Respect
There is a third context in which Kant employs the term “respect,” in which
“respect” clearly has a different meaning from respect for the moral law and the sort of
respect that is owed to all human beings, expressed negatively through the duties of
respect. It is, like the second sense, directed toward other human beings. Unlike the
second sense, though, it is not directed to all of humanity equally. It is morally possible to
withhold respect from someone in this third, merit-based sense. That is, it is not a moral
requirement to have respect for all human beings in the merit-based sense. Merit-based
respect is, as we will see, reserved for those who have demonstrated a comparatively high
level of commitment to the moral law. It is a respect that can be earned.

125

This third sense of respect is already contained in a section of the Critique of
Practical Reason we examined in our discussion of respect for the moral law. In fact, the
inclusion of this third sense of respect seems a bit confusing at first. After having
established to his satisfaction that respect for the moral law is the only incentive for
actions that have moral worth, and then having explained the effect of the moral law on
self-love and self-conceit, Kant writes, “Respect is always directed only to persons, never
to things.”323 This statement seems odd. The moral law clearly is not a person, but we also
are to have respect for the moral law. The sentence, then, appears to be false. Strictly
speaking, of course, it must be false. It is obviously not the case that respect is directed
only to persons.
The confusion dissipates if we read the sentence as a shift in the discussion; Kant
is now discussing a sense of “respect” that is not the same thing as respect for the moral
law. Respect in this sense is indeed directed only to persons. This shift in meaning,
though, is not to the second sense of respect that we have already discussed. Kant writes,
“A human being can also be an object of my love, fear, admiration even to amazement and
yet not be an object of respect.”324 But respect in the second sense we have discussed is
owed to all human beings. So a human being would always be an object of respect in the
second sense. It is clear, then, that Kant must have some other sense of respect in mind in
this section. Respect, in this sense, is reserved for virtuous human beings. Kant describes
the sort of person who does in fact receive respect when he writes, “[B]efore a humble
common man in whom I perceive uprightness of character in a higher degree than I am
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aware of in myself my spirit bows…”325 In saying that his “spirit bows” to the person who
has “uprightness of character,” Kant is asserting an attitude of respect for the person. A
few sentences later Kant writes, “Respect is a tribute that we cannot refuse to pay to merit,
whether we want to or not; we may indeed withhold it outwardly but we still cannot help
feeling it inwardly.”326 This sentence is striking for a variety of reasons: Firstly, this
respect we “pay to merit” is involuntary much in the same way as respect for the moral
law is irresistible for human beings. As Kant says, “we…cannot help feeling it [respect]
inwardly” to the morally upright character.
Secondly, this respect we pay to merit has a complex, ambivalent effect on us
(much like respect for the moral law). In seeing a person who exhibits an uprightness of
character that exceeds our own, we become more aware of our own moral shortcomings.
Awareness of one’s moral limitations is obviously not a pleasant experience. In fact in the
face of a morally upright character, we may be tempted to defame the person in order to
lessen the burden of our own conscience: “So little is respect a feeling of pleasure that we
give way to it only reluctantly with regard to a human being. We try to discover something
that could lighten the burden of it for us, some fault in him to compensate us for the
humiliation that comes upon us through such an example.”327 In being confronted with an
example of a morally upright person we experience displeasure in the awareness of our
own moral limitations.
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Yet we experience some positive feeling in these instances. We witness the
actuality of the moral law. We see a real instance of it in the world: “His example holds
before me a law that strikes down my self-conceit when I compare it with my conduct, and
I see observance of that law and hence its practicability proved before me in fact.”328 This
can certainly be construed as at least a partially pleasant experience. We see the possibility
of observance of the moral law (something we inherently know to be valuable) in the
world of “fact.” Furthermore, though Kant does not explicitly mention this here, we might
gain a sense of solidarity with another in our shared interest in the moral law. Kant does
say that even if we simultaneously are aware of a similar, or shared, degree of
commitment to the moral law in us, we nevertheless still feel respect for the other: “Now,
I may even be aware of a like degree of uprightness in myself, and yet the respect
remains.”329
A third striking feature of this sense of respect is its entirely inward character.
Unlike respect in the second sense, which has a behavioral component (expressed
negatively through the prohibition of contemptuous modes of behavior), this sense of
respect is paid exclusively through an inward feeling. There is an irresistible effect on us
when faced with a moral exemplar that mirrors the inherent pull the moral law has on us in
our recognition of its universal validity.
This third sense of respect, what I will call “merit-based respect,” is something
reserved to morally disciplined people. Kant does not elaborate further on this sense of
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respect in this section of the Critique of Practical Reason, but in his Lectures on Ethics
this sense of respect is examined in more detail. As a result, the picture becomes a bit
more complicated. As of now, merit-based respect is reserved for people who fit under the
rather broad category of those who possess an “uprightness of character.” We may
wonder, though, what constitutes having an “uprightness of character.” It seems like it
must have something to do with the fulfilling of duties, even if we have countervailing
inclinations. But questions arise at this point: Is it in the performance of all our duties? Or
is it just in our narrow ones? What about our positive duties?
We get closer to an answer to this line of questioning in the Collins Lectures. The
context is a discussion of what Kant calls “true honor” as opposed to mere “vanity.”330
True honor has both negative and positive senses. The negative sense of true honor
consists in not violating one’s narrow duties. As Kant says, “If he everywhere acts in
accordance with duty, even the greatest scoundrel must pay him respect, and even the
tyrant cannot rob him of the idea of self-respect, and the worth arising from his merit.”331
It is clear Kant is talking about narrow duties when he continues by saying, “This concept
is negative, because to that extent the agent merely refrains from acting contrary to his
humanity and its worth…”332 So, respect is owed to those who are able to conduct
themselves in a way that does not cause them to violate the narrow duties.
Importantly, this is not the same respect that we owe to all human beings (i.e. our
second sense of respect). This third type of respect, unlike respect in the second sense, can
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be forfeited if we behave in ways that violate our narrow duties. Elsewhere in the Collins
Lectures, Kant says, “We acquire respect in virtue of good conduct, but honour in virtue
of meritorious actions. We forfeit respect by failure to perform duties incumbent on us.”333
“Good conduct” consists in the fulfillment of one’s narrow duties (i.e. avoiding prohibited
actions). “Meritorious actions” is the comparatively high level of fulfillment of our wide
duties; it is through meritorious actions that we receive, not respect, but honor.
We have discussed some of the narrow duties we have towards others at length,
delineated by Kant under the heading of duties of respect owed to others. Failure to
comport oneself to those duties will automatically forfeit a rightful claim to respect in this
merit-based sense. There is another way, though, that one can forfeit respect in this third
sense. Namely, in the violation of one’s narrow duties to oneself.
Perhaps the clearest way a person can abdicate the claim to respect is in the vice of
what Kant calls “false humility” or “servility.”334 Just as we are duty-bound to recognize
the humanity in others, we are also obliged to recognize it in ourselves. Kant writes,
“[F]rom our capacity [Fähigkeit] for internal lawgiving and from the (natural) human
being’s feeling himself to revere the (moral) human being within his own person…there
comes exaltation of the highest self-esteem, the feeling of his inner worth (valor), in terms
of which he is above any price (pretium) and possesses an inalienable dignity (dignitas
interna), which instills in him respect for himself (reverential).”335 Kant provides a list of
prohibitions that, if acted upon, would undermine one’s claim to respect. For example, we
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are to be “no man’s lackey;” we cannot “let others tread with impunity” on our rights; we
cannot become a “parasite or a flatterer or a beggar;” and we are to avoid “kneeling down
or prostrating oneself on the ground.”336 Violating any of these duties is contrary to our
dignity as bearers of humanity. Thus, when we violate these duties we forfeit our claim to
respect. In servility, a person, as Kant writes in his discussion of the duties of respect,
“makes himself unworthy of it [the respect we are owed by other human beings].”337 This
point is echoed in the Vigilantius Lectures when Kant says, “If he wishes others to have
respect for his person, he must likewise hold fast to it, and show that he respects
himself.”338 Failure to avoid servility is one way in which others may withhold meritbased respect for us.339
Respect in this third, merit-based sense, then, is actually narrower than it first
appeared in Kant’s discussion in the Critique of Practical Reason. We earn merit-based
respect through the fulfillment of our narrow duties (i.e. through our refusal to commit
acts prohibited by the moral law). Through fulfillment of our wide duties (i.e. of
beneficence toward others, or the cultivation of our talents) we receive (positive) honor:
“We acquire respect in virtue of good conduct, but honour in virtue of meritorious actions.
We forfeit respect by failure to perform duties incumbent on us.”340 The contrast is clearly
drawn in Kant’s discussion of the positive concept of true honor: “The positive concept of
true honor consists in this, that it essentially takes on actions that involve a merit—more
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than what is required; so if a man merely does what is required of him, he has simply
averted dishonor…he has not exposed himself to contempt and reproof. But if he has done
those things that contain more good than obligation required of him, then merit can arise
for him, and this may bring him true honor.”341 “Contempt and reproof,” here (not to be
confused with contempt in the context of the second sense of respect), mean the
withholding of merit-based respect.
The basic picture that emerges when we combine the second and third senses of
respect go as follows: 1) All human beings are owed respect. Respect on this level means
that no one is to be viewed with contempt. Contempt is the denial of a human being’s
humanity, their moral predisposition, and their potential for moral action. 2) Those human
beings who fulfill their narrow duties to others and to themselves are owed respect.
Respect here means the recognition that, through their actions, they have made themselves
worthy of humanity. They conduct themselves with both self-esteem and with respect for
others.
IV. Conclusion: Respect for the Law and Respect for Persons
Respect for the moral law must be the starting point for any other sense in which
we might have respect for a person. We respect others only insofar as 1) the moral law
requires us to, or 2) others provide an example of moral uprightness in general and
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commitment to the narrow duties that are required by the moral law in particular. In other
words, the two senses of respect that are directed towards other people ultimately have
their source in respect for the moral law. Respect for the moral law, then, grounds respect
for other people (in both senses). That is, respect for the moral law is the most basic kind
of moral respect. Without respect for the moral law, respect for other people is actually not
rationally anchored in anything. In all likelihood, without respect for the moral law, socalled “respect” for other people is mere sentimental outpouring that has nothing to do
with serious morality.
An interesting question to consider in light of Kant’s contention that most, if not
all, people are actually evil (that is, they privilege self-love over morality) is whether or
not respect for the moral law is possible in imperfectly moral people (that is, people who
while affectively responsive to the moral law fail to live up to its dictates when faced with
enough resistance from inclinations). In my view, respect for the moral law is an affective
state brought about by the striking down of self-love when it conflicts with the
requirements of the moral law. It follows, then, that cases of authentic respect for the
moral law, according to Kant, will be infrequent, vanishingly so. Respect for the moral
law will occur in cases where 1) the person experiences a moral crisis in which nature
leads him or her in one direction and freedom in another and 2) the person possesses a
good will and thus strikes down self-love in favor of morality.
Respect for persons, therefore, comes after possession of a good will. While the
duties of respect are unconditionally required of us, only those who have achieved a good
will are in a position to respect persons in a truly morally worthwhile fashion.
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While each sense of respect is distinct from the other, there are similarities
between all three senses of respect’s impact on our affective state. Each sense of respect
dramatizes, internally (in our own minds), the moral crisis that is an inevitable part of our
experience of moral life. In all three senses, there is a dynamic (and sometimes
antagonistic) interplay between what the moral law imposes on us and what inclination
may pull us toward. In the case of respect for the moral law, we must, at times, restrict the
efficaciousness of inclination in our decision making in order to do our duty. In the case of
our duties of respect, we may be tempted to act on inclinations that would assert
superiority over others. Finally, in the case of merit-based respect, our own conscience
may be pained by the respect we irresistibly give to moral exemplars. As a result, we may
have an inclination to seek out ways in which we can diminish the degree to which we
must afford them respect (though of course this could easily lapse into a serious violation
of our duties of respect). Each sense of respect, cultivates in us authentic humility.342 In his
discussion of the vice of servility in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes, “True
humility follows unavoidably from our sincere and exact comparison of ourselves with the
moral law (its holiness and strictness).”343 Each sense of respect reminds us, in one way or
another, of our propensity toward evil. They engender, like much of Kant’s moral theory
as a whole, honest self-reflection about our own problematic and complex relation to the
moral law.
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CHAPTER 4
The Sublime and Its Relation to Kant’s Moral Philosophy
Introduction
This chapter examines some issues surrounding Kant’s account of the sublime
and its relation to his moral philosophy. In particular, it focuses on the relation between
the moral feeling of respect and the feeling that constitutes a dynamically sublime
experience. I begin with a discussion of Kant’s description of the sublime as given in The
Critique of the Power of Judgment. I then consider the relationship between the sublime
and morality. In particular, I discuss some similarities and differences between the moral
feeling of respect and the feeling of the sublime. In this section, I also consider the
indirect contribution to morality that the sublime makes. I discuss the role sublimity has
in Kant’s broader moral philosophy and consider the implications that sublimity has on
subjects who undergo a sublime experience. I argue that sublimity does not reveal
anything new to the subject, but it does dramatize the preexisting receptivity to moral
ideas that the subject must have in order to have a sublime experience in the first place.
I. On the Sublime in General
Kant holds that the sublime, like the beautiful, pleases for itself. That is, the
pleasure we experience from the sublime does not seek some further satisfaction above
and beyond the intrinsic feel of the experience itself. So the satisfaction we experience in
the sublime, like the beautiful, does not depend on sensation (like agreeable sensation)
nor does it depend on a determinate concept (like judging something to be good of its
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kind).344 Early on in his treatment of the sublime Kant writes that judgments about the
sublime are, “related to concepts, although it is indeterminate which, hence the
satisfaction is connected to the mere presentation or to the faculty for that, through which
the faculty of presentation or the imagination is considered, in the case of a given
intuition, to be in accord with the faculty of concepts of the understanding or of reason,
as promoting the latter.”345 Concepts, therefore, may play some role in the satisfaction we
experience in the sublime, but they must be indeterminate.
The characteristic mark of the sublime is the experience of a mental movement in
which the mind becomes agitated and stirred to excitement. Kant writes, “For since the
feeling of the sublime brings with it as its characteristic mark a movement of the mind
connected with the judging of the object, whereas the taste for the beautiful presupposes
and preserves the mind in calm contemplation, yet this movement is to be judged as
subjectively purposive (because the sublime pleases).”346 There are two sorts of mental
movements that can take place in a sublime experience and there are two forms of the
sublime that correspond to each variety of sublime mental movement. Kan refers to them
as the mathematical sublime and the dynamical sublime. He writes, “Thus this movement
is related through the imagination either to the faculty of cognition or to the faculty of
desire, but in both relations the purposiveness of the given representation is judged only
with regard to this faculty (without an end or interest): for then the first is attributed to
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the object as mathematical, the second as a dynamical disposition of the
imagination.”347
The Mathematical Sublime
Kant provides an initial definition of the sublime when he writes, “We call
sublime that which is absolutely great.”348 Something is absolutely great when it “is
great beyond all comparison.”349 The sublime, it seems to follow, must be something that
dwarfs all other things. In other words, we say a thing is sublime when it has a vast
magnitude. Greatness of magnitude is the defining feature of the mathematical sublime.
Since, as Kant argues, the sublime is to be found in a formless, limitless object, the
magnitude of an object must be, in a sense, limitless. Obviously anything we have a
sensory perception of can be quantified in some way (and therefore is not limitless). Does
it follow from this that nothing in nature, properly speaking, is actually sublime? This
seems to rub against Kant’s theory of the sublime since he argues that objects in nature
can, in fact, be rightly called sublime.
Kant, at this point, makes an important distinction that explains why he thinks we
can still talk about encountering objects in experience that we can rightly think of as
sublime. The distinction Kant draws is between our capacity to attach numerical concepts
to an object and our capacity to take in objects aesthetically. Kant writes, “The estimation
of magnitude by means of numerical concepts (or their signs in algebra) is mathematical,
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but that in mere intuition (measured by the eye) is aesthetic.”350 Aesthetic estimation
involves the presentation of an object in one, unified representation; it does not break up
a magnitude into units of measurement and then attach some numerical concept to it. In
this aesthetic sense, then, objects can still be sublime because they are not easily unified
in intuition.
The mathematical sublime is, as Kant asserts, that which “in comparison with
which everything else is small.”351 Of the objects we encounter in nature, there will
always be the possibility of it being large enough to have a greater numerical concept
attached to it. No matter how tall the tallest mountain in the world might be, it is possible
that we can imagine a still-taller mountain, which would have a greater numerical
magnitude. All the objects we encounter in nature actually have limits, even if they
require enormous calculation and imagination to comprehend them. So, in nature, nothing
can be sublime in a non-aesthetic sense: “Here one readily sees that nothing can be given
in nature, however great it may be judged to be by us, which could not, be amplified for
our imagination up to the magnitude of a world…Thus nothing that can be an object of
the senses is, considered on this footing, to be called sublime.”352 Though nothing in
nature is infinite, there can be, in nature, sublime objects. We can think of objects in
nature, then, as sublime when we confront objects within it that cause us to think of
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unbounded magnitude: “Nature is thus sublime in those of its appearances the intuition of
which brings with them the idea of its infinity.”353
Objects bring about, in our minds, the idea of infinity only when the mind
encounters vast objects, not easily subsumed within a single representation. The
mathematical sublime is only encountered when our sensory capacities are unable to
absorb wholly, or take in, some vast object. Phenomenologically, the experience of
aesthetic estimation might be understood as our eyes finding the borders, or limits, of the
object. Once the borders are taken in, one can reflect on the object as a whole. An
experience of aesthetic estimation, therefore, becomes sublime when the eye cannot take
in the borders of the object and thus cannot have a representation of the entire object at
one time.
Kant describes this experience of being unable to take in the entirety of an object
as consisting both of pleasant and unpleasant elements. In other words, the mind
experiences a complex feeling, which cannot simply be labeled as wholly pleasurable or
displeasurable.354 The mathematical sublime is initially unpleasant because we fail to take
in the vast object aesthetically, all at once in one representation. This failure results in
frustration when confronted with the limitation of our sensory and imaginative capacities.
Thus the mind cannot comprehend the infinite, though. Kant writes, “Comprehension
353
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becomes ever more difficult the further apprehension advances, and soon reaches its
maximum, namely the aesthetically greatest basic measure for the estimation of
magnitude.”355 So, our comprehension of magnitude is limited and an experience of this
limitation is unpleasant. The mind is frustrated by its inability to comprehend the infinite,
even as it continually strives to do so.
This displeasure, however, is not permanent because in our frustrated desire to
take in the whole, we realize that we must have another mental faculty that causes us to
think of an infinite magnitude as a whole in the first place: “But what is most important is
that even being able to think of it as a whole indicates a faculty of mind which surpasses
every standard of sense.”356 The very cause of our initial displeasure, in the end, becomes
the revelatory source for an awareness of an “unlimited capacity.”357 Kant describes this
progression from frustration to satisfaction as follows: “The quality of the feeling of the
sublime is that it is a feeling of displeasure concerning the aesthetic faculty of judging an
object that is yet at the same time represented as purposive, which is possible because the
subject’s own incapacity reveals the consciousness of an unlimited capacity of the very
same subject, and the mind can aesthetically judge the latter only through the former.”358
Mathematical sublimity, therefore, is found in vast objects, in things like the Pyramids or
the Milky Way. This is not because they are limitless themselves, but rather because our
eye’s strain to take in the whole of the Pyramids or in our eye’s (and also in our
imagination’s) failure to comprehend the whole Milky Way inevitably gives rise to the
355
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idea of limitlessness. The mathematical sublime is the kind of sublimity that centers upon
vastness. The link between vastness and sublimity was a well-established idea by the time
Kant wrote the Critique of the Power of Judgment.359 Kant, however, does not limit his
discussion of the sublime to vast objects. There is another form of sublimity which is not
related, directly, to vastness at all, but rather to notions of power and danger. Kant calls
this sort of sublimity “dynamical.”360
The Dynamical Sublime
Kant defines the dynamical sublime in the following way: “Nature considered in
aesthetic judgment as a power that has no dominion over us is dynamically sublime.”361
The definition is striking because of Kant’s description of nature as a power, but as a
power that has no dominion over us. That is, Kant, in discussing the dynamical sublime
argues that nature is judged to be a power, but, in some way, it is a power under whose
dominion we do not entirely fall.
Kant lists some objects which can elicit an experience of the dynamical sublime:
“Bold, overhanging, as it were threatening cliffs, thunder clouds towering up the heavens,
bringing with them flashes of lightning and crashes of thunder, volcanoes with their alldestroying violence, hurricanes with the devastation they leave behind, the boundless
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ocean set into a rage, a lofty waterfall on a mighty river, etc.”362 Kant seems to think that
the paradigmatic cases of dynamically sublime objects are mighty and dangerous objects
in nature that carry with them awesome force. Kant says that objects such as these “make
our capacity to resist into an insignificant trifle in comparison with their power.”363 As a
result of their immense power to overcome our resistance, dynamically sublime objects
are fearful: “If nature is to be judged by us as dynamically sublime, it must be
represented as arousing fear…For in aesthetic judging the superiority over obstacles can
only be judged in accordance with the magnitude of the resistance. However, that which
we strive to resist is an evil, and, if we find our capacity to be no match for it, an object of
fear.”364 We can imagine what would happen to us if we fell into a mighty river. We
would simply be at the mercy of its rapids and force. Furthermore, in such a case, there is
little we can do to ensure our very survival. Our lives would be at the mercy of forces that
are utterly beyond our control. Objects that possess this immense destructive powers are
what Kant holds are capable of giving rise to a dynamically sublime experience.
It is important to keep in mind that these harrowing experiences with those
terrifying objects must be imaginative. Authentic fear cannot be a constituent of a
dynamically sublime experience. Kant writes, “Someone who is afraid can no more judge
about the sublime in nature than someone who is in the grip of inclination and appetite
can judge about the beautiful.”365 An experience is dynamically sublime only when there
is no genuine threat from the sublime object. Observing a raging river from a safe
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distance, for example, allows us to imagine ourselves confronting the river and to
contemplate its power. This is done, though, while also knowing that we are safely
removed from it and that it poses no real threat. We recognize the object as fearful
without actually being afraid of it. This happens when, “We judge it in such a way that
we merely think of the case in which we might wish to resist it and think that in that case
all resistance would be completely futile.”366 Being in the grip of authentic fear is simply
terrifying and it would be impossible for the complex feeling of the sublime to come
about. A dynamically sublime experience is marked, in the end, by “joyfulness.”367
Imagined fear and joyfulness, then, are the two defining features of the
dynamically sublime experience. The sublime, then, is a complex feeling consisting of
both positive and negative aspects. Having to imagine the utterly futility of resistance is
not a straightforwardly pleasant psychological event. It forces us to accept our finitude
and, ultimately, our own mortality. When one imagines resisting a raging river, for
example, one cannot help but entertain the possibility that one would die as a result of
falling in. These considerations are not pleasant to think about because perhaps our most
fundamental natural inclination is to self-preservation. The fearful aspects of dynamically
sublime objects, however, are also the very same features that allow us to discover our
capacity of reason: “they [frightening objects] elevate the strength of our soul above its
usual level, and allow us to discover within ourselves a capacity for resistance of quite
another kind, which gives us the courage to measure ourselves against the apparent all-
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powerfulness of nature.”368 Kant seems to be suggesting that when we are confronted
with a dynamically sublime object and realize the futility in resisting its power, we still
nevertheless “discover” within ourselves a “capacity for resistance.” This capacity is not
subject to the power of the fearful object. The fearful object can do nothing to undermine
or diminish this capacity.369
Kant argues that this capacity allows us to see ourselves as independent of and
superior to nature. He writes,
“The irresistibility of its [the dynamical sublime object]
certainly makes us, considered as natural beings, recognize
our physical powerlessness, but at the same time it reveals
a capacity for judging ourselves as independent of it and a
superiority over nature on which is grounded a selfpreservation of quite another kind than that which can be
threatened and endangered by nature outside is, whereby
the humanity in our person remains undemeaned even
though the human being must submit to that dominion.”370

When confronted with dynamically sublime objects we realize that it is possible to retain
our humanity, or our freedom, even in the face of physical danger. Authentic moral
action, or adherence to the moral law, is not subject to the dangers and contingencies that
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natural being and our moral being: “The object that elicits a judgment of the dynamical sublime is
viewed as having so much power that, insofar as the aesthetic subject is a natural being, she
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Malcolm Budd also argues that the kind of resistance that is opened up here is our capacity to act
morally, even in the face of natural destruction: “The second [mode of resistance] is the ability
not to abandon our moral principles and commitment to morality, even under the greatest
pressure” (The Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature 78).
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abound in the natural world. The forces of nature are incapable of undermining our
humanity, so long as we continue to adhere to the moral law.
II. Sublimity and Morality
A) The Moral Feeling of Respect and Sublimity
There are several similarities between the moral feeling of respect and the experience of
sublimity. Perhaps the most striking similarity between respect and sublimity is that both
experience involve a complex feeling, consisting of negative and positive aspects. In
discussing Kant’s discussion of respect in the Critique of Practical Reason, Paul Guyer
writes, “The structure of Kant’s account is the same as that which he was to use two years
later in his characterization of the feeling of the sublime. The palpable painfulness of the
frustration of the imagination in attempting to grasp the infinite or our fear of physical
destruction itself reveals to us the higher power of reason to form the very idea of an
infinite in the first place and to grant us a value that is immune from physical
destruction.”371 In Kant’s accounts of both respect and sublimity, the subject is left with a
complex, though unified, feeling.
Another related similarity between respect and sublimity is that the source of the
negative aspect of the feeling is the very same as that of the positive feeling. In the case
of the mathematical sublime, the imagination undergoes an unpleasant experience of its
limits. It attempts to comprehend the infinite, but fails to do so. However, that very
failure is what gives rise to an awareness that there must be some faculty within us that is
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beyond, in some way, the limitations of the senses and of imagination. Similarly, in the
case of the dynamical sublime the revelation that we can within ourselves a capacity to
withstand physical pressure and to remain resolute in our commitment to morality comes
only in the imaginative grappling with a physically unconquerable force in nature. The
negative “moment” of the dynamical sublime is the very thing that makes the positive
“moment” possible.
Respect also has this positive-negative structure. It involves limiting or infringing
upon one’s self-love and also in striking down completely one’s self-conceit. Both of
these acts are unpleasant because they require us to adjust and to diminish our natural
inclinations. But Kant also describes respect as consisting of a positive element. The
positive aspect in respect is, in striking down self-conceit and in infringing upon one’s
self-love, we are able to act freely, which for Kant is the only legitimate ground for a
claim to self-worth. It is only through the negative aspects of respect that a person can act
freely; the negative feeling is the ultimate source for the positive.
Respect and sublimity also highlight the distinction between our natural being and
our moral being. With regard to respect, this distinction is fairly obvious. Inclinations are
natural occurrences for all human beings, and it is only after one has made the decision to
adhere to the moral law does one reconsider and diminish the role of inclinations in
forming our behavior. It is only through the exercise of pure practical reason does selflove become rational and in accordance with the demands of morality. In a sense, then,
our supersensible freedom must intrude upon the otherwise normal operations of our
natural selves. In the case of the dynamical sublime the most fundamental natural
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inclination we have is undermined, yet there remains something in us that can still resist.
We might think of self-preservation as the most basic and fundamental inclination we
have. In the experience of the dynamical sublime, however, we are able to distance
ourselves even from this inclination. We identify a part of ourselves that is not attached to
self-preservation.
The mathematical sublime too, like respect, causes us to have an experience that
reinforces the notion that there are faculties contained in us that transcend our natural,
empirical being. In the case of the mathematical sublime, our imagination is unable to
comprehend the infinite, but through the failure we are made more aware that some
capacity within us causes our mind to strive to take in the infinite as a unified whole.
Strikingly, this realization causes in us a feeling of respect:
Our imagination, even in its greatest effort with regard to the
comprehension of a given object in whole of intuition (hence
for the presentation of the idea of reason) that is demanded of
it, demonstrates its limits and inadequacy, but at the same
time its vocation for adequately realizing that idea as a law.
Thus the feeling of the sublime in nature is respect for our
own vocations, which we show to an object in nature through
a certain subreption (substitution of a respect for the object
instead of for the idea of humanity in our subject), which as it
were makes intuitable the superiority of the rational vocation
of our cognitive faculty over the greatest faculty of
sensibility.372

Again, we can see how the mathematical sublime might be an indirect contribution to
morality because it reveals to us that we have vocations that go beyond, and are
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independent of, our natural being. We feel, in an immediate way, the “superiority of the
rational vocations of our cognitive faculty over the greatest faculty of sensibility.”373
The dynamical sublime also simulates, in a way, the striking down of self-conceit
that takes place when one develops consciousness of the moral law. Self-conceit,
according to Kant, is wholly incompatible with morality because it attaches some value to
the self prior to the self’s adherence to the moral law. Kant writes that self-conceit
involves, “claims to esteem for oneself that precede accord with the moral law.”374 These
claims, for Kant, must be “null and quite unwarranted because certainty of a disposition
in accord with this law is the first condition of any worth of a person, and any
presumption prior to this is false and opposed to the law.375 Self-conceit, then, must be
grounded in something other than pure practical reason. Self-conceit might result from
thinking about one’s fortune, or one’s intelligence, or one’s good looks prior to moral
considerations, but respect strikes down all these considerations and turns the subject’s
attention to the moral law, first and foremost.
The dynamical sublime seems to have a similar effect on the subject. In
considering the likelihood of being physically overwhelmed by a force in nature, one
realizes that no matter how rich one is, or how smart one is, there is no way to resist the
force that would be coming upon oneself. However, one becomes more acutely aware
that it remains possible to remain morally resolute and to maintain one’s commitment to
morality, even in the face of physical or material destruction. The dynamical sublime,
373
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like respect, seems to belittle, or to diminish, the importance of non-moral values. It
makes us experience, firsthand, the idea that the highest and best possibilities for us
reside in committing ourselves to the moral law.
While there are interesting similarities between sublimity and respect, it is also
important to observe that there are some of the differences between them. One difference
between them seems to be in the phenomenological order of the experience. In the case of
moral respect, the subject attains awareness of the moral law and then must rein in or
diminish one’s inclinations in order to abide by the dictates of pure practical reason. Kant
writes, “Hence the moral law unavoidably humiliates every human being when he
compares with it the sensible property of his nature.”376 The negative moment, although
in the case of respect culminates in a positive feeling, comes after recognition of one’s
capacity for moral action. Once one has actually subjugated some inclinations in the
name of morality one experiences the joy that comes from being free.
The sublime, by contrast, has the phenomenological story going in the opposite
direction. The sublime initially has a negative moment in which one struggles against the
limits of the imagination (mathematical sublime) or in which one imaginatively struggles
with a force that cannot be overcome (dynamical sublime). The positive moment emerges
only after the limitations of one’s imagination or one’s bodily strength are recognized by
the subject.
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Another important difference between respect and sublimity is in the differing
relations each has to moral action. In the case of the sublime, all that is revealed to the
subject is a faculty that he or she has. The faculty need not be exercised in the case of the
sublime, rather it is sufficient that the subject be made aware that he or she does indeed
have the faculty. The feeling culminates, for Kant, in a conscious awareness of our
superiority to nature (just because we have a faculty that, if exercised, will render us
superior). He writes, “Thus sublimity is not contained in anything in nature, but only in
our mind, insofar as we can become conscious of being superior to nature within us and
thus also to nature outside us (insofar as it influences us). Everything that arouses this
feeling in us, which includes the power of nature that calls forth our own powers, is thus
(although improperly) called sublime.”377 The sublime is, according to this passage, a
state of mind that comes about when one encounters objects in nature which reveal a
person’s superiority over nature to his or herself.
Respect, by contrast, is the effect on one’s experience of adopting the moral law
as one’s fundamental maxim. The attitude of respect emerges when one actually has
exercised the faculty of pure practical reason. Kant describes the feeling of respect when
he writes:

Freedom, the causality of which is determinable only
through the law, consists just in this: that it restricts all
inclinations, and consequently the esteem of the person
himself, to the condition of compliance with its pure law.
This restriction now has an effect on feeling and produces
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the feeling of displeasure which can be cognized a priori
from the moral law. It is, however, so far a negative effect
which…mainly infringes upon the activity of the subject
so far as inclinations are his determining grounds…378

Respect only comes about when one actually has made a morally relevant decision. That
is, the moral law has provided incentive (namely, itself) for a specific course of action.
Respect is a feeling that emerges out of this sort of situation.379
Moral feeling is necessary in order for someone to have a sublime experience, but
the subject need not actually make a morally worthy decision to undergo a sublime
experience. One needs to have the idea of the moral law or of freedom in order to have a
sublime experience, but one does not need to have actually adopted the dictates of the
moral law as their fundamental maxim. Kant is skeptical that we will have widespread
agreement over which objects in nature are sublime. Kant writes, “We cannot promise
ourselves that our judgment concerning the sublime in nature will so readily find
acceptance by others. For a far greater culture, not merely of the aesthetic power of
judgment, but also of the cognitive faculties on which that is based, seems to be requisite
in order to be able to make a judgments about this excellence of the objects of nature.”380
For a person to have a sublime experience at all, they need to be receptive to certain ideas
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(i.e. the idea of freedom, the moral law, infinity). He writes, “The disposition of the mind
to the feeling of the sublime requires its receptivity to ideas.”381
Sublimity and respect, therefore, have some striking shared features, but it would
be a mistake to take their similarities too far and to treat them as involved in
fundamentally the same role within Kant’s Critical system. Sublimity, even though it
shares phenomenological structures with respect, and even though it can indirectly
contribute to one’s moral being is not to be taken as identical with the moral feeling of
respect.382 We also, should be careful not to treat the sublime as, in anyway, providing
incentive for moral action. If we did this, then we would, ultimately, be making morality
impossible since a peculiar feeling marks sublimity and a feeling can never be the basis
for moral action according to Kant. Rather, we should view sublimity as a peculiar state
of mind that is disinterested (it takes satisfaction only in the presentation of a faculty),
which pleases for its own sake, but nevertheless which might still play an important,
albeit indirect, role in the cultivation of one’s moral being.
The dynamical sublime also has long-term effects on a person’s moral life. That
is, the significance of the experience of the dynamical sublime can also play an indirect
role in the long-term cultivation of one’s moral being. The dynamical sublime can
reinforce a more steadfast and brave manner in our adherence to the moral law. Kant
writes, “But even tumultuous movements of the mind…can in no way clam the honor of
381
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the sublime can arise in various ways. For instance, one might reduce the sublime to the moral
feeling or identify sublimity with moral feeling” (The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of
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being a sublime presentation, if they do not leave behind a disposition of mind that, even
if only indirectly, has influence on the consciousness of its strength and resolution in
regard to that which brings with it intellectual purposiveness (the supersensible)” (CPJ
5:273). The dynamical sublime involves a moment during which a capacity is revealed to
us, but it also makes a long-term or indelible mark on our way of thinking. Presumably,
the indelible mark made on us will, if only indirectly, affect our future behavior. Namely,
it will make us more strong and resolute in our commitment to morality.
III. Sublimity and the Problem of Enthusiasm
The sort of both physical and phenomenal characteristics that accompany a
sublime experience seem also to be common to paradigmatic cases of enthusiasm. One
example of this similarity comes in Kant’s description of a sublime experience as
“astonishment bordering on terror, the horror and the awesome shudder.”383 The
description provided here by Kant seems to equally apply to a person in an enthusiastic,
ecstatic state. Kant recognizes that sublimity and enthusiasm can easily associated with
each other; he writes that enthusiasm is a “state of mind” which “seems to be sublime.”384
Furthermore, both enthusiasm and sublimity seem to be understood by Kant as consisting
in intense and potentially overpowering feelings. Given these similarities, it is no surprise
that one might be tempted to link the two together. Perhaps they have a similar source, or
perhaps even they often overlap with each other.
This apparent connection between enthusiasm and sublimity, though, has the
potential to complicate the relation between sublimity and morality in a troubling way.
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384

CPJ 5:269.
CPJ 5:272.
153

The problem might arise because, according to Kant, enthusiasm is problematic for
morality. In fact, enthusiasm often, if not always, makes true morality impossible. Kant
argues that people in the thrall of enthusiasm cannot be motivated by respect for the
moral law, but rather by an affect, which must be, by definition, pathological to some
degree or other. Freedom is impossible when one is in the thrall of enthusiasm because
one’s actions are governed not by free choice, but rather by the particular emotion one is
feeling.385 In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant writes, “The moral level on which a
human being (and, so far as we can see, every rational creature as well) stands is respect
for the moral law…By exhortation to actions as noble, sublime, and magnanimous, minds
are attuned to nothing but moral enthusiasm and exaggerated self-conceit; by such
exhortations they are led into the delusion that it is not duty…which constitutes the
determining ground of their actions…but that it is as if those actions are expected from
them, not from duty but as bare merit.”386 Enthusiasm, according to Kant, may enthrall
people and cause them to do the right thing (the sort of action that is in conformity to the
demands of morality), but this makes morality impossible in that instance. Only respect
for the moral law can be the motivating source of a truly moral action.
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A person in an enthusiastic state, though, is likely to be acting from a principle
that is different than respect for the moral law. Being motivated by enthusiasm, therefore,
would have disastrous ramifications for morality. Kant writes:
“For when they [people motivated by being in an enthusiastic state
of mind] imitate such deeds…not only have they quite failed to
fulfill the spirit of the law, which consists in the disposition
subjecting itself to the law, not in the lawfulness of the action; not
only do they locate the incentive pathologically (in sympathy or
self-love), not morally; but they produce in this way a frivolous,
high-flown, fantastic cast of mind, flattering themselves with the
spontaneous goodness of heart that needs neither spur nor bridle
and for which not even a command is necessary and thereby
forgetting their obligation, which they ought to think rather than
merit.387

Kant, in this passage, describes three problems with moral enthusiasm: (1) It goes against
the “spirit” of morality because it views our relation to the moral law incorrectly. That is,
moral enthusiasts see moral action as flowing from, or consistent with, human nature.
There is not, in the moment of enthusiasm, a struggle to do the right thing even though
our pathological drives might drive us to do the wrong thing. (2) It leads people to do
moral deeds for the wrong sorts of reasons. If moral action is grounded in moral
enthusiasm, then it cannot be grounded in respect for the moral law. Interestingly, Kant
does not (morally) distinguish between being in an enthusiastic state and being driven
into a state of sympathy and acting from self-love. Both sources of motivation are
pathological. (3) An enthusiast has the wrong “cast of mind” necessary for serious moral
action. The enthusiast “flatters” him or herself and self-indulgently revels in their
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purported “goodness of heart.” Such a character, while capable of isolated moral action,
is not fit for a lifetime of moral behavior.
Given this rather negative treatment of enthusiasm in the Critique of Practical
Reason, it may seem reasonable to suppose that enthusiasm is entirely contrary to
morality and should be avoided in order to avoid the moral difficulties Kant describes. It
seems to follow that if it is to serve morality in anyway, it cannot lead to enthusiasm.
Enthusiasm and sublimity, in other words, must be treated separately and it must be
possible to have a sublime experience without falling into enthusiasm. On this reading,
the “seeming” of enthusiasm to be sublime must in fact be inaccurate, an inaccuracy
which would be dispelled through further analysis of sublime experience. One would
expect, then, that Kant, when turning to his theory of the sublime would unambiguously
deny enthusiasm as having any positive relationship with the sublime, even though, on
first glance, they seem to share several features.
When we turn to the Critique of the Power of Judgment, however, the discussion
of enthusiasm in the “General remark on the exposition of aesthetic reflective judgments”
is far from straightforward. In fact, Kant’s treatment of the enthusiasm and its relation to
the sublime, in the CPJ is rather complicated.388 Kant begins his discussion of enthusiasm
and sublimity when he writes, “The idea of the good with affect is called enthusiasm.
This state of mind seems to be sublime, so much so that it is commonly maintained that
without it nothing great can be accomplished.”389 So far, these comments would still be
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consistent with Kant’s ultimate rejection of enthusiasm having any role in sublime
experience. Kant, here, would just be showing the superficial similarities between
sublimity and enthusiasm, but will go on to show that they are not important, substantive
similarities. Again, this “seeming” would have to be shown to be illusory. Kant
apparently then does in fact go on to distance sublimity from enthusiasm when he writes
that enthusiasm “cannot in any way merit a satisfaction of reason” because it makes
impossible “engaging in free consideration of principles, in order to determine itself in
accordance with them.”390 Enthusiasm, therefore, can never yield pleasure when
considered in terms of satisfying one’s reason.
Sublimity, unlike enthusiasm, is a satisfaction of reason because it reveals to us a
capacity we have to realize our humanity (to freely choose to act from the right sort of
principle), even when faced with the prospect of physical destruction. From this it would
seem to follow that Kant is completely disassociating the sublime from enthusiasm.
The story, however, does not entirely end here. Kant does go on to, in some sense,
link enthusiasm with sublimity. He writes, “Nevertheless, enthusiasm is aesthetically
sublime, because it is a stretching of the powers through ideas, which give the mind a
momentum that acts far more powerfully and persistently than the impetus given by
sensory impressions.”391 Enthusiasm, then, can be considered “aesthetically sublime”
because those in the grip of enthusiasm are often driven to heroic resistance to obstacles.
Kant writes, “Every affect of the courageous sort (that is, which arouses the
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consciousness of our powers to overcome any resistance) is aesthetically sublime.”392
Enthusiasm, it seems, can be considered sublime when the person who is in an
enthusiastic state is driven to a similar sort of total resistance as a person feels when they
recognize some capacity in them over which nature does not have dominion. This of
course does not amount to an unequivocal endorsement of enthusiasm, but Kant does
allow for it to have some aesthetically redeeming qualities. In fact, in admitting that
enthusiasm can, at times, be aesthetically sublime, Kant is implicitly rejecting the idea
that enthusiasm is necessarily and always a threat to morality. While enthusiasm cannot
provide motivating grounds for moral action, it can cause a similar movement of the
mind towards sublime feelings, which in turn give rise to an increased awareness of
oneself as a moral being.
IV. Sublimity, Enthusiasm, and Fanaticism
We noted earlier how Kant argues that the sublime can indirectly contribute to
morality. Kant seems to argue that the sublime can leave with us a newfound resoluteness
when we think of ourselves as committed to morality. The person undergoing a sublime
experience feels energized or invigorated in their commitment to the moral law because
they have, in a sense, felt their capacity for transcending the natural in an immediate way.
There are two, related parallels one can draw to this sort of experience that people
normally undergo, especially in Kant’s time: first, through hearing a rousing, edifying
sermon which prompts them in an ecstatic and energetic way to commit themselves to
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God (and to morality and righteousness); and second through a religious experience,
often consisting in some sort of encounter with the divine (having beatific visions or
hearing the word of God). Both sermons and religious experiences can, like sublime
experiences, leave an indelible mark on a person and create in them a newfound
resoluteness to be moral. Kant seems to present his account of sublime experience as
providing the same sort (or perhaps even a purer, better sort) of moral edification
provided by religious seers or by fiery sermons without the lapse into superstition. That
is, while traditional religious practices often depend on unjustified claims to knowledge,
Kant’s account of the sublime can withstand critique and can nevertheless still provide
human beings with strong feelings about morality and their capacity to realize their
humanity.
Kant describes his account of the sublime as if sublime feeling is a morally
superior alternative to more traditional modes of religious experience. Kant asserts that
his account of the sublime is superior to traditional, religious presentations of morality.
He writes, “This pure, elevating, merely negative presentation of morality carries with it
no risk of visionary rapture, which is a delusion of being able to see something
beyond all bounds of sensibility, i.e., to dream in accordance with principles (to rave
with reason), precisely because the presentation in this case is merely negative.”393 Here,
Kant suggests that his sort of sublime experience is a presentation of morality, but one
that does not carry with it unsound claims about what one “sees.” In other words, a

393

CPJ 5:275.
159

Kantian sublime experience will not devolve into the fantasies a Swedenborgian mystical
experience.
At this point, though, one might wonder if Kant’s alternative will be disappointing
to people who previously have relied upon more fanciful and sensuous experiences when
seeking moral edification. Does Kant’s account leave the subject feeling a cold, dull chill
where the thrall of enthusiasm had previously left them aflame with feeling? Kant seems
to anticipate this criticism that one could levy against his account by a religious
enthusiast when he writes, “It is utterly mistaken to worry that if it [the representation of
the moral law and the predisposition to morality in us] were deprived of everything that
the senses can recommend it would then bring with it nothing but cold, lifeless approval
and no moving force or emotion.”394 In fact, Kant argues that his account is actually more
powerful than sermons or visions which attach a sensory element to them (i.e. seeing God
or hearing the word of God). Emotion will run so high that we must take pains to assure
ourselves that we are not swept away into enthusiasm. He writes, “For when the senses
no longer see anything before them, yet the unmistakable and inextinguishable idea of
morality remains, there it would be more necessary to moderate the momentum of an
unbounded imagination so as not to let it reach the point of enthusiasm, rather than, from
fear of powerlessness of these ideas, to look for assistance for them in images and
childish devices.”395
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Kant’s account of sublimity, therefore, can provide edification for a mind that has
overcome an unseemly dependence on images and “childish” heuristic devices in its
thinking about morality. Sublime objects in nature, such as thunderbolts, storms, cliffs,
and mountains no longer are literally manifestations of an anthropomorphic God, but
rather are seen for what they are: natural objects which, when contemplated, can give rise
to an awareness of our capacity for freedom.
V. Sublimity and Moral Precariousness
Since our capacity for freedom consists in our ability to choose our own ends (and
not to be determined solely by instinct), Kant’s account of sublimity dramatizes, through
an aesthetic experience, the conflict between morality and self-love. The sublime is an
intense experience where the mind is moved by awareness of the moral law (and its
applicability to us as moral agents). Kant’s account of the sublime provides an outlet for
inflamed, passionate experience without reverting to enthusiasm and fanaticism.
Sublimity, unlike enthusiasm and fanaticism, retains the inextricability of moral crisis,
while also allowing us to feel ourselves as subject to the moral law (and therefore
elevated above nature). On this understanding, Kant’s account of the sublime can be an
authentic moral experience. The fanatic and enthusiast, by contrast, are actually more
prone to inauthentic moral experience and, especially in the case of the fanatic, to
immoral behavior. That is, enthusiasm and fanaticism distort the relationship between
human beings and the moral law. In doing so, it obscures the inextricably complex and
problematic connection human beings have to the moral law.
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In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant defines enthusiasm in the
following way: “The idea of the good with affect is called enthusiasm.”396 When a
person experiences an intense feeling on account of thinking about the good, that person
is in an enthusiastic mindset. Enthusiasm, for Kant, is morally problematic because an
action conducted in an enthusiastic mindset is likely not grounded in reason, but rather in
feeling. Kant writes, “Now, however, every affect is blind, either in the choice of its end,
or, even, if this is given by reason, in its implementation; for it is that movement of the
mind that makes it incapable of engaging in free consideration of principles, in order to
determine itself in accordance with them. Thus it cannot in any way merit a satisfaction
of reason.”397 Enthusiasm can distort our thought process and make us act in a way that
reflects our enlivened mindset, but such action would be grounded in feeling, and not
reason. Authentically moral action (action from awareness of one’s duty) only comes
about through the exercise of one’s practical reason; enthusiasm makes thinking more
difficult, if not impossible.
Enthusiasm, while problematic on its own, can lead to states of mind which are
even more threatening to morality. In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, when
comparing sublimity with enthusiasm, Kant warns against enthusiasm because it can lead
to “visionary rapture” and the “delusion” that one has the ability to “see” beyond “all
bounds of sensibility.”398 Such “visionary rapture” is a more intense, and also more
dangerous, passion. Kant writes, “In enthusiasm, as an affect, the imagination is
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unreined; in visionary rapture, as a deep-rooted, oppressive passion, it is unruled. The
former is a passing accident, which occasionally affects the most healthy understanding;
the latter is a disease that destroys it.”399 Enthusiasm, on my reading, is problematic not
only in itself, but also because it tends towards fanaticism. The enthusiast is at high risk
of becoming a fanatic.
The rapture of the fanatic often has its origins in the intense emotion of the
enthusiast. Rachel Zuckert refers to this sort of rapture as “fanaticism” in her paper
“Kant’s Account of Practical Fanaticism.”400 There, she describes the dangers of
fanaticism as follows: “First, the practical fanatic confuses emotional sensibility and
sensation: he misinterprets a feeling of his own state (pleasure, or being moved by
religious or moral ideas) for a sense experience of or received from the object of those
ideas…Second…the fanatic understands an effect of the moral, religious articulation of
ends (to be brought about by him) itself as an end, indeed as the ultimate accomplishment
of his highest aims.”401 The first problem of fanaticism is a violation one of the basic
tenants of Kant’s theoretical philosophy: a claim to experience of a mere idea. Kant
expresses his concern for this first problem in the above-quoted remark where he writes
that the so-called visionary is under a “delusion” in which he or she claims the ability to
“see something beyond all bounds of sensibility.”402
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The second problem of fanaticism involves a fundamentally mistaken view on the
moral situation of human beings. Human beings, if they are to possess moral worth, must
actually achieve a good will. In the Religion, Kant puts this a bit differently, but it is the
same line of thought, put in a religious context: “To begin with I accept the following
proposition as a principle requiring no proof: Apart from a good life-conduct, anything
which the human being supposes that he can do to become well-pleasing to God is mere
religious delusion and counterfeit service to God.”403 In the case of visionary rapture and
fanaticism, there is an acute risk that the mere presence of fervor and intensity in
someone is sufficient to make oneself pleasing to god (i.e. is sufficient to make one
good). Such a view badly obfuscates the basic relation that human beings have to
morality, and to the way in which human beings can become good.
The sublime gives rational people an outlet for the joyful or exhilarating sense of
one’s capacity for morality, and thus of one’s capacity to rise above all of nature (in all its
vastness and power). The sublime does not yield an image, or a positive representation of
our freedom and our capacity for morality. Such an image is impossible. Kant writes,
“For the inscrutability of the idea of freedom entirely precludes any positive
presentation; but the moral law is sufficient in itself in us and originally determining, so
that it does not even allow us to look around for a determining ground outside of it.”404
Our awareness of the moral law, coupled with a recognition of its validity prepares us for
a sublime experience. Without awareness of the moral law, sublimity is impossible.
When we do encounter the sublime, we experience a heightened awareness of the moral
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law because we come to feel (in a way we previously understood) ourselves as elevated
above the vast or powerful natural object before us. This presentation of our freedom
remains negative because we do not “see” the moral law, or our own freedom, or any
kind of deity (the source of all goodness according to religious traditions). While merely
negative in its presentation of our freedom, Kant writes that the sublime, in its wake, can
“leave behind a disposition of mind that, even if only indirectly, has influence on
consciousness of its strength and resolution in regard to that which brings with it
intellectual purposiveness (the supersensible).”405 Such a disposition does not confuse
feeling for authentic moral experience, and it does not lead toward fanatical identification
with the good itself or with a privileged and direct access to the supersensible. It leaves
us where we started, only with a heightened awareness of what we already knew: that we
are capable of morality, if we can only prioritize the moral law over self-love in our
supreme maxim (expressed through our actions and their accompanying subordinate
maxims).
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CHAPTER 5
Becoming Good: Moral Evil, Freedom, and Grace in Kant’s Moral Philosophy

Introduction
This chapter considers Kant’s views on moral evil and on the possibility for moral
improvement. Part I provides a brief overview of Kant’s basic conception of evil and his
claim that evil is a pervasive trait in human beings. Part II provides an account of Kant’s
notion of intelligible freedom. This section provides the basic framework through which I
will analyze Kant’s views on moral evil and the possibility of moral improvement. Part
III discusses the relationship between freedom and appearances. Here, I develop Kant’s
claim that, while metaphysically distinct from each other, the empirical and the
intelligible have a relationship best understood as one of ground and consequence. Part
IV introduces Kant’s conception of moral evil. It examines Kant’s claim that the basic
moral struggle in which human beings find themselves is between competing principles:
the principle of self-love and the principle of morality. Part V considers the important
notion of the inscrutability of the ultimate ground of moral evil in human beings. Here, I
argue that the notion of inscrutability turns largely on Kant’s theory of freedom. Part VI
begins my discussion of Kant’s account of moral improvement. Part VII centers on the
relationship between Kant’s account of moral improvement and his views on the
traditional religious concept of grace. Here I argue that Kant’s account of moral
improvement is not simply a reformulation of the notion of grace, but it nevertheless
bears some striking similarities to it. Finally, in Part VIII, I consider two possible
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objections to Kant’s account of moral improvement. I offer a qualified defense of Kant
against he first objection, but then argue that the second objection brings out a serious
issue in Kant’s account of moral improvement. I end the chapter by arguing first that the
basis on which the objection rests is a foundational feature of Kant’s moral theory
(namely, intelligible freedom), and then by responding to the claim that Kant’s possible
failure to account for intelligible moral improvement engenders moral despair.
I. The Pervasiveness of Evil
Kant defines moral evil in human beings in the following way: “[T]he statement,
“The human being is evil,” cannot mean anything else than that he is conscious of the
moral law and yet has incorporated into his maxim the (occasional) deviation from it.”406
Human beings are evil insofar as they are aware of the requirements of morality, but
nevertheless act in ways that fail to meet those requirements. More specifically we should
think of human evil as residing in the kinds of maxims we adopt: “We call a human being
evil, however, not because he performs actions that are evil (contrary to law), but because
these are so constituted that they allow the inference of evil maxims in him.”407 An
immoral, or evil, maxim places self-love above morality as providing the sufficient
determining ground for exercising one’s power of choice. That is, evil maxims privilege
self-love over morality. In cases where the two come into conflict, the evil person, at
times, will choose to satisfy an inclination rather than fulfill his or her moral obligation.
In the Religion, Kant writes, “In order, then, to call a human being evil, it must be
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possible to infer a priori from a number of consciously evil actions, or even from a single
one, an underlying evil maxim...”408
Evil is an especially pressing issue to consider because Kant claims that
immorality, rather than morality, is the most prominent disposition in most people. In the
Groundwork, Kant writes, “One need not be an enemy of virtue but only a cool observer,
who does not take the liveliest wish for the good straight–away as its reality, to become
doubtful at certain moments (especially with increasing years, when experience has made
one’s judgment partly more shrewd and partly more acute in observation) whether any
true virtue is to be found in the world.”409 In the Religion, Kant writes, “We can spare
ourselves the formal proof that there must be such a corrupt propensity rooted in the
human being, in view of the multitude of woeful examples that the experience of human
deeds parades before us.”410 Kant goes on to describe some of the manifestations of
moral evil that even so-called “civilized” people exhibit: “If we are however disposed to
the opinion that we can have a better cognition of human nature known in its civilized
state…we must then hear out a long melancholy litany of charges against humankind—of
secret falsity even in the most intimate friendship…of a hearty goodwill that nonetheless
admits the remark that “in the misfortunes of our best friends there is something that does
not altogether displease us”; and of many other vices yet hidden under the appearance of
virtue, let alone those of which no secret is made…”411 Evil is widespread; in fact, Kant
seems here to suggest that moral evil is the rule rather than the exception in human
408
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affairs. Thinking about the moral situation of human beings, then, seems to require taking
this unhappy fact into account. In other words, given the pervasiveness of evil in human
life, it merits careful consideration, particularly how it relates to Kant’s broader moral
philosophy.
II. Freedom in the Intelligible World
I would argue that any discussion of moral goodness or moral evil, ultimately,
should be grounded in Kant’s account of freedom. Since moral evil is the result of our
freely chosen actions, it seems natural to begin with Kant’s account of freedom. Kant’s
theory of freedom is obviously complicated, but for our purposes, we need focus only on
two aspects of it: 1) on Kant’s insistence that freedom cannot reside in appearances
themselves, and 2) Kant’s derivation of freedom from moral obligation.
Freedom and Appearances
In the first Critique, Kant famously claims that it is a mistake to take appearances for
things in themselves. Various sorts of errors arise from conflating appearances and
things-in-themselves, both theoretical mistakes and, crucially for our purposes, mistakes
regarding practical philosophy, especially about the possibility of freedom. In the first
Critique, Kant writes, “For if appearances are things in themselves, then freedom cannot
be saved.”412 Why? Because if appearances were also things-in-themselves, and not
merely objects of experience, then all things could be completely explained in terms of
the mechanistic laws of nature. In the B Preface to the first Critique, Kant writes, “Now if
412

CPR A536/B564.
169

we were to assume that the distinction between things as objects of experience and the
very same things as things in themselves, which our critique has made necessary, were
not made at all, then the principle of causality, and hence the mechanism of nature in
determining causality, would be valid of all things in general as efficient causes.”413
On Kant’s view, this mechanistic framework provides one fundamental way of
thinking about causality. But, with the distinction between appearances and things-inthemselves in place, another kind of causality is possible. Kant writes, “In respect to what
happens, one can think of causality in only two ways: either according to nature or from
freedom.”414
Importantly then, Kant argues that the idea of freedom can be preserved if we
make the proper distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves. Insofar as we
are natural beings, we are “subject to natural necessity” and hence “not free.”415 But, with
the distinction in mind, we can think of ourselves as free. Kant writes, “Now although I
cannot cognize my soul, considered from the latter side [as subject to the law of nature],
through any speculative reason (still less through empirical observation), and hence I
cannot cognize freedom as a property of any being to which I ascribe effects in the world
of sense…nevertheless, I can think freedom to myself…so long as our critical distinction
prevails between the two ways of representing (sensible and intellectual)…”416 Kant’s
aim in the first Critique is to show that freedom is possible (that we can at least think of
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ourselves as free). Kant draws a contrast between cognizing and thinking: “To cognize an
object, it is required that I be able to prove its possibility (whether by the testimony of
experience from its actuality or a priori through reason). But I can think whatever I like,
as long as I do not contradict myself, i.e., as long as my concept is a possible thought,
even if I cannot give any assurance whether or not there is a corresponding object
somewhere within the sum total of all possibilities.”417
In the second Critique, Kant tries to show that freedom is not only thinkable, but
also that there is in fact an object to which that concept corresponds. We do not cognize
our freedom directly, like we do ordinary objects of experience. Kant writes, that we can
“neither be immediately conscious of this [freedom]…nor can we conclude to it from
experience, since experience lets us cognize only the law of appearances and hence the
mechanism of nature, the direct opposite of freedom.”418 The law of appearances-mechanistic determinism-- is the “direct opposite of freedom” because any change that
occurs, any event that takes place, can be explained solely in terms of a prior state of
affairs and the laws of nature. Therefore, anything we, understood only as natural beings,
may do will be caused, or determined by, something outside of ourselves (natural laws).
How, then, do we arrive at freedom? Freedom, on this line of thinking, is implied by the
objective validity of the moral law with regard to our own wills. That is, Kant proves
freedom indirectly, by arguing that we know for a fact that morality applies to us, that we
have moral obligations. Kant writes, “It is therefore the moral law, of which we become
immediately conscious (as soon as we draw maxims of the will for ourselves), the first
417
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offers itself to us and, inasmuch as reason presents it as a determining ground not to be
outweighed by any sensible conditions and indeed quite independent of them, leads
directly to the concept of freedom.”419 Kant here is claiming that as soon as we become
aware that, in acting in an intentional way, we are also acting on some volitional principle
(and therefore not merely from uncritical, unthinking instinct), we recognize that there
are under certain obligations that are absolutely necessary and cannot be overridden by an
appeal to “sensible conditions.”
Freedom and Inclination
Perhaps the most pressing and morally relevant “sensible condition” beings like
us have to contend with are inclinations. Inclinations are subjective, sensory desires that
we often feel impelled to satisfy. Kant writes, “The dependence of the faculty of desire
upon feelings is called inclination…”420 Kant holds that freedom in part consists in
independence from the dictates of inclination. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant
writes, “Freedom in the practical sense is the independence of the power of choice from
the necessitation by impulses of sensibility. For a power of choice is sensible insofar as
it is pathologically affected (through moving-causing of sensibility); it is called an
animal power of choice (arbitrium brutum) if it can be pathologically necessitated.” 421
He goes on to claim that “The human power of choice” differs from the animal power of
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choice because, in the case of human choice, “there is a faculty of determining oneself
from oneself, independently of necessitation by sensible impulses.”422
Without this faculty for “determining oneself from oneself,” freedom would be
impossible. Kant takes this as a rather obvious point: “It is easy to see that if all causality
in the world of sense were mere nature, then every occurrence would be determined in
time by another in accord with necessary laws.”423 A person’s deeds (and misdeeds)
would simply be, on this picture, necessary outcomes, caused by occurrences in accord
with necessary (natural) laws. Freedom, by contrast, attaches a causality to our power of
choice that can place its origin entirely within our own faculty of choice. Kant writes that
practical freedom (our power of choice) “presupposes that although something has not
happened, it nevertheless ought to have happened, and its cause in appearance was thus
not so determining that there is not a causality in our power of choice such that,
independently of those natural causes and even opposed to their power and influence, it
might produce something determined in the temporal order in accord with empirical laws,
and hence begin a series of occurrences entirely from itself.”424 Free actions, according
to Kant, do precisely this; they set aside completely the determining influence of natural
desires and pressures, and are chosen in accordance with the dictates of the moral law (of
which we have immediate awareness).425
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Fact of reason
We have seen that freedom must involve a faculty for overriding the influence of
natural inclinations in favor of the requirements of morality. Kant claims that we do in
fact have the capacity to resist any and all of our inclinations, and that we are responsible
for our actions when we fail to (when morality requires that we do so). Kant, in the
second Critique, seems to take this to be an unproblematic and obvious claim. He makes
this point first through an imaginary example:
Suppose someone asserts of his lustful inclination that, when
the desired object and the opportunity are present, it is quite
irresistible to him; ask him whether, if a gallows were erected
in front of the house where he finds this opportunity and he
would be hanged on it immediately after gratifying his lust, he
would not then control his inclination. One need not
conjecture very long what he would reply. But ask him
whether, if his prince demanded, on pain of the same
immediate execution, that he give false testimony against an
honorable man whom the prince would like to destroy under a
plausible pretext, he would consider it possible to overcome
his love of life, however great it may be…He judges,
therefore, that he can do something because he is aware that
he ought to do it and cognizes freedom within him, which,
without the moral law, would have remained unknown to
him.426

In the former case, the person is choosing in accordance with the principle of self-love.
Kant assumes here that the desire to stay alive is our most basic and unshakeable
inclination, so we will satisfy that physical desire above all others. In the latter case,
though, we recognize, through the example, that it is sometimes required of us to set
aside even this most fundamental inclination and instead act in a way that morality
426
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requires. Additionally, we also recognize in this example that we are indeed capable of
doing so.
After providing this example, Kant describes this realization as a “fact of reason.”
He writes, “Consciousness of this fundamental law may be called a fact of reason
because one cannot reason it out from antecedent data of reason, for example, from
consciousness of freedom (since this is not antecedently given to us) and because it
instead forces itself upon us of itself as a synthetic a priori proposition that is not based
on any intuition, either pure or empirical…”427 Our consciousness of morality, and with it
consciousness of our moral obligation to act according to its requirements, is an
irreducible fact, not derived from something more basic than this brute awareness itself.
This fact of reason is evident in our practice of imputing responsibility onto others
for their actions. When determining the moral worth of an individual who has committed
a misdeed, we may begin with an investigation into “the sources of the person’s empirical
character, seeking them in a bad upbringing, bad company, and also finding them in the
wickedness of a natural temper insensitive to shame, partly in carelessness and
thoughtlessness.”428 Nevertheless, we still place blame on the person for his actions:
“Now even if one believes the action to be determined by these causes, one nonetheless
blames the agent, and not on account of his unhappy natural temper, not on account of the
circumstances influencing him, not even on account of the life he has led previously; for
one presupposes that it can be entirely set aside how that life was constituted, and that the
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series of conditions that transpired might not have been, but rather that this deed could be
regarded as entirely unconditioned in regard to the previous state, as though with that act
the agent started a series of consequences entirely from himself.”429
From the reality of moral obligation, Kant reasons that we must posit freedom, the
faculty of choice that allows us to determine our will independent of natural laws (which
determine the content of our inclinations). Without freedom, moral imputation would not
be possible.
Since we know that there are moral obligations applying to us, and that this fact
implies freedom, we might well ask: Where or what is the realm of freedom? The realm
of freedom cannot be the world of appearances. This is a view Kant had expressed in the
years leading up to the first Critique. In a note on metaphysics, dated from the mid-to-late
1770’s, Kant writes, “Reason is not in the chain of appearances and is with regard to all
of that free with regard to its own causality (the actions of reason themselves are also not
appearances, only their effects are).”430 Freedom must exist in something other than
appearances; it cannot be a property of objects insofar as they exist in the sensible world
(i.e. of merely sensible objects), but rather of what Kant calls “intelligible” objects. In the
first Critique, Kant provides a definition of intelligible objects in the following manner:
“I call intelligible that in an object of sense which is not itself appearance.” As we saw
earlier, Kant argues that it is admissible to think of anything so long as one does not run
into contradiction in doing so, and that we are free to think of ourselves as free (so long

429
430

CPR A555/B583.
Notes on metaphysics 18:252.
176

as we distinguish between things in themselves and appearances). We can therefore think
of ourselves as subjects as having both a sensible or empirical character (as an
appearance) and an intelligible character (that is us, as an object, that is not itself
appearance).
III. The Relationship Between Freedom and Phenomena
According to Kant, we can think of ourselves as members of both the sensible
world of appearances (or the phenomenal world), and also as members of an intelligible
(or noumenal) world. In the Groundwork Kant describes this possibility as follows:
Since he does not as it were create himself and does not get
his concept a priori but empirically, it is natural that he can
obtain information even about himself only through inner
sense and so only through the appearance of his nature and the
way in which his consciousness is affected—although beyond
this constitution of his own subject, made up of nothing but
appearances, he must necessarily assume something else lying
at their basis, namely his ego as it may be constituted in itself;
and thus as regards mere perception and receptivity to
sensations he must count himself as belonging to the world of
sense, but with regard to what there may be of pure activity in
him…he must count himself as belonging to the intellectual
world, of which however he has no further cognizance.431

I claim that there is an important consequence of this line of thinking: the free choice, the
choice which determines the order of priority between morality and self-love, is not made
by the empirical self, but rather by the intelligible self. I mean by “intelligible self” what
Kant seems to be describing in Ground III when he writes: “As a rational being, and thus
a being belonging to the intelligible world, the human being can never think of the
431
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causality of his own will otherwise than under the idea of freedom; for, independence
from the determining causes of the world of sense (which reason must always ascribe to
itself) is freedom.”432 The intelligible self is the genuine ground of human freedom.
Human freedom exists in the phenomenal world whenever we impute moral worth (or
moral blame) to an agent.
Being free and being a member of the intelligible world are, for Kant, mutually
entailing states of being: “[W]hen we think of ourselves as free we transfer ourselves into
the world of understanding as members of it and cognize autonomy of the will along with
its consequence, morality; but if we think of ourselves as put under obligation we regard
ourselves as belonging to the world of sense and yet at the same time to the world of
understanding.”433 In Groundwork III, Kant seems to take the former approach, trying to
provide an independent proof of freedom. In the second Critique, though, Kant takes the
latter approach. He first lays out the fact of reason, and then, from that fact, derives our
freedom.
As we saw in an earlier quotation, Kant clearly argues that we can have “no
further cognizance” of the intelligible world, or ourselves as intelligible agents, beyond
merely knowing that we are in fact free, and that freedom needs to reside in the
intelligible world. The intelligible world and the sensible world are radically different
from each other. The sensible world is the realm of experience, of space and time, of
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objects to which the categories of the understanding apply (etc.). The intelligible world is
rather different; as Kant puts it in a note: “In the intelligible world nothing happens and
nothing changes, and there the rule of causal connection disappears.”434
It might seem natural to suppose, given their radical heterogeneity, that the
intelligible world and the sensible world have nothing to do with each other. This seems
especially plausible when one thinks that the very idea of mechanistic causal connection
does not apply to the intelligible world.
Kant presents a picture, though, not of radical rupture, but rather one of ground
and consequence. In a section of the first Critique called “The possibility of causality
through freedom unified with the universal law of natural necessity,” Kant writes:
[E]very effective cause must have a character, i.e., a law of
its causality, without which it would not be a cause at all.
And then for a subject of the world of sense we would have
first an empirical character, through which its actions, as
appearances, would stand through and through in connection
with other appearances in accordance with constant natural
laws, from which, as their conditions, they could be derived;
and thus, in combination with these other appearances, they
would constitute members of a single series of the natural
order. Yet second, one would also have to allow this subject
an intelligible character, through which it is indeed the
cause of those actions as appearances, but which does not
stand under any conditions of sensibility and is not itself
appearance. The first one could call the character of such a
thing in appearance, the second its character as a thing in
itself.435
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Later in this section, Kant describes the empirical character of our actions as being “a
mere appearance of the intelligible character…”436
The intelligible self has a determining influence over what happens with the
empirical self. When a person, in the sensible world, has set aside the influence of
inclinations and performed his or her duty, then we know that, in the intelligible world,
the power of choice was exercised in a way that will lead him or her to privilege morality
over self-love in the empirical world. The exact way in which this choice is made,
though, is utterly unknowable. We have no access to the intelligible world; we only know
that it must be the world of freedom, and hence of morality. Kant writes in a note: “In
free actions reason has influence not merely as a comprehending but also as an effecting
and driving principium. We have no insight into how it does not merely…judge, but fills
the place of a natural cause, let alone how it is itself determined to action or omission by
means of impulses.”437
The actions of the empirical self do, though, reveal something of the choice made
by the intelligible self. The empirical effects manifested in the sensible world are a bit
like a function of the intelligible choice. Kant seems to have something like this in mind
when he writes, “The true activity of reason and its effect belong to the intelligible world
(mundo intelligibili). Hence we do not know to what degree we should impute.
Nevertheless we know that the influencing power of reason is not determined and
necessitated by any phenomena, rather that it is free, and (in the case of imputation) we

436
437

CPR A541/B569.
Notes on metaphysics 18:253.
180

judge the action merely in accordance with rational laws. The actions here in the world
are mere Schemata of the intelligible [actions]; yet these appearances (this world already
signifies “schema”) are still interconnected in accordance with empirical laws, even if
one regards reason itself, in accordance with its expressions, as a phaenomenon (of the
character). But what the cause of this may be we do not discover in phaenomenis.”438
This intriguing passage seems to suggest the following: the intelligible choice is not
directly apparent in the phenomenal world (i.e. we have no intuition of the choice itself
through our inner or outer senses). We do, though, see its effects in phenomena (namely,
in the actions to which we can assign moral blame or (potential) praise). So, the
intelligible choice determines outcomes in the phenomenal world, but, at the same time,
all actions in the phenomenal world are describable in terms of natural laws (even
morally good actions in the phenomenal world are consistent with the laws of nature).
Nevertheless, insofar as we are able to render moral judgments, some of what we observe
in the phenomenal world must also be explainable in terms of a free, noumenal choice.
IV. Radical Evil: Freedom and Self-Love
In the empirical world, the moral struggle in human beings consists in the
opposition sometimes experienced between the need to carry out our moral obligations
and the desire we have to satisfy our inclinations (to achieve happiness). When a human
being chooses to satisfy a desire even when doing so would violate the moral law, he or
she is privileging self-love over morality and is therefore evil. There are two competing
sets of basic volitional principles: the principle of morality and the principle of self-love.
438
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Achieving morality in the empirical world is not a matter of extirpating one
principle and retaining the other (even very bad people retain some predisposition to the
good, and even morally good people are naturally impelled to seek happiness), but rather
one of ordering and priority. Kant writes, “The difference, whether the human being is
good or evil, must not lie in the difference between the incentives he incorporates into his
maxim (not in the material of the maxim) but in their subordination (in the form of the
maxim): which of the two he makes the condition of the other.”439 The morally evil
person acts on maxims of the following form: “I will act in accordance with morality so
long as doing so does not clash too severely with my inclinations.” The morally good
person, by contrast, forms a maxim like the following: “I will seek to satisfy my
inclinations when and only when doing so will not interfere with fulfilling my moral
obligations.”440 Immoral actions, therefore, are grounded in the principle of self-love,
and, in particular, in the privileging of self-love over the moral law. In the Religion Kant
claims that, “self-love…is precisely the source of all evil.”441 The source of all moral
goodness, by contrast, lies in placing morality, and its requirements, as sufficient in
determining the will, without acquiescing to the pleadings of self-love.
So within this basic framework, we can understand Kant’s definition of morally
meritorious action (or action from duty) given in Groundwork I: “Now, an action from
duty is to put aside entirely the influence of inclination and with it every object of the
will; hence there is left for the will nothing that could determine it except objectively the
439
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law and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and so the maxim of complying
with such a law even if it infringes upon all my inclinations.”442 Satisfying one’s
inclinations is the basic activity that derives from the principle of self-love, so in
choosing morality over self-love as the most fundamental volitional principle, one only
acts to satisfy those inclinations that would not result in violations of the moral law. Since
human beings always must act on the basis of some kind of motive, in cases where there
is not a single pathological inclination that would explain why the person acted in the
way he or she did, then all that would be left is respect for the moral law. Respect for the
moral law, in other words, is not a characteristic of the intelligible self (we cannot know
anything about the intelligible self beside the fact that it exists and it is free), but rather of
the phenomenal or empirical self. Respect for the moral law always remains, even in the
case of immoral persons, a potential motive for action; it just seems to be the case that the
vast majority of people (perhaps everyone) does not in fact act on this motive, but rather
on some other inclination (or set of inclinations).
Human beings, on this account, are interminably torn between these two sets of
volitional principles. For Kant, so long as one is human, one is potentially subject to
inclinations that, if acted upon, would pull us away from our duties. At the same time,
however, human beings will always be aware of (and, in the case of immoral agents,
tasked by) the moral law and its binding force. In the Religion Kant describes this
ceaseless back-and-forth in the following manner:
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The human being (even the worst) does not repudiate the
moral law, whatever his maxims, in rebellious attitude (by
revoking obedience to it). The law rather imposes itself
irresistibly, because of his moral predisposition; and if no
other incentive were at work against it, he would also
incorporate it into his supreme maxim as sufficient
determination of his power of choice, i.e. he would be
morally good. He is, however, also dependent on the
incentives of his sensuous nature because of his equally
innocent natural predisposition, and he incorporates them too
into his maxim (according to the subjective principle of selflove). If he took them into his maxim as of themselves
sufficient for the determination of his power of choice,
without minding the moral law (which he nonetheless has
within himself), he would then become morally evil.443

This is a struggle that has no resolution in the life of human beings. Human beings cannot
possess holy wills (a will in which there is no clash between inclination and morality).
The basic structure of the moral life is identical for all people. The details may vary (the
kinds of inclinations one has, the strength of those inclinations), but there is always the
potential for, and often actual, struggle for volitional priority between self-love and the
moral law.
V. Inscrutability and Radical Evil
Whether or not a person fulfills the requirements of morality in the empirical
world, is, as we have seen, a function (or effect) of the intelligible exercise of free choice.
In the Religion, Kant writes, “The human being must make or have made himself into
whatever he is or should become in a moral sense, good or evil. These two [characters]
must be an effect of his free power of choice, for otherwise they could not be imputed to
443
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him and, consequently, he could be neither morally good nor evil.”444 People are morally
responsible for their actions when their actions can be imputed to them. Without the
ability to impute actions to people, we cannot have an account of moral goodness or evil.
In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant defines moral imputation in the following way:
“Imputation (imputatio) in the moral sense is the judgment by which someone is regarded
as the author (causa libera) of an action, which is called a deed (factum) and stands under
laws.”445 The idea of an intelligible self, then, is the ground for the possibility of imputing
deeds onto an individual person, and not some series of antecedent empirical state of
affairs. That means, though, that in cases of human evil, we cannot impute the misdeed to
the person as a natural being, but rather as an intelligible agent. Since we do not have
experiential access to the intelligible world, we cannot, ultimately, know why a person, as
an intelligible being, has chosen moral evil rather than goodness. The ground of moral
evil (the faculty of choice) is, in Kant’s terms, inscrutable.
Kant seems to be working with a notion of inscrutability similar to that of
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, who defined a will as inscrutable when the “impelling
causes are incomprehensible.”446 In the Religion Kant describes this inscrutability when
he writes, “Whenever we…say, “The human being is by nature good, or, “He is by nature
evil,” this only means that he holds within himself a first ground (to us inscrutable) for
the adoption of good or evil (unlawful) maxims…”447 One might interject at this point
and claim that this inscrutability is not as resounding as it might initially seem; since evil
444
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people are evil insofar as they privilege self-love over the demands of morality, then
perhaps one could simply say that people are evil because they have such and such an
inclination that they could not control when morality required that they do so. This
reading of Kant’s account of evil, however, is unwarranted. It seems to confuse the
ground of moral evil with its effects. The free choice a person makes (as an intelligible
being), is independent of and (metaphysically) prior to the normal sensible operations of
inclinations. In a footnote from the Religion, Kant claims that we cannot find the ground
of a free choice in terms of natural incentives.448 Evil in human beings is grounded on the
intelligible character of one’s choice, not in the choice’s empirical effects. Kant writes,
“Now, the ground of this evil cannot (1) be placed, as it is commonly done, in the
sensuous nature of the human being, and in the natural inclinations originating from
it.”449 It is wrong to say that a robber, for instance, is evil because he had a desire for
money; he is evil because, as an intelligible being, he exercised his power of choice in
such a way that, in the empirical world, he would act to satisfy his desire for money, even
when morality requires that he not act on that desire. Our explanation can go no further
than this.
This lack of explanatory power in Kant’s account of evil has led some
commentators to fault Kant’s theory of evil as being uninformative, and therefore
unhelpful in explaining moral evil. One of the more forceful criticisms on this issue
comes from Richard Bernstein. In his book Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation,
Bernstein writes, “Presumably, the introduction to the concept of radical evil is intended
448
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to explain why (from a practical point of view) we deviate from following the moral law.
We do not always follow the moral law because as human beings, we have an innate
propensity to evil. Our wills are corrupted at their root. But does this “because” really
explain anything? Does it do any conceptual work? I do not think so…In short, radical
evil—the alleged propensity to moral evil which is a universal characteristic of human
beings—does not have any explanatory force (practical or theoretical) at all!”450 I would
agree with Bernstein that Kant’s account of radical evil does not explain why human
beings choose evil beyond the obvious claim that human beings are evil because they
deviate from the requirements of morality, but would deny that this observation amounts
to a significant objection to Kant’s account. Kant’s account of radical evil cannot, and
does not presume to, provide an ultimate account for why human beings are evil.451 It is
crucial to his metaphysics that the ultimate “why” of human evil, the free choice, eludes
our epistemological grasp.
In his paper “Evil Everywhere: The Ordinariness of Kantian Radical Evil,” Robert
B. Louden makes a similar response to this kind of “explanatory emptiness” objection to
Kant’s account of radical evil. In that paper, Louden defends Kant’s conception of evil in
part by reaffirming Kant’s claim about the inscrutability of moral evil’s ultimate ground.
He writes, “For Kant is quite clear in stating that his doctrine of radical evil is in no way
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intended to explain why human beings choose to adopt evil maxims.”452 Louden even
claims that this is a positive aspect of Kant’s account: “Kant’s position regarding the
ultimate inscrutability of human motives is a strength rather than a weakness in his
doctrine of radical evil.453
I agree with Louden’s claim that it is a mistake to fault Kant for not providing an
explanation for why human beings are evil, but not necessarily with how he argues for
that claim. In the previous quotation I provided from Louden, he claims that “human
motives” are inscrutable, and that fact informs Kant’s claim that the ground of human
evil is inscrutable. This tendency to treat human motives as inscrutable continues when
Louden refers to a passage in the Religion where Kant writes “the depths of his [any
person’s] own heart (the subjective first ground of his maxims) are to him
inscrutable.”454 Additionally, Louden makes a similar claim about other people in
general: “Our assessment of others’ motives and acts is always fallible.”455 It is
problematic, though, to ground Kant’s claims about the inscrutability of human evil in
claims about the inscrutability of a person’s motives because motives operate in the
world of sensibility, and not in the intelligible world. I would argue that we should
distinguish between two different kinds of inscrutability: 1) Empirical inscrutability and
2) Intelligible inscrutability. Louden’s response to Bernstein would be more compelling if
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he were more sensitive to this distinction. Let me briefly discuss each of these, beginning
with empirical inscrutability.
In the Groundwork, Kant famously makes the claim that we can never be certain
that any single act we commit was truly done out of respect for the moral law:
It is indeed sometimes the case that with the keenest selfexamination we find nothing besides the moral ground of
duty that could have been powerful enough to move us to
this or that good action and to so great a sacrifice; but from
this it cannot be inferred with certainty that no covert
impulse of self-love, under the mere pretense of that idea,
was not actually the real determining cause of the will; for
we like to flatter ourselves by falsely attributing to ourselves
a nobler motive, whereas in fact we can never, even by the
most strenuous self-examination, get entirely behind our
covert incentives, since, when moral worth is at issue, what
counts is not actions, which one sees, but those inner
principles of actions that one does not see.456

Here, Kant is making an empirical claim about our own inability to plumb completely the
depths of our motives. Perhaps behind the good act of assisting those in need there is
really the desire for praise and esteem, or perhaps the desire to satisfy an inclination to
feelings of self-righteousness and of superiority over others. While the action is still
rightly counted as good, it would, if motivated by those sorts of inclinations, not count as
morally good. In the Religion, Kant makes a similar claim when he writes that the
“depths of” a person’s heart “are to him inscrutable.”457 Also in the Metaphysics of
Morals, Kant writes, “For a human being cannot see into the depths of his own heart so
as to be quite certain, in even a single action, of the purity of his moral intention and the
456
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sincerity of his disposition, even when he has no doubt about the legality of the
action.”458 Assisting those in need can certainly be a morally legal option, we can be sure
of that, but we cannot be sure that, when we are assisting someone, we are acting on a
purely moral motive. The inscrutability of our authentic motives described in these
passages are about the impossibility of being sure that some sensible inclination is not
actually at the root of our actions. It is empirical because, ultimately, these sorts of
uncertainties derive from the limits of our capacity for empirical introspection.
Importantly, this kind of skepticism about motives applies also to cases in which a
person violates the moral law. We can never be entirely sure why a person commits a
misdeed. A robbery, for instance, might be motivated by all sorts of motives that may
elude even the perpetrator’s understanding. Empirical inscrutability seems to be
something that, at least in principle, is a tractable problem. Even though there are limits
to our own capacity for introspection, we can imagine science (psychology) proceeding
along and, eventually, being able to track down the actual motives on which a person
acts. There must indeed be a particular motive on which any action rests, and, more often
than not, it will be some inclination. This idea fits in nicely with Kant’s overall moral
theory: Our actions are guided by either morality or self-love. When we are motivated by
morality, we are acting out of respect for the moral law and fulfill our moral obligations;
when we are guided by self-love, we are motivated by the principle of self-love and act
on our desires (given to us through inclination). So, when someone does not fulfill his or
her duty, then we can know that he or she was motivated by self-love. There must be
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some inclination (or set of inclinations) that he or she is trying to satisfy, at the expense
of moral duty. We may be able to investigate into the volitional structure of an agent and
uncover the true motive on which he or she acted. Empirical inscrutability, in other
words, might someday be overcome. Kant seems to suggest that this possibility exists
when he writes, “[A]ll the actions of the human being in appearance are determined in
accord with the order of nature by his empirical character and the other cooperating
causes; and if we could investigate all the appearances of his power of choice down to
their basis, then there would be no human action that we could not predict with certainty,
and recognize as necessary given its preceding conditions.”459 In instances of evil actions,
we can also make investigations into the particular types of inclinations that people seek
to satisfy when they deviate from the requirements of morality. Kant himself engages in
this sort of theorizing in the Metaphysics of Morals when he describes the desire to be
superior to others as an inclination that leads to the moral offences of arrogance,
defamation, and ridicule.460 Empirical inscrutability, therefore, is not in principle
insurmountable. While our authentic psychological motivations for our actions may even
resist our own, good faith introspective investigation, it remains possible that psychology
may be able to provide information about our real motivations.
Empirical inscrutability, however, is not the most important kind of inscrutability,
and even if we were to “solve” the problem of empirical inscrutability (whether through
introspective, first-person or through scientific, third-person methods), the ground of
human evil would remain inscrutable. In addition to empirical inscrutability there is also
459
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the far more important issue of intelligible inscrutability. Intelligible inscrutability is the
result of the metaphysical gap (or, put less dramatically, ‘distinction’) between the
intelligible world and the sensible world. Since the realm of freedom is outside the world
of appearances, we do not have access to the choice itself. The choice, though, must not
be explainable in terms of an appeal to inclinations.
Louden’s response to Bernstein, as I have claimed, seems to conflate these two
kinds of inscrutability. This leads, I think, to two problems: 1) It does not counter the
initial objection as precisely as it could have and 2) It fails to do justice to the
(understandable) concern that seems to inform Bernstein’s objection.
The “explanatory emptiness” objection claims that Kant cannot explain evil, and
that this is a problem for Kant’s account of radical evil. Louden counters this claim by
arguing that Kant’s account of radical evil does not purport to explain evil, and that fact
is actually a strength of Kant’s view, not a fault. I agree with this basic response, but
now, with the distinction between empirical and intelligible inscrutability in mind, we can
make this point more forcefully. That is, making explicit the distinction between
empirical and intelligible inscrutability makes clear why exactly the “explanatory
emptiness” objection is misguided as a criticism of Kant’s discussion of moral evil in
human beings.
Thinking in terms of intelligible inscrutability, the objection now seems even
more off base because attempting to provide an explanation of radical evil would violate
the limits imposed by transcendental idealism itself. Asking for an explanation would be
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a request for knowledge about something of which we cannot claim to have knowledge at
all (the intelligible world). Louden seems to be making a point similar to this when he
writes, “In any given choice situation, we can hypothesize about the roles that various
environmental and genetic factors may have played in leading a person to make the
choice that he or she made, but ultimately no causal explanation is fully satisfactory, for
the simple reason that the choice was free.”461 Now we can see that, in this sentence,
Louden is referring to empirical inscrutability in the beginning and then turns to
intelligible inscrutability at the end. It seems that Louden is conflating these two senses
of inscrutability. Investigations into “various environmental and genetic factors” do
provide information that takes away some of our initial empirical inscrutability, but it has
no bearing at all on the action’s intelligible inscrutability.
The distinction between empirical and intelligible inscrutability, I think, also does
more justice to what I take to be the concern at the heart of Bernstein’s objection, which I
take to be a desire to understand why people do wicked things. Kant’s account may seem
to fail to go beyond any account of evil beside the claim that human beings are evil
because they knowingly deviate from the requirements of morality and instead act in
accordance with the principle of self-love.
Louden suggests that Kant does not attempt to lessen what I am calling empirical
inscrutability of human evil. Louden writes, “However, given the indecipherable
character of much human action, perhaps it is best not to speak presumptuously about
why people commit evil. Those who think they have succeeded in descending into the
461
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depths here are often mistaken. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to ever reach bottom in
this particular line of work, for the depths of human evil are unfathomable.”462 While it is
certainly a good idea not to “speak presumptuously about why people commit evil,” it
nevertheless seems legitimate to inquire into people’s empirical motives to try to fill out
our understanding of human behavior (if, for nothing else, perhaps as a way of yielding
some practical advice into how we might go about lessening evil in the world). Louden’s
criticism of Bernstein seems to suggest that it is not useful or worthwhile to make this
kind of inquiry because of the inexorableness of empirical inscrutability. I have already
suggested, though, that empirical inscrutability is something that can perhaps someday be
overcome. We can, with the distinction in mind, make significant progress in
understanding motives and incentives. After all, in the case of evildoers, there is in fact
some incentive on which they are acting. An empirical investigation into the relationship
between inclinations and behavior might well yield interesting (albeit perhaps also
distressing) results. We should not, though, make the mistaken claim that in improving
our naturalistic explanation of people’s behavior, we have made any progress whatsoever
in overcoming intelligible inscrutability. Even with a perfected science of human
behavior, the inscrutability of moral evil will remain as troubling and perplexing as ever.
VI. Moral Improvement
Kant’s moral theory makes the following claims: 1) Human beings are subject to
morality (fact of reason); 2) Most, if not all, human beings are evil (the prevalence of
self-love); 3) Human beings, even the worst, take an interest in the moral law that, at the
462
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very least, manifests itself as a wish to be morally good. A natural question that arises,
then, is the following: How is it that an immoral person can become good? If I find
myself habitually and occasionally deviating from the moral law, and, because of my
original disposition to the good, I wish I could be moral, what hope can I have regarding
the potential for moral improvement? This section examines Kant’s account of moral
improvement. Taking into account our earlier discussion of freedom and the inscrutability
of the ground of moral evil, I consider Kant’s statements about moral improvement in the
Religion.
Kant’s Two-Fold Account of Moral Improvement
Before examining Kant’s account of moral improvement, let us briefly review
Kant’s distinction between the empirical and intelligible character of our actions.463 All
our imputable actions have both an empirical and intelligible character because they can
be described as natural phenomena in the world of sense and as appearances that express
the nature of our intelligible use of our power of choice. When a person does an action
out of respect for the moral law (say, helps someone in need), there can be an empirical
463
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description of the action. From a psychological perspective, the account would culminate
in some reference to the psychological state of pure respect for the moral law as
providing the ultimate psychological motivation for the action. This, in turn, may involve
a description of the relationship between the respect they feel for the moral law and the
nature of the inclinations that may have stood in opposition to the moral law’s
requirements.
We can imagine an empirical account, therefore, of a person who is perhaps about
to spend her money on something that will satisfy an inclination (say, she is on her way
to a nice restaurant) when she passes by a collection station for a charity. Instead of
satisfying the inclination for delicious food, the person may elect to take some of her
money and give it to charity and instead eat someplace cheap. Even though she was
excited for the delicious food from the nice restaurant, her commitment to the moral
law—expressed here through her imperfect duty to beneficence—overrides her
inclinations. An empirical account of this action can provide a good deal of information
about her psychological state and the precise nature of the struggle between her
inclinations on the one hand and her respect for the moral law on the other.
For her action to be authentically imputable, though, there must also be an
intelligible character to her action. That is, for her action to carry any moral worth, her
action must be the result of her own choice. She must be the author of the action. As we
have previously seen, if we are to be the authors of some of our actions (those for which
we bear moral responsibility), then they must result from our freedom. Freedom, in turn,
cannot reside in appearances. Appearances are governed by the laws of nature, which
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leave no room for moral freedom. Only by maintaining a distinction between things in
themselves from appearances is an account of freedom rendered possible.464 As Kant
writes in the Critique of Pure Reason, “[I]f appearances are things in themselves, then
freedom cannot be saved.”465 Keeping Kant’s “critical distinction” in mind, then, we
must say that our morally imputable actions are ultimately the result of the way in which
our power of choice is exercised in the intelligible world. It follows, then, that we cannot
get much of an account of intelligible choice. All we can say is that a choice is made and
our actions in appearances are determined by it.
This distinction between intelligible and empirical characters of our actions must
remain central to a discussion of Kant’s account of moral improvement. If Kant wants to
describe and, importantly, account for moral improvement in a human being, then the
discussion must be limited only to imputable actions that are morally relevant. We can, it
seems, speak freely enough of improvement in a more general, amoral sense. We can
provide an account for how someone, desiring to become famous and respected in the
eyes of others, went from causing unhappiness and misery in people to augmenting and
promoting human happiness by only referring to the empirical character of her actions.
We may try to trace her inclination to be respected back to its roots and then to provide
an account for how such inclinations led her to behave in such and such way.
Importantly, though, such an account would attach no moral worth to her actions (good as
464
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along with the limitation of the pure concepts of the understanding arising from it…” (CPR
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they may be). For an account of moral improvement, there needs to be reference to, and
assurance of, a change in the intelligible character of a person’s actions.
In Part One of the Religion, Kant provides an account of moral improvement that
tracks this distinction between the empirical and intelligible character of our actions.
Here, Kant describes moral improvement as the “restoration of the original predisposition
to good in us.”466 Most, if not all, people find themselves at some point or other
prioritizing self-love over the moral law. Even in cases where people do not find
themselves in flagrant violation of the moral law, they can never rest assured with
complete confidence that their law-abiding behavior is motivated by pure respect for the
law. In fact, it is the more likely hypothesis to suppose that their motives are more opaque
than they seem and there is likely to be some influence of inclinations behind their
actions. This privileging of self-love over the moral law is moral evil. Moral
improvement must involve an inversion of two principles. The moral law, if moral
improvement is to occur, must be the ultimate ground for one’s actions. Actions must be
motivated purely by respect for the moral law. Reinforcing inclinations may accompany
the feeling of respect, but they cannot play a casually efficacious role in one’s
motivation.467 That is, an otherwise lawful action has no moral worth if were it not for
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If inclinations did play even a partial role in the motivating ground of one’s action, the person
would still be morally evil. Earlier in the Religion, Kant describes the three basic “grades” of our
“natural propensity to evil” (Rel. 6:29). The second grade of evil is what Kant calls, “the impurity
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inclinations pushing the agent to that action, the action would not have occurred. Kant,
unsurprisingly, then, describes this moral improvement as “only the recovery of the
purity of the law, as the supreme ground of all our maxims, according to which the law
itself is to be incorporated into the power of choice, not merely bound to other incentives,
nor indeed subordinated to them (to inclinations) as conditions, but rather in its full
purity, as the self-sufficient incentive of that power.”468 Any moral improvement must
involve the priority of moral over self-love. Anything short of that, it seems, would not be
bona fide moral improvement, if moral improvement is understood as the “restoration of
the original predisposition to good in us.”469
Kant’s account of moral improvement, then, seeks to retain this rigorous standard
while also acknowledging the empirical and intelligible characters of our actions. An
account of moral improvement needs to begin with the state of the moral actor before the
moral improvement occurs. Prior to moral improvement, there is an incessant moral push
on us, even when we voluntarily violate the moral law. Kant writes, “[T]he command that
we ought to become better human beings still resounds unabated in our souls… Surely
we must presuppose…that there is still a germ of goodness left in its entire purity, a germ
that cannot be extirpated or corrupted.”470 Without the constant prodding and pressure
from the “germ of goodness” in us, we would never feel impelled to alter fundamentally
the priority between the moral law and self-love.
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Kant’s account of moral improvement is two-fold, involving related discussions
of moral improvement: one regarding improvement in the empirical world and the other
regarding improvement in the intelligible world. As we will see, Kant’s account for moral
improvement in the empirical world relies on the possibility for moral improvement in
the intelligible world.
Kant describes the apparent trajectory of moral improvement in the empirical
world first. Kant writes, “When the firm resolve to comply with one’s duty has become a
habit, it is called virtue…in a legal sense, in its empirical character (virtus
phaenomenon). Virtue here has the abiding maxim of lawful actions, no matter whence
one draws the incentives that the power of choice needs for such actions.”471 Lawful
actions conform to the demands of the moral law, but may not necessarily be motivated
solely by respect for the moral law. The way a person improves in his or her capacity to
engage in lawful actions is piecemeal. Kant writes, “Virtue, in this sense, is accordingly
acquired little by little, and to some it means a long habituation (in the observance of the
law), in virtue of which a human being, through gradual reformation of conduct and
consolidation of his maxims, passes from a propensity to vice to its opposite.”472 Kant
cites some examples of this kind of improvement toward legality in the following
manner: “[A]n immoderate human being converts to moderation for the sake of health; a
liar to truth for the sake of reputation; an unjust human being to civic righteousness for
the sake of peace or profit, etc., all in conformity with the prized principle of a
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happiness.”473 These sorts of reforms of one’s actions are the kinds of observable patterns
of behavior that seem to track moral improvement. It seems fair to say that we are likely
to think of a formerly dishonest (but now honest) person as someone who has undergone
moral improvement.
It is clear from Kant’s account of moral worth, though, that there is a crucial
element to moral improvement that may be lacking in these cases. It is not enough for
one’s action to conform to the moral law; they must also be motivated by pure respect for
the moral law. Kant claims that cases like these are possible even when there has been no
authentic moral improvement: “But not the slightest change of heart is necessary for this;
only a change of mores.”474 Even a person who is improving in the legal sense, they may
still lack moral goodness. In the cases given above, a person whose actions are lawful
may still be motivated by the principle of self-love. We may also imagine cases where a
person commits more fervently to abide by the moral law, but still occasionally deviates
from it. Maybe the frequency with which they violate the moral law diminishes, but their
maxim still incorporates the principle of self-love in a privileged way. Recall Kant’s
definition of human evil: “[T]he statement, “The human being is evil,” cannot mean
anything else than that he is conscious of the moral law and yet has incorporated into his
maxim the (occasional) deviation from it.”475 Even if one is violating the moral law less
frequently, it is not clear how we can still call such a development moral improvement. It
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seems, rather that the supreme maxim upon which the person acts is becoming more
refined, or perhaps more and more intelligent in achieving one’s happiness.
Kant notices a tension here between the stricter standards his account of moral
evil requires for moral improvement and the importance we often attach to improvement
in one’s behavior when he writes, “However, that a human being should become not
merely legally good, but morally good (pleasing to God) i.e. virtuous according to the
intelligible character [of virtue] (virtus noumenon) and thus in need of no other incentive
to recognize a duty except the representation of duty itself…cannot be effected through
gradual reform but must rather be effected through a revolution in the disposition of the
human being (a transition to the maxim of holiness of disposition).”476 It seems that we
can rely on our own naturally possessed qualities to enact a reformation of our character,
but, again, this alone cannot count as moral improvement unless it is accompanied by a
reordering of the relationship between the principles of self-love and of morality. That is,
moral improvement would already have had to occur via a “revolution in the disposition
of the human being.”
If the moral improvement has already happened, though, what are we do make of
the gradualism of reform? In his account, Kant attempts to account for, and to
incorporate, both the reforming and revolutionary aspects of moral improvement. Kant
introduces his two-fold approach to think about moral improvement when he writes, “But
if a human being is corrupt in the very ground of his maxims, how can he possibly bring
about this revolution by his own forces and become a good human being on his own? Yet
476
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duty commands that he be good, and duty commands nothing but what we can do. The
only way to reconcile this is by saying that a revolution is necessary in the mode of
thought but a gradual reformation in the mode of sense (which places obstacles in the
way of the former), and [that both] must therefore be possible also to the human
being.”477 The “gradual reformation in the mode of sense” is achieved through an
increased participation in lawful actions. The idea seems to be the moral convert, as a
result of a reordering of the principles of self-love and morality, engages increasingly in
lawful behavior. Kant describes the morally improved person as possessing “genuine
disposition toward improvement…”478 Meanwhile, the “revolution in the mode of
thought” is achieved through structuring one’s maxims in such a way that objectively the
moral law and subjectively respect for the moral law have priority over the principle of
happiness. The real source of moral improvement must be in the revolutionary reordering
of self-love and morality. The reformation of one’s actions is the inevitable consequence
of the revolution. We can only see lawful actions from others, but lawful actions are not
sufficient proof for a moral conversion. We may get something closer to a proof over the
course of an entire lifetime in which a person moves consistently and constantly towards
lawful actions:
If by a single and unalterable decision a human being
reverses the supreme ground of his maxims by which he
was an evil human being…he is to this extent, by principle
and attitude of mind, a subject receptive to the good; but he
is a good human being only in incessant laboring and
becoming i.e. he can hope – in view of the purity of the
principle which he has adopted as the supreme maxim of
477
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his power of choice, and in view of the stability of this
principle – to find himself upon the good (and narrow) path
of constant progress from bad to better. For him who
penetrates to the intelligible ground of the heart…for him
to whom this endless progress as a unity, i.e. for God, this
is the same as actually being a good human being (pleasing
to him); and to this extent the change can be considered a
revolution.479

Moral improvement requires this fundamental switch in one’s attitude towards
inclinations and the feeling of respect for the moral law. For this reason, moral education
“must begin, not with an improvement of mores, but with the transformation of his
attitude of mind and the establishment of a character, although it is customary to proceed
otherwise and to fight vices individually, while leaving their universal root
undisturbed.”480 Hence, a merely reformist account of moral improvement will tend
toward instances of individuals who ceasing lying for the sake of reputation or seek civic
justice merely for the sake of securing profits. Only the more radical revolutionary
inversion of self-love and morality can bring about authentic moral improvement.
Reform’s place in this picture is as a representation or expression of the more basic
change.
Importantly, though, the ultimate ground for this needs to be in the intelligible
realm, which, ultimately, determines moral worth. Kant’s discussion here seems to be
entirely within the empirical world. That is, even the revolutionary change brought about
by the reordering of the principles of self-love and of morality are themselves
psychological phenomena, determining the content of our maxims. Maxims, it bears
479
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emphasizing, are themselves psychological, empirical states. If moral improvement is
actually to occur, then it would need to result from a new state of affairs in the intelligible
world. Without an account for the ultimate ground of moral improvement, then it seems
like Kant’s account of moral improvement would be incomplete. It would lack an account
of the exact way in which moral improvement actually happens. For human beings, who
are often tasked by the moral law and wishful that they could live up to it, but who are
nevertheless living in a state of moral evil, an account for how moral improvement occurs
at the basic, radical level (that is, the intelligible character of one’s actions) may stave off
moral despair. For if one cannot even imagine how it could be that one could become
good, then it may well dispirit our resolve.
VII. Moral Improvement and Grace
For Kant, authentic moral improvement must have as its ultimate ground the
intelligible exercise of our power of choice. Evil people must have exercised their
freedom of choice in such a way that, in the empirical world, they would commit
misdeeds or would act on the basis of impure motives. That means that people who are
now good, but were formerly evil, must have altered in some way the way in which their
power of choice was exercised so that their lives are now marked by the “incessant
laboring” on the “good (though narrow) path of constant progress from bad to better.”481
An account of this change at the intelligible level, though, will, by the limitations
imposed on our knowledge of the intelligible by Kant’s transcendental idealism, be thin
and nearly barren.
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Kant does discuss the nature of this transformation that must take place in cases of
authentic moral improvement, but his discussion, I would argue, is puzzling. In the
Religion Kant writes, “If it is said, The human being is created good, this can only mean
nothing more than: He has been created for the good and the original predisposition in
him is good; the human being is not thereby good as such, but he brings it about that he
becomes either good or evil, according as he either incorporates or does not incorporate
into his maxims the incentives contained in that predisposition (and this must be left
entirely to his free choice).”482 So far, this is simply a reiteration of the basic features of
Kant’s views of moral worth. The next sentence, though, Kant goes on to write, “Granted
that some supernatural cooperation is also needed to his becoming good or better,
whether this cooperation only consist in the diminution of obstacles or be also a positive
assistance, the human being must nonetheless make himself antecedently worthy of
receiving it; and he must accept this help…in this way alone is it possible that the good
be imputed to him, and that he be acknowledged a good human being.”483 Here, Kant
claims that “supernatural cooperation” is necessary for a human being to become morally
better. There are at least two questions one may ask regarding this notion of “supernatural
cooperation.” First, what notion of “supernatural” is Kant using? Second, what is the
source of the cooperation?
Before considering a potential Kantian response, it is worthwhile to examine a
response that was very likely on the minds of Kant’s more religiously minded readers.
There is a single traditional religious response to both these questions: the cooperation is
482
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supernatural in the sense that its source is God, a supernatural being. Furthermore, the
process whereby one receives supernatural cooperation in becoming good is called grace.
Although Kant seems at least skeptical and at most bitterly dismissive of the notion of
grace, it seems that Kant’s account of intelligible moral improvement shares some
characteristics with the traditional notion of grace.
The “supernatural cooperation” discussion quoted in the Religion is, in some
ways, strikingly similar to the discussion of grace Kant has in his work The Conflict of
the Faculties. There, Kant writes, “Finally, as far as our will and its fulfillment of God’s
commands is concerned, the biblical theologian must not rely on nature—that is, on the
human being’s own moral power (virtue) – but on grace (a supernatural but, at the same
time, moral influence), which the human being can obtain only by an ardent faith that
transforms his heart – a faith that itself, in turn, he can expect only through grace.”484
The mention of “supernatural cooperation” in the quotation from the Religion
(with its obvious resonances with the Christian doctrine of grace) and the pride of place
apparently given to grace in the quotation from The Conflict of the Faculties may seem
perplexing, given Kant’s account of moral worth. It would be important to not here,
though, that in The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant claims that the “biblical theologian”
makes reference to grace in order to explain how a person can become moral. The
philosopher, by contrast, cannot overtly rely on a notion that draws its power from
revealed religion, and not reason. Nevertheless, the notion of “supernatural cooperation”
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we encounter in the Religion operates in much the same way as grace would within
religious discourse.
While they may function similarly in both contexts, the notion of grace creates
fundamental problems within Kant’s critical moral philosophy. It seems that if the
ultimate cause of a human being’s moral improvement is the result of a gift from some
external source (grace is traditionally described as an (undeserved) gift from God), then
moral improvement cannot be imputed exclusively to moral agents. Kant himself seems
to be voicing this very same concern in the Religion when he writes, “[T]o expect an
effect of grace means…that the good (the morally good) is not our doing, but that of
another being…”485 Furthermore, Kant seems to heap scorn upon the mindset which
bemoans one’s own immorality and waits to receive grace passively:
Now surely it is not because of the inner nature of the
Christian faith, but because of the manner in which people’s
minds are introduced to it, that a similar charge can be
brought against it with respect to those who are the most
serious about it but who, starting with human corruption and
despairing of all virtue, place their religious principle solely
in piety (by which is understood the principle of conducting
oneself passively in view of the divine blessedness expected
through a power from above). For these [individuals] never
place any reliance in themselves but constantly look about
them in constant anxiety for a supernatural assistance, and
even think that in this self-contempt (which is not humility)
they possess a means of obtaining favor. The outward
expression of this (in pietism or false piety) is indeed a sign
of a slavish cast of mind.486
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Grace, defined as the intelligible basis for reordering the relationship between self-love
and morality, is not something that can occur in the empirical world; hence Kant’s
obvious disdain for preachers who claim the ability to generate grace like a weaver can
generate a garment. Grace cannot be caused by, or occasioned by, events in the natural
world. In the religious context, prayer is sometimes held up as a means a receiving grace
from God. Kant dismisses this notion when he writes, “Praying, conceived as an inner
ritual service to God and hence as a means of grace, is a superstitious delusion (a fetishmaking); for it only is the declaring of a wish to a being who has no need of any
declaration regarding the inner disposition of the wisher, through which nothing is
therefore accomplished nor is any of the duties incumbent on us as commands of God
discharged; hence God is not really served.”487 The person in prayer here is not all that
different from the “hardened scoundrel” Kant describes in the Groundwork who wishes
he could be good.488 While it is true that the noumenal choice seems remote from the
phenomenal experience of the self (so remote that it may seem to be wholly alien from
the phenomenal self), it is crucial that the noumenal choice is nevertheless thought of as
self-wrought (that is, I and not God am the agent responsible for it).
So, while Kant’s account of moral improvement cannot simply be reduced to a
religious account of grace, there are good, heuristic reasons for loosely associating the
two. The basic relationship between the empirical and intelligible character is one of
ground and consequence. The activity of the intelligible self determines the actions of the
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sensible self.489 We cannot access the working of the intelligible world, nor stake any sort
of knowledge claim regarding how the power of choice is exercised. We only know that
freedom must reside in the intelligible world and that that exercise of freedom determines
the imputable actions we take in the empirical world. From the perspective of our
empirical selves, then, it may seem to some that the source of moral improvement must
be some outside source (since there is a metaphysical gulf between the intelligible and the
sensible worlds). We are somewhat in a position, as empirical beings, of discovering
through our (empirically) chosen actions the nature of our intelligible use of freedom.
Importantly, also, there does not seem to be any way in which Kant can allow for
empirical self to determine the nature of the intelligible self. The intelligible self must be
the ground of the empirical self.
It is important to emphasize, though, that this line of reasoning does not imply a
kind of pious quietude about moral improvement. Kant is adamant in claiming that the
surest sign of an intelligible switch from evil to good is a long and steady movement from
immorality to morality, from lawless actions to lawful ones. A “genuine disposition
toward improvement” and not mere “self-proclaimed confessions of faith” is the
authentic mark of a morally improved human being.490 Given the rigid, absolute
489

“The true activity of reason and its effect belong to the intelligible world (mundo intelligibili).
Hence we do not know to what degree we should impute. Nevertheless we know that the
influencing power of reason is not determined and necessitated by any phenomena, rather that it
is free, and (in the case of imputation) we judge the action merely in accordance with rational
laws. The actions here in the world are mere Schemata of the intelligible [actions]; yet these
appearances (this world already signifies “schema”) are still interconnected in accordance with
empirical laws, even if one regards reason itself, in accordance with its expressions, as a
phaenomenon (of the character). But what the cause of this may be we do not discover in
phaenomenis” (Notes on metaphysics 18:254).
490
Rel. 6:77.
210

distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal, one may well press Kant on his
account of moral improvement. In what sense can the notion of moral improvement be
intelligible so long as the authentic ground for free actions is in a self of whom we have
no direct experience? In the next section, I consider two possible concerns that can be
raised against Kant on the issue of moral improvement.
VIII. Two Possible Objections to Kant’s Account of Moral Improvement
Kant’s account of moral improvement, I would argue, may be open to at least two
possible objections. The first centers on Kant’s rather strict and narrow conception of
moral goodness; the second centers on the possibility of intelligible change. I will deal
briefly with each objection. I will argue that the first objection can be met, but not
without first accepting a paradoxical feature of Kant’s account of moral improvement. I
will then argue that the second objection may seem more serious, but can also be met. I
will end by arguing that the second objection brings out a logical consequence of basic
features of Kant’s metaphysics.
Is ‘Bad to Better’ Any Different from ‘Bad to Bad’?
In the Religion, Kant is clearly committed to the position that human beings
express earnest devotion to the moral law through a whole life of moral toil in which they
gradually diminish their immoral acts. After describing the person who engages in a
lifelong struggle to be good, in which finds “himself upon the good (though narrow) path
of constant progress from bad to better,” Kant writes, “For him who penetrates to the
intelligible ground of the heart (the ground of all the maxims of the power of choice), for
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him to whom this endless progress is a unity, i.e. for God, this is the same as actually
being a good human being (pleasing to him)…”491 Human beings, in contrast to God,
must see our actions as temporally organized, which involves a continuous stream of
actions that gets progressively closer to moral goodness, but perhaps without ever fully
arriving there: “For the judgment of human beings, however, who can assess themselves
and the strength of their maxims only by the upper hand they gain over the senses in time,
the change is to be regarded only as an ever-continuing striving for the better, hence as a
gradual reformation of the propensity to evil, of the perverted attitude of mind.”492 The
image seems to be that if a person begins life in a state of frequent violation of the moral
law and, over time, they diminish the frequency of their immoral actions (through this
constant struggle desire to act out of respect for the moral law), then they will have
improved morally over the course of his or her life.
It is not clear, though, how seeing a human’s life as a unity moving from less
lawfulness to more lawfulness alone is sufficient to show authentic moral improvement at
all. If (1) the sole determination of the moral worth of a human being is whether or not
self-love is privileged over morality, and (2) the person ends up in a situation where they
are still occasionally violating the moral law or are acting from mixed motives, then it
follows that the person was evil in the beginning of the progression and he or she remains
evil at the end of it. If this is correct, then it leads to the paradoxical claim that an evil
human being can, at the same time, be a good human being (insofar as he or she has
improved).
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There is, perhaps, a response that one could make on Kant’s behalf here. Perhaps
the paradox of a person being evil and good is not as contradictory as it may initially
seem because there is a precise sense in which both can be true of the same person.
Consider the question: What is the volitional structure of a person who has undergone
moral improvement? We can imagine a person who, in previous times (but no longer),
would satisfy an inclination to superiority and brag about past accomplishments in an
attempt to make others feel inferior. The person used to act on the inclination, and
perhaps the inclination is still present as a potential source of psychological satisfaction,
but now the person reins in the inclination and refrains from bragging out of respect for
others (which the moral law requires). We can further imagine this very same person,
shortly after refraining from bragging about past accomplishments now telling a selfserving lie motivated, say, by an inclination to vanity. The person, therefore, remains
evil, even though there has been moral improvement with regard to the inclination to
superiority. So, while the inclination to superiority (one expression of the desire for
happiness) has been brought into a proper relation with the moral law, the inclination to
vanity (another expression of the desire for happiness) as not. The supreme maxim upon
which the person acts must therefore be evil. It would take the form (partially and
roughly) of the following: “When an inclination to superiority arises in me, I will restrain
it and not allow for it to deviate from my moral duty, but when an inclination to vanity
arises in me I will forego my moral duty not to lie.” This is certainly better, in a sense,
than a supreme maxim that would privilege both superiority complexes and vanity, but it
seems odd to call such a person morally good.
213

Imagine, though, that motivating influence of this inclination to vanity is itself
diminished over time. Say this tendency generalizes over all one’s inclinations. One acts
more and more out of respect for the moral law at the end of the temporal sequence than
at the beginning. This does in fact seem to resemble the kind of reforming tendency that
Kant described in the Religion.
Is Intelligible Improvement Coherent?
One may ask a further question here: What does this tell us about the nature of the
intelligible choice one has made? If the progression is in fact a moral one, then it follows
that the way in which the intelligible choice was exercised had to have changed. If one
previously engaged in self-aggrandizement at the expense of others’ self-image, then the
intelligible choice must be the ultimate source of the action. So, if a person who
previously was immoral in that regard, but is no longer, the change must be explained in
terms of the exercise of one’s intelligible power of choice. Whereas the person’s choice
was previously exercised in a way to lead to bad moral outcomes in the presence of that
inclination, it now must be exercised in a different way. That is, there had to have been
moral improvement in the intelligible power of choice itself. How, though, is the notion
of moral conversion or improvement in the intelligible world possibly coherent? In a note
I had quoted earlier, Kant writes, “In the intelligible world nothing happens and nothing
changes, and there the rule of causal connection disappears.”493 If nothing changes in the
intelligible world, then how can an evil person change at all? Appearances, among which
are actions in which we either fail or succeed in carrying out our duty, are simply the
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effects of the real actions of reasons, which are not found in appearances, but rather in the
intelligible world.494 It seems that the very notion of “change” cannot apply to the
intelligible world without obscuring the distinction between the empirical and intelligible
worlds.
While the problem of intelligible change may, at first, seem problematic for Kant,
there is, perhaps, a way to respond to the charge. One could argue, on Kant’s behalf here,
that the possibility of moral improvement does not lead to problems for Kant’s overall
picture because there is nothing problematic in asserting that the intelligible subject’s
choice can actually undergo change. In defending the possibility of noumenal change,
one can evoke Kant’s principle of the primacy of practical reason. If our use of practical
reasoning requires us to posit the possibility of change in the noumenal self, then we are
not at fault for doing so. Kant lays out his notion of the primacy of practical reason in the
second Critique in “On the Primacy of Pure Practical Reason In Its Connection With
Speculative Reason.”495 There, Kant writes, “[I]n the union of pure speculative with pure
practical reason in one cognition, the latter has primacy, assuming that this union is not
contingent and discretionary but based on reason itself and therefore necessary.”496 The
idea seems to be that if pure practical reason derives a claim from necessary principles
(i.e. principles upon which the faculty of practical reason rests), then, so long as the claim
is consistent with, theoretical reason (i.e. it is not in open contradiction with theoretical
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reason), speculative reason must allow the claim to hold. In a paper on the topic,
Sebastian Gardner describes Kant’s principle of the primacy of practical reason as
follows: “To assert the primacy of practical reason with respect to speculative reason is,
therefore, to assert that propositions on which the interest of practical reason depends
necessarily, so long as they are not contradicted by theoretical reason, must be accepted
by theoretical reason.”497 In the case of noumenal change, then, if it can be shown that the
need to posit the possibility of noumenal change rests on basic, necessary principles of
pure practical reason, then we can allow for it, so long as it does not contradict the claims
of theoretical reason.
First, then, let us examine what principles we can trace that inform and necessitate
the need to allow for the possibility of noumenal change. I would argue that the
possibility of noumenal change is an inescapable result of accepting two basic features of
Kant’s moral philosophy: (1) The universal validity of the fact of reason and (2) The
principle of ‘ought implies can.’ Since both (1) and (2) are taken by Kant to be necessary,
then we are compelled to accept (3) The possibility of noumenal change. As we saw
earlier, Kant describes the ‘fact of reason’ in the following way: “Consciousness of this
fundamental law may be called a fact of reason because one cannot reason it out from
antecedent data of reason, for example, from consciousness of freedom (since this is not
antecedently given to us) and because it instead forces itself upon us of itself as a
synthetic a priori proposition that is not based on any intuition, either pure or
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empirical…”498 The fact of reason is how we come to know that morality’s requirements
apply to us. Morality applies to equally to those who have well-ordered wills and those
who lack well-ordered wills. It follows, then, that those who currently have a will that
prioritizes self-love over morality are morally obligated to reorder their priorities and
incorporate the moral law as the supreme ground of all their actions. Where there is a
moral obligation, there must also be the capacity to fulfill one’s obligation. That is, ought
implies can. Kant regularly invokes the principle that ‘ought implies can.’ See, for
instance, in the second Critique, where Kant writes, “He judges, therefore, that he can do
something because he is aware that he ought to do it and cognizes freedom within him,
which, without the moral law, would have remained unknown to him.”499 Here Kant is
claiming that knowing one ought do something is sufficient to know that one can do
something. If an evil person has a moral obligation to become good and moral
improvement must ultimately be grounded in a change in how noumenal choice is
exercised, then noumenal change must be possible.
IX: The Propensity to Evil
Kant holds that there is a propensity to evil in all human beings. With such a
claim, it might seem that Kant is veering toward a kind of moral fatalism that dooms all
of humanity to lives of immorality without real hope of moral improvement. In
discussing this propensity to evil, Kant writes, “[W]e may presuppose evil as subjectively
necessary in every human being, even the best.”500 In light of statements such as this, it
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becomes understandable to be concerned about a creeping moral pessimism in the
Religion and to worry about how such a bleak picture can be consistent with Kant’s other
substantive ethical claims about human freedom and dignity. In what follows I will
provide a close reading the section of the Religion where Kant discusses the propensity to
evil. I will argue that, first appearances notwithstanding, Kant’s claims about the
propensity to evil are consistent with his broader moral philosophy.
Before delving into the minutiae of Kant’s discussion of the propensity to evil, it
makes good sense to reiterate briefly some basic features of Kant’s theory of moral
accountability. Doing so will provide basic interpretive guidelines that will need to
inform any account of the propensity to evil. That is, if Kant’s account of the propensity
to evil is to be consistent with his overall moral philosophy, it would need to be in
accordance with his more central claims about the nature of moral accountability and
moral worth. Any defense of Kant’s discussion of the propensity to evil in the Religion,
therefore, must show that the discussion does indeed square with the more substantive
and central features of his moral philosophy.
A person is morally accountable only for actions that result from freely chosen
maxims. If we are to assign moral approbation or disapprobation to a person, then we are
assuming that his or her actions were freely chosen. Moral goodness (or evil) is expressed
through one’s freely chosen maxims, the principle of volition that underlies our actions:
“Hence the ground of evil cannot lie in any object determining the power of choice
through inclination, not in any natural impulses, but only in a rule that the power of
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choice itself produces for the exercise of its freedom, i.e., in a maxim.”501 The crucial
idea, then, is that, underlying the actual carrying out of a deed, there is some maxim upon
which the deed is based. Furthermore, the adoption of that maxim itself must be
predicated on some exercise of free choice to take on that maxim in the first place. Kant
refers to this choice as the “supreme ground of the human being’s freedom.” When
explaining the idea that human beings are evil by nature, Kant writes, “[L]et it be noted
that by “the nature of a human being” we only understand here the subjective ground—
wherever it may lie—of the exercise of the human being’s freedom in general (under
objective moral laws) antecedent to every deed that falls within the scope of the
senses.”502 Kant’s account of the propensity to moral evil, then, should be consistent with
this more general account of moral responsibility.
The Propensity to Evil, Defined
Kant first defines propensity in the following manner: “By propensity (propensio)
I understand the subjective ground of the possibility of an inclination (habitual desire,
concupiscentia), insofar as this possibility is contingent for humanity in general.”503 A
propensity, on this rendering, is the thing that makes us susceptible to particular
inclinations. In a note on this passage Kant adds, “Propensity is actually only the
predisposition to desire an enjoyment which, when the subject has experienced it, arouses
inclination to it.”504 A person can have a propensity to something without actually
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desiring it. Kant’s racist example of “savages” with a propensity for “intoxicants”
indicates that, on Kant’s view, a propensity can exist without an accompanying desire in
cases where the person has no concept of the object that would satisfy the merely
potential inclination.505
Kant’s discussion of propensity, though, becomes a bit confused in the very next
sentence. He writes, “It [propensity] is distinguished from a predisposition in that a
propensity can indeed be innate yet may be represented as not being such: it can rather be
thought of (if it is good) as acquired, or (if evil) as brought by the human being upon
himself.”506 In the previously quoted note, Kant seems to be claiming that a propensity is
a predisposition. Here, Kant is distinguishing between a propensity and a predisposition,
claiming that a propensity, unlike a predisposition, can be represented as not being innate.
Kant alleviates some of this confusion a bit later in the Religion. After laying out
the three “grades” of this natural propensity to evil, Kant provides a useful expansion of
his notion of a propensity: “Every propensity is either physical, i.e. it pertains to a
human’s power of choice as natural being or moral, i.e. it pertains to a human’s power of
choice as a moral being.”507 Kant then insists that “In the first sense [the physical sense]
there is no propensity to moral evil, for the latter must originate from freedom; a physical
propensity (one based on sensory inducements) to whatever use of freedom, be it for
good or evil, is a contradiction.”508 Physical propensities are morally neutral for the same
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reason we refrain from rendering moral judgments onto a ferocious lion that kills a
human being. There cannot be moral responsibility without an accompanying capacity of
choice to guide whether or not a being (whether it be a human or another kind of animal)
will act to satisfy an inclination. Kant then concludes, “Hence a propensity to evil can
only attach to the moral faculty of choice. Nothing is, however, morally (i.e. imputably)
evil but that which is our own deed.”509
Kant then enters into a confusing discussion about the two meanings of the word
“deed.” While it might, on a first look, appear insignificant, I would argue that it is
crucial in coming to an understanding of Kant’s concept of propensity to evil. Kant gets
into his discussion of the term “deed” by noting that “the concept of a propensity is
understood a subjective determining ground of the power of choice that precedes every
deed, and hence is itself not a deed.”510 If a propensity is not itself a deed, but rather the
determining ground of the power of choice, and, as Kant claims, only deeds are morally
(or imputably) evil, then it would seem to follow that the propensity to evil would not
itself be evil. Kant, though, explicitly states that the propensity to evil is itself evil:
“[T]his propensity must itself be considered morally evil, hence not a natural
predisposition but something that a human being can be held accountable for…”511 Kant
recognizes this potential inconsistency, and provides an illuminating (for understanding
his position) discussion of the two possible senses of the word “deed.” He begins by
writing, “There would then be a contradiction in the concept of a simple propensity to
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evil, if this expression could not somehow be taken in two different meanings, both
nevertheless reconcilable to the concept of freedom.”512 Both “meanings” of deed must
be “reconcilable” to freedom because deeds, if they are to carry any moral content (if can
be said to be good or evil) must be imputable, and therefore must be grounded in the free
exercise of the power of choice.
Kant introduces the dual meaning of the phrase “deed” with the following long
sentence: “Now, the term “deed” can in general apply just as well to the use of freedom
through which the supreme maxim (either in favor of, or against, the law) is adopted in
the power of choice, as to the use by which the actions themselves (materially considered,
i.e. as regards the objects of the power of choice) are performed in accordance with that
maxim.”513 Kant here is distinguishing between two kinds of imputable actions (or
deeds). On the one hand, we have ordinary, observable actions to which we attach moral
significance. We may observe someone performing a perfect duty, e.g. telling the truth
even when it seems to be against their immediate self-interest to do so. On the evil side,
we may witness a person treating another person with contempt by ridiculing them. Both
these observable actions are deeds insofar as we can impute those actions to the moral
agent. On the other hand, we have the freely chosen of a supreme maxim, which consists,
in Kant’s starkest rendering of the choice, as the prioritizing of self-love over the moral
law (or vice versa) as the overriding principle of volition. An evil supreme maxim
privileges self-love over morality such that whenever there is a clash between the
demands of morality and the pleadings of self-love, the agent will formulate his or her
512
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lower level maxims in a way that is consistent with the principle of self-love. This,
ultimately, will lead to deeds in the other sense that will be at odds with one’s duty. The
propensity to evil is not a deed in the sense of observable actions, but rather in the sense
of the choosing of a supreme maxim. Kant writes, “The propensity to evil is a deed in the
first meaning (peccatum originarium), and at the same time the formal ground of every
deed contrary to law according to the second meaning, [i.e. of a deed] that resists the law
materially and is then called vice (peccatum derivatium).”514 Both sorts of deeds carry
moral significance, but the propensity to evil is based on a deed that cannot be directly
observed: “The former [the sense of deed involving the propensity to evil] is an
intelligible deed, cognizable through reason alone apart from any temporal condition; the
latter [the sense of deed involving actions in the phenomenal world] is sensible,
empirical, given in time (factum phenomenon).”515
While these two senses of the term “deed” are conceptually distinguishable, it is
important to note that there is a relationship that must exist between them. One cannot
commit morally good deeds in the phenomenal world without having committed the
supreme good deed in the noumenal world. At best, one can hope for deeds that are in
conformity with the law, but not grounded in respect for the law. Similarly, one cannot
commit misdeeds in the phenomenal world if one has made the morally correct choice in
the noumenal world. If the supreme maxim one adopts is to privilege morality over self-
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love as the foundational point of one’s particular maxims, then one will never knowingly
violate the moral law.516
The propensity to evil, then, seems to be nothing other than an intelligible deed in
which we exercise our free power of choice in a way that prioritizes self-love over the
moral law. This intelligible deed informs our adoption of “supreme maxim” the basic
volitional structure with which we formulate more particular maxims in the phenomenal
world and then act upon.517 Such a deed can rightly be thought of as a propensity because
it precedes the adoption of particular maxims and instead instills in us, prior to our
actions in the phenomenal world, the freely adopted framework within which we act.
Like other kinds of propensities, then, the propensity to evil makes us susceptible to
experience certain inclinations. In the case of the propensity to evil, these inclinations, if
acted upon, would lead us to misdeeds in the second, material sense of “deed.”
A formal proof for the universal propensity to evil?
Kant declares that one can presuppose that this propensity to evil is present in
every human being. In explaining what he means in claiming that humans are evil by
516
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nature, he writes, ““He is evil by nature” simply means that being evil applies to him
considered in his species…”518 Insofar as an individual is a member of the human
species, the property of “being evil” can apply to him or her. Kant goes on to assert, “we
may suppose evil as subjectively necessary in every human being, even the best.”519 With
such a wide-ranging claim, Kant seems to anticipate a demand for a formal proof, an
argument that will support the universality and necessity claimed in his statement that
human being, by a sort of subjective necessity, possesses a propensity to evil. The
universalistic and apparent a priori character of Kant’s terminology here has led several
commentators to argue that Kant is indeed making an argument that is grounded in a
priori reasoning, and not merely empirical observation. In reviewing some of Kant’s
language, David Sussman writes, “Such claims do not appear to be merely empirical
generalizations based on the ubiquity of human vice.”520 Sussman then, on the basis of
this claim, constructs an argument from necessity that purports to show that “there is a
basis of human evil that is simultaneously a necessary feature of human agency and a
kind of active resistance to morality that each of us freely and continuously engages
in.”521 Similarly, in his paper entitled “An Alternative Proof to the Universal Propensity
to Evil,” Pablo Muchnik claims that Kant does indeed provide a “transcendental” proof
for the universal propensity to evil, which he draws out in his paper, that, in Muchnik’s
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words, “goes a long way to justify the subjective necessity, universality, and a priori
character of the propensity to evil…”522
Kant, at least at first, does not attempt to provide a formal argument for the
universality of the propensity to evil. He goes on to write, “We can spare ourselves the
formal proof that there must be such a corrupt propensity rooted in the human being, in
view of the multitude of woeful examples that the experience of human deeds parades
before us.”523 Kant then describes a series of evil deeds that different people exhibit in
various parts of the world. He begins by describing “scenes of unprovoked cruelty in the
ritual murders of Tofoa, New Zealand, and the Navigator Islands, and the never-ending
cruelty…in the wide wastes of northwestern America…”524 Kant also discusses the kind
of evil one would encounter in places where human beings exist in a more “civilized state
(where its predispositions can be more fully developed).”525 Here, too, Kant contends
that, if we look to human beings in the more “civilized” condition, “we must then hear
out a long melancholy litany of charges against humankind.”526 The evil we might
encounter here would be more subtle, but equally indicative of a propensity to evil as one
would find elsewhere. Some of the evil deeds that prevail in more developed locations
include: “secret falsity even in the most intimate friendship, so that restraint on trust in
the mutual confidence of even the best friends is reckoned a universal maxim of prudence
522
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in social dealings; of a propensity to hate him to whom we are indebted, to which a
benefactor must always heed; of a hearty goodwill that nonetheless admits the remark
that “in the misfortune of our best friends there is something that does not altogether
displease us”; and of many other vices yet hidden under the appearance of virtue, let
alone those of which no secret is made, for to us someone already counts as good when
his evil is common is common to a class.”527
There are at least two aspects of Kant’s strategy here that are worth noting. First,
the evidence Kant upon which Kant relies is all drawn from experience. That is, Kant
mentions different sorts of evil deeds that are based on actual deeds that one can
encounter in experience, either through direct observation or through psychological
prodding into one’s (or others’) motives. Second, Kant seems to suggest that, whether we
admit it or not, we all already believe it to be the case that there exists a universal
propensity to evil. Why else, Kant asks, would we deem it wise not to trust other people,
even one’s best friend? The only possible response, Kant seems to suggest, is to say that
we do not believe that human beings are trustworthy, no matter how well we may think
we know someone.
Kant’s discussion of the universality of evil in human beings has generated
critical commentary. Some recent scholarship, as noted above, has attempted to provide a
formal proof where one seems to lack in Kant’s own work. I would argue, though, that
Kant is not making especially robust claims to universality and necessity, as it may seem
in these passages from the Religion. Further, I argue that more basic elements of Kant’s
527
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moral philosophy actually preclude us from attaching necessity, though not universality,
to all human beings. I will argue for this by showing what Kant cannot possibly be
claiming in those earlier-quoted passages. I will then show that Kant’s broader account of
moral evil does not require an a priori justification. Finally, I will provide my
understanding of the reach and scope of moral evil in Kant’s discussion, arguing that,
problems of clarity notwithstanding, Kant’s discussion of radical evil is not at odds with
the basic features of Kant’s account of moral responsibility.
Whatever else Kant’s account of moral evil is claiming, it cannot possibly claim
that human beings, when engaged in evil actions, cannot have acted otherwise. Crucial to
Kant’s moral philosophy is the idea that moral (or immoral) actions are imputable to the
agent engaged in them. If, though, an agent does something that he or she is morally
responsible for, then the cause of that action is his or her exercise of free choice at the
noumenal level. An action is free only when there is the possibility that the agent could
have acted otherwise; denying this would be a clear violation of the ‘ought implies can’
principle that Kant clearly holds. If all people are in fact evil, then it must mean that
everyone has made a free, noumenal choice that accounts for the privileging of self-love
over morality in the phenomenal world. Crucially, in each and every case of an immoral
person, it must be true that he or she was free to order his or her will otherwise; namely,
he or she could have privileged morality over self-love. Kant, therefore, cannot be
claiming that all people are necessarily evil. That would imply that a good will (one with
the proper volitional structure) is unachievable. If Kant is indeed making a claim of
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necessity, it would have to be one consistent with the view that immoral agents could
have acted otherwise.
Even so, one might argue, Kant does in fact claim that human beings are evil by
necessity. The particular passage to which one might refer in order to make this point
clear is the following: “[A]ccording to the cognition we have of the human being through
experience, he cannot be judged otherwise [i.e. as moral], in other words, we may
presuppose evil as subjectively necessary in every human being, even the best.”528 This, it
seems, is the most emphatic claim to necessity that Kant makes about moral evil in
human beings. Here, we should examine carefully how the word “necessary” is operating
in the sentence. The phrase that Kant uses is “subjectively necessary,” but, importantly in
my view, it appears in the sentence as a paraphrase of a preceding clause, namely
“according to the cognition we have of the human being through experience, he cannot be
judged otherwise.”529 The judgment that “all human beings are evil” rests, we can clearly
read here, on the “cognition we have of the human being through experience.”530 In other
words, by virtue of the fact that we regularly witness, in ourselves and in others, immoral
acts, dispositions, or attitudes, we cannot help but presuppose, in any particular human
being, the propensity to evil (or an evil will). This experience-based claim is the context
for Kant’s discussion one paragraph later of the particular kinds of evils one may
encounter when we observe the evil that happens in the world. It is subjectively
necessary, for us, to view human beings as evil just as it is subjectively necessary for us
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to view rocks as solids or ravens as black. This subjective kind of necessity is wholly
consistent with the view that immoral human beings could in fact become moral.
With Kant’s claim to necessity explicated, we can now turn to his claim that all
human beings are in fact evil. The second troubling (perhaps more troubling) claim
embedded in Kant’s discussion of moral evil is that “even the best” human being can be
presupposed as being evil. If even the best human being is evil, then what rational hope
can anyone have of attaining true virtue? Importantly, as I’ve stressed above, Kant’s
claim cannot be that it is impossible for the human beings to be morally good. It is
certainly possible that there will one day be a human being who does indeed achieve a
good will, even if it has not yet occurred. In claiming that “even the best” human being
can be presupposed to be evil, Kant is perhaps being a bit unclear. Kant clearly has not
profiled all the likely candidates for the designation “morally good,” so his claim cannot
justifiably be making any definitive statements about the absence or limited presence of
moral goodness in the world. Furthermore, Kant, according to his own account of the
metaphysics of freedom, would not be able to determine definitively whether or not
someone truly possesses a good will (the ultimate ground for our free choices are not
accessible through inner or outer sense).
So what sense can be made out Kant’s claim here? Kant, it seems, could be
making one of two different claims in writing that even the best human being possesses a
propensity to evil. First, Kant could be asserting that even good people (truly good people
with a good will) possess the propensity to evil because they have inclinations that, if
acted upon, would cause them to violate the moral law. Surely it is a reasonable
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generalization to claim that all human beings have such inclinations because of our
sensuous nature, which subjects us to inclinations toward happiness and, perhaps at
times, against the moral law. Kant writes that human beings are “dependent on the
incentives of his sensuous nature” which, if taken into our supreme volitional maxim as
“themselves sufficient for the determination of his power of choice, without minding the
moral law,” we “would then become morally evil.”531 This might seem like a promising
way to interpret Kant, but I would argue that it is an incorrect approach. Such a reading
would contradict Kant’s considered view of the propensity to evil, which I above argued
is an intelligible deed that prioritizes self-love over the moral law. Morally good people,
though, are good only insofar as they have not made this intelligible choice.
Fortunately, there is a second possible interpretation of Kant that preserves his
considered view of the propensity to evil (though perhaps betrays a bit of sloppiness in
the writing of this passage). On this reading, Kant is hypothesizing that every living
person, even the person who comes closest to conforming to the requirements of the
moral law, has actually prioritized, in one way or another, self-love over morality. This
would be the culmination of the kind of empirical generalizing that Kant does in the
subsequent passage in the Religion. While, for reasons stated above, Kant is not really
entitled to make such a wide-ranging claim, it is not an especially important claim for his
broader account of moral evil. If there is actually someone, or some set of people, who
have good wills, then Kant would simply have to adjust his more somber observations to
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accommodate the new information. This adjustment, though, would not cause his claims
about moral imputation, moral evil, or freedom any difficulties.
Conclusion: The Intractability of Crisis
Given Kant’s unflinching and negative assessment of human beings as they are, it
is especially interesting to examine Kant’s remarks about the nature and possibility of
moral improvement. In the Religion, when Kant turns directly to the prospect of moral
improvement in evil people, he expresses a kind of perplexity regarding its very
possibility: “How is it possible that a naturally evil human being should make himself
into a good human being surpasses every concept of ours. For how can an evil tree bear
good fruit?”532 Kant is not calling into doubt evil human beings’ capacity to improve
morally, but rather is claiming that we have difficulty tracing such a change with
concepts. Since we can have no cognition of us as noumenal agents, and therefore have
no theoretical access to the noumenal choice itself, there will always be something
inexplicable and mysterious about human freedom at its very root. He claims that the
“fall from good into evil…is no more comprehensible than the ascent from evil back to
good…”533 Even if we cannot conceptually represent moral improvement (i.e. the change
from a propensity to evil to a good will), we can recognize that the moral law applies to
us, and, therefore, we must be capable of virtue: “[T]he command that we ought to
become better human beings still resounds unabated in our souls; consequently, we must
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also be capable of it…”534 The ground for individual and collective moral should not, for
Kant, be based on sentimental wishful thinking, nor on an inaccurately rosy picture of the
real moral state of humanity, but rather on the findings in Kant’s critical philosophy,
especially, I would contend, by experiencing directly the force of the moral law (through
the fact of reason) and deriving its implications: the dignity and freedom of human
beings.
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